Trespass Statutes

RC Phillips, DDA, Ret.
October, 2021

§ 602. Trespasses; What acts included; Punishment

Except as provided in subdivision (u), subdivision (v), subdivision (x), and Section 602.8, every person who willfully commits a trespass by any of the following acts is guilty of a misdemeanor:

(a)  Cutting down, destroying, or injuring any kind of wood or timber standing or growing upon the lands of another.

(b)  Carrying away any kind of wood or timber lying on those lands.

(c)  Maliciously injuring or severing from the freehold of another anything attached to it, or its produce.

(d)  Digging, taking, or carrying away from any lot situated within the limits of any incorporated city, without the license of the owner or legal occupant, any earth, soil, or stone.

(e)  Digging, taking, or carrying away from land in any city or town laid down on the map or plan of the city, or otherwise recognized or established as a street, alley, avenue, or park, without the license of the proper authorities, any earth, soil, or stone.

(f)  Maliciously tearing down, damaging, mutilating, or destroying any sign, signboard, or notice placed upon, or affixed to, any property belonging to the state, or to any city, county, city and county, town or village, or upon any property of any person, by the state or by an automobile association, which sign, signboard, or notice is intended to indicate or designate a road or a highway, or is intended to direct travelers from one point to another, or relates to fires, fire control, or any other matter involving the protection of the property, or putting up, affixing, fastening, printing, or painting upon any property belonging to the state, or to any city, county, town, or village, or dedicated to the public, or upon any property of any person, without license from the owner, any notice, advertisement, or designation of, or any name for any commodity, whether for sale or otherwise, or any picture, sign, or device intended to call attention to it.

(g)  Entering upon any lands owned by any other person whereon oysters or other shellfish are planted or growing; or injuring, gathering, or carrying away any oysters or other shellfish planted, growing, or on any of those lands, whether covered by water or not, without the license of the owner or legal occupant; or damaging, destroying, or removing, or causing to be removed, damaged, or destroyed, any stakes, marks, fences, or signs intended to designate the boundaries and limits of any of those lands.

(h) 

(1)  Entering upon lands or buildings owned by any other person without the license of the owner or legal occupant, where signs forbidding trespass are displayed, and whereon cattle, goats, pigs, sheep, fowl, or any other animal is being raised, bred, fed, or held for the purpose of food for human consumption; or injuring, gathering, or carrying away any animal being housed on any of those lands, without the license of the owner or legal occupant; or damaging, destroying, or removing, or causing to be removed, damaged, or destroyed, any stakes, marks, fences, or signs intended to designate the boundaries and limits of any of those lands.

(2)  In order for there to be a violation of this subdivision, the trespass signs under paragraph (1) must be displayed at intervals not less than three per mile along all exterior boundaries and at all roads and trails entering the land.

(3)  This subdivision shall not be construed to preclude prosecution or punishment under any other provision of law, including, but not limited to, grand theft or any provision that provides for a greater penalty or longer term of imprisonment.

(i)  Willfully opening, tearing down, or otherwise destroying any fence on the enclosed land of another, or opening any gate, bar, or fence of another and willfully leaving it open without the written permission of the owner, or maliciously tearing down, mutilating, or destroying any sign, signboard, or other notice forbidding shooting on private property.

(j)  Building fires upon any lands owned by another where signs forbidding trespass are displayed at intervals not greater than one mile along the exterior boundaries and at all roads and trails entering the lands, without first having obtained written permission from the owner of the lands or the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession.

(k)  Entering any lands, whether unenclosed or enclosed by fence, for the purpose of injuring any property or property rights or with the intention of interfering with, obstructing, or injuring any lawful business or occupation carried on by the owner of the land, the owner's agent, or by the person in lawful possession.

