By Robert Phillips  
Deputy District Attorney (ret.)  

Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause 

A criminal case dismissed due to insufficient evidence to convict may not be refiled under the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause. A case dismissed in the interest of justice may be refiled. The latter is presumed absent “clear evidence” to the contrary. 

In a case more of interest to prosecutors and defense attorneys than law enforcement officers (but necessarily important to all), an interesting issue was discussed by California’s Sixth District Court of Appeal in a case from Santa Clara County’s Superior Court. The issue dealt with when a previously dismissed case is subject to refiling despite the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause (applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause; see Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784, 794. See also see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.).  

The case is People v. Superior Court [Woodward] (Mar. 14, 2024), Cal.App.5th [2024 Cal.App. LEXIS 176].  

Background 

The problem arose after defendant John Kevin Woodward on Sept. 5, 1992, in Mountain View, Santa Clara County, strangled to death his roommate’s girlfriend, Laurie Houts. In an obviously weak case, two trials resulted in hung juries, each leaning toward acquittal, 8 to 4 and 7 to 5, respectively. 

After the second trial, at a hearing on Aug. 6, 1996, the judge dismissed the case orally on the record, as reflected in the written transcript, as well as in a written “minute order” (generally referring to the written entry of a court’s ruling into the minutes), and a separate, signed written order. 

Penal Code §1385(a) was cited by the trial court judge as the statutory authority for dismissal. Subdivision (a) of that section, as it read both before and after it was amended in 2014, lists “in furtherance of justice” as the legal grounds for a dismissal. All three documents (the judge’s transcribed statements, the minute order, and the court’s written order), however, reflected the judge’s intention to dismiss the case both “in furtherance of justice” and due to the “insufficiency of the evidence (to convict) as a matter of law.” Either way, the case was dead – or at least, so it appeared – and Woodward thought he was in the clear.  

Case Discussion 

However, after all this occurred, along came the advent of DNA. Due to the prosecution developing more evidence via DNA of Woodward’s personal participation in Houts’ murder, the case was refiled again in 2022. Woodward cried foul, citing the double jeopardy clause. The trial judge agreed and again dismissed the case against him. The prosecution sought a petition for writ of mandate, asking the Sixth District Court of Appeal to reverse the trial court’s dismissal. The Sixth District agreed with the prosecution, providing an extensive explanation of the law of double jeopardy, i.e., when it applies, and when it does not.  

In this case, the court, agreeing with the prosecution, held that it did not. That’s because there is a difference between “a dismissal for insufficient evidence as a matter of law to obtain a conviction” and “a dismissal in furtherance of justice.” While a dismissal because there is “insufficient evidence as a matter of law” invokes the double jeopardy rule, a dismissal “in furtherance of justice” does not. A dismissal of a criminal case pursuant to P.C. §1385 could be either, depending upon the intent of the trial judge as that intent is reflected in the appellate record.  

As noted by the court: “(U)nless the record (from the trial court) clearly indicates the (trial) court applied the substantial evidence standard in deciding the evidence was legally insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, ‘we (the appellate court) will assume the (trial) court did not intend to dismiss for legal insufficiency and foreclose re-prosecution.’” (Italics added)  

In discussing this issue, the Sixth District Court noted that, “the record must show that the (appellate) court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt...‘Absent such a showing, (the court) will assume the (trial) court did not intend to dismiss for legal insufficiency...’ ” (Italics added)  

The trial court in Woodward’s situation, while dismissing the case, confused the issue by making statements that seemed to include both reasons: that a dismissal of the case was due to the “insufficiency of the evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” and that dismissal was warranted “in the interest of justice.” This ambiguity, the appellate court held, did not require them to find that double jeopardy applied. To the contrary, it required the appellate court to assume the case was dismissed in the interest of justice only, thus allowing it to be filed again. 

California’s Supreme Court previously dealt with this issue in People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260. California’s high court held in Hatch that, “neither the (trial) trial court’s identification of insufficient evidence as the reason for the 1996 dismissal order, nor the (trial) court’s analysis of various ‘interest of justice’ factors relevant to a section 1385 dismissal, is determinative unless the record demonstrates the court intended to exercise its power to acquit.” (Italics added)  

“While the trial court has the power to dismiss for insufficient evidence as a matter of law pursuant to section 1385, the reviewing court ‘will not construe its dismissal as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes absent clear evidence the court intended to exercise this power.’” (Hatch, supra, at p. 271.)  

The Sixth District in Woodward ultimately held in its March 14, 2024, ruling that the record in this case did not “unambiguously” show that the trial court intended to dismiss the case for insufficiency of the evidence to convict. As such, double jeopardy did not apply. 

So, Woodward could now face a third trial in Houts’ slaying, though he could appeal the appellate decision to the California Supreme Court. 

What it Means in Practice 

Obviously, therefore, criminal trial attorneys (prosecution and defense) need to make sure a trial court judge is clear as to his or her reasons for dismissing a criminal case. Is the evidence as presented to the court “legally insufficient to warrant a conviction” (invoking the double jeopardy clause), or is it being dismissed merely “in the interest of justice” (seeking fairness to all involved)? This determination makes an obvious difference should the prosecution later attempt to give it one more shot.