(l)  Entering any lands under cultivation or enclosed by fence, belonging to, or occupied by, another, or entering upon uncultivated or unenclosed lands where signs forbidding trespass are displayed at intervals not less than three to the mile along all exterior boundaries and at all roads and trails entering the lands without the written permission of the owner of the land, the owner's agent, or of the person in lawful possession, and

(1)  Refusing or failing to leave the lands immediately upon being requested by the owner of the land, the owner's agent or by the person in lawful possession to leave the lands, or

(2)  Tearing down, mutilating, or destroying any sign, signboard, or notice forbidding trespass or hunting on the lands, or

(3)  Removing, injuring, unlocking, or tampering with any lock on any gate on or leading into the lands, or

(4)  Discharging any firearm.

(m)  Entering and occupying real property or structures of any kind without the consent of the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession.

(n)  Driving any vehicle, as defined in Section 670 of the Vehicle Code, upon real property belonging to, or lawfully occupied by, another and known not to be open to the general public, without the consent of the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession. This subdivision shall not apply to any person described in Section 22350 of the Business and Professions Code who is making a lawful service of process, provided that upon exiting the vehicle, the person proceeds immediately to attempt the service of process, and leaves immediately upon completing the service of process or upon the request of the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession.

(o)  Refusing or failing to leave land, real property, or structures belonging to or lawfully occupied by another and not open to the general public, upon being requested to leave by (1) a peace officer at the request of the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession, and upon being informed by the peace officer that he or she is acting at the request of the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession, or (2) the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession. The owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession shall make a separate request to the peace officer on each occasion when the peace officer's assistance in dealing with a trespass is requested. However, a single request for a peace officer's assistance may be made to cover a limited period of time not to exceed 30 days and identified by specific dates, during which there is a fire hazard or the owner, owner's agent, or person in lawful possession is absent from the premises or property. In addition, a single request for a peace officer's assistance may be made for a period not to exceed six months when the premises or property is closed to the public and posted as being closed. However, this subdivision shall not be applicable to persons engaged in lawful labor union activities which are permitted to be carried out on the property by the Alatorre-Zenovich-Dunlap-Berman Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 (Part 3.5 (commencing with Section 1140) of Division 2 of the Labor Code) or by the National Labor Relations Act. For purposes of this section, land, real property, or structures owned or operated by any housing authority for tenants as defined under Section 34213.5 of the Health and Safety Code constitutes property not open to the general public; however, this subdivision shall not apply to persons on the premises who are engaging in activities protected by the California or United States Constitution, or to persons who are on the premises at the request of a resident or management and who are not loitering or otherwise suspected of violating or actually violating any law or ordinance.

(p)  Entering upon any lands declared closed to entry as provided in Section 4256 of the Public Resources Code, if the closed areas shall have been posted with notices declaring the closure, at intervals not greater than one mile along the exterior boundaries or along roads and trails passing through the lands.

(q)  Refusing or failing to leave a public building of a public agency during those hours of the day or night when the building is regularly closed to the public upon being requested to do so by a regularly employed guard, watchperson, or custodian of the public agency owning or maintaining the building or property, if the surrounding circumstances would indicate to a reasonable person that the person has no apparent lawful business to pursue.

(r)  Knowingly skiing in an area or on a ski trail which is closed to the public and which has signs posted indicating the closure.

(s)  Refusing or failing to leave a hotel or motel, where he or she has obtained accommodations and has refused to pay for those accommodations, upon request of the proprietor or manager, and the occupancy is exempt, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1940 of the Civil Code, from Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1940) of Title 5 of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code. For purposes of this subdivision, occupancy at a hotel or motel for a continuous period of 30 days or less shall, in the absence of a written agreement to the contrary, or other written evidence of a periodic tenancy of indefinite duration, be exempt from Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1940) of Title 5 of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code.

(t) 

(1)  Entering upon private property, including contiguous land, real property, or structures thereon belonging to the same owner, whether or not generally open to the public, after having been informed by a peace officer at the request of the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession, and upon being informed by the peace officer that he or she is acting at the request of the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession, that the property is not open to the particular person; or refusing or failing to leave the property upon being asked to leave the property in the manner provided in this subdivision.

(2)  This subdivision shall apply only to a person who has been convicted of a crime committed upon the particular private property.

(3)  A single notification or request to the person as set forth above shall be valid and enforceable under this subdivision unless and until rescinded by the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession of the property.

(4)  Where the person has been convicted of a violent felony, as described in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, this subdivision shall apply without time limitation. Where the person has been convicted of any other felony, this subdivision shall apply for no more than five years from the date of conviction. Where the person has been convicted of a misdemeanor, this subdivision shall apply for no more than two years from the date of conviction. Where the person was convicted for an infraction pursuant to Section 490.1, this subdivision shall apply for no more than one year from the date of conviction. This subdivision shall not apply to convictions for any other infraction.

(u) 

(1)  Knowingly entering, by an unauthorized person, upon any airport operations area, passenger vessel terminal, or public transit facility if the area has been posted with notices restricting access to authorized personnel only and the postings occur not greater than every 150 feet along the exterior boundary, to the extent, in the case of a passenger vessel terminal, as defined in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3), that the exterior boundary extends shoreside. To the extent that the exterior boundary of a passenger vessel terminal operations area extends waterside, this prohibition shall apply if notices have been posted in a manner consistent with the requirements for the shoreside exterior boundary, or in any other manner approved by the captain of the port.

(2)  Any person convicted of a violation of paragraph (1) shall be punished as follows:

(A)  By a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100).

(B)  By imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding six months, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, if the person refuses to leave the airport or passenger vessel terminal after being requested to leave by a peace officer or authorized personnel.

(C)  By imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding six months, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, for a second or subsequent offense.

(3)  As used in this subdivision, the following definitions shall control:

(A)  "Airport operations area" means that part of the airport used by aircraft for landing, taking off, surface maneuvering, loading and unloading, refueling, parking, or maintenance, where aircraft support vehicles and facilities exist, and which is not for public use or public vehicular traffic.

(B)  "Passenger vessel terminal" means only that portion of a harbor or port facility, as described in Section 105.105(a)(2) of Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations, with a secured area that regularly serves scheduled commuter or passenger operations. For the purposes of this section, "passenger vessel terminal" does not include any area designated a public access area pursuant to Section 105.106 of Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

(C)  "Public transit facility" has the same meaning as specified in Section 171.7.

(D)  "Authorized personnel" means any person who has a valid airport identification card issued by the airport operator or has a valid airline identification card recognized by the airport operator, or any person not in possession of an airport or airline identification card who is being escorted for legitimate purposes by a person with an airport or airline identification card. "Authorized personnel" also means any person who has a valid port identification card issued by the harbor operator, or who has a valid company identification card issued by a commercial maritime enterprise recognized by the harbor operator, or any other person who is being escorted for legitimate purposes by a person with a valid port or qualifying company identification card. "Authorized personnel" also means any person who has a valid public transit employee identification.

(E)  "Airport" means any facility whose function is to support commercial aviation.

(v) 

(1)  Except as permitted by federal law, intentionally avoiding submission to the screening and inspection of one's person and accessible property in accordance with the procedures being applied to control access when entering or reentering a sterile area of an airport, passenger vessel terminal, as defined in Section 171.5, or public transit facility, as defined in subdivision (u), if the sterile area is posted with a statement providing reasonable notice that prosecution may result from a trespass described in this subdivision, is a violation of this subdivision, punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for the first offense. A second and subsequent violation is a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a period of not more than one year, or by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.

(2)  Notwithstanding paragraph (1), if a first violation of this subdivision is responsible for the evacuation of an airport terminal, passenger vessel terminal, or public transit facility and is responsible in any part for delays or cancellations of scheduled flights or departures, it is punishable by imprisonment of not more than one year in a county jail.

(w)  Refusing or failing to leave a battered women's shelter at any time after being requested to leave by a managing authority of the shelter.

(1)  A person who is convicted of violating this subdivision shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year.

(2)  The court may order a defendant who is convicted of violating this subdivision to make restitution to a battered woman in an amount equal to the relocation expenses of the battered woman and her children if those expenses are incurred as a result of trespass by the defendant at a battered women's shelter.

(x) 

(1)  Knowingly entering or remaining in a neonatal unit, maternity ward, or birthing center located in a hospital or clinic without lawful business to pursue therein, if the area has been posted so as to give reasonable notice restricting access to those with lawful business to pursue therein and the surrounding circumstances would indicate to a reasonable person that he or she has no lawful business to pursue therein. Reasonable notice is that which would give actual notice to a reasonable person, and is posted, at a minimum, at each entrance into the area.

(2)  Any person convicted of a violation of paragraph (1) shall be punished as follows:

(A)  As an infraction, by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100).

(B)  By imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, if the person refuses to leave the posted area after being requested to leave by a peace officer or other authorized person.

(C)  By imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, for a second or subsequent offense.

(D)  If probation is granted or the execution or imposition of sentencing is suspended for any person convicted under this subdivision, it shall be a condition of probation that the person participate in counseling, as designated by the court, unless the court finds good cause not to impose this requirement. The court shall require the person to pay for this counseling, if ordered, unless good cause not to pay is shown.

(y)  Except as permitted by federal law, intentionally avoiding submission to the screening and inspection of one's person and accessible property in accordance with the procedures being applied to control access when entering or reentering a courthouse or a city, county, city and county, or state building if entrances to the courthouse or the city, county, city and county, or state building have been posted with a statement providing reasonable notice that prosecution may result from a trespass described in this subdivision.

History

Enacted Stats 1872. Amended Code Amdts 1873-74 ch 614 § 36; Code Amdts 1877-78 ch 467 § 1; Stats 1905 ch 526 § 1; Stats 1917 ch 208 § 1; Stats 1927 ch 726 § 1; Stats 1929 ch 687 § 1; Stats 1931 ch 693 § 1; Stats 1941 ch 578 § 1; Stats 1945 ch 403 § 1; Stats 1947 ch 647 § 1; Stats 1949 ch 1333 § 1; Stats 1957 ch 2013 § 1; Stats 1963 ch 1299 § 1; Stats 1967 ch 1187 § 4; Stats 1969 ch 43 § 1; Stats 1970 ch 1607 § 1, ch 1608 § 1; Stats 1977 ch 870 § 1; Stats 1978 ch 1392 § 1; Stats 1981 ch 349 § 1; Stats 1982 ch 312 § 12, effective June 28, 1982; Stats 1983 ch 199 § 1; Stats 1985 ch 1181 § 1, effective September 29, 1985; Stats 1988 ch 140 § 2, ch 1024 § 1; Stats 1989 ch 870 § 1; Stats 1990 ch 424 § 1 (AB 3147); Stats 1993 ch 583 § 7 (AB 284), ch 589 § 115 (AB 2211) (ch 793 prevails), ch 793 § 3.5 (AB 504); Stats 1994 ch 680 § 2 (SB 2088); Stats 2000 ch 149 § 1 (AB 1787); Stats 2002 ch 608 § 2 (SB 510), effective September 17, 2002; Stats 2003 ch 355 § 1 (AB 936), ch 361 § 1 (AB 1263), ch 805 § 1.3 (SB 993); Stats 2005 ch 289 § 2 (AB 280), ch 378 § 3 (SB 584), effective January 1, 2006; Stats 2010 ch 531 § 1 (AB 668), effective January 1, 2011, ch 675 § 2.5 (AB 2324), effective January 1, 2011; Stats 2011 ch 296 § 207 (AB 1023), effective January 1, 2012.

Historical Derivation: 
(a) Crimes and Punishment Act § 138 (Stats 1850 ch 99 § 138).
(b) Stats 1862 ch 273 § 1.
(c) Stats 1863 ch 467 § 1.
(d) Stats 1863-64 ch 147 §§ 1, 2.
(e) Stats 1865-66 ch 536 § 6.

Annotations

Notes

Amendments: 

1873-74 Amendment: 

Substituted subd (2) for former subd (2) which read: "2. Carrying away any kind of wood or timber that has been cut down and is lying on such lands; or,".

1877-78 Amendment: 

Added subd 7 to read: "7. Entering upon any lands owned by any other person or persons whereon oysters or other shell fish are planted or growing; or injuring, gathering, or carrying away any oysters or other shell fish planted, growing, or being on any such lands, whether covered by water or not, without the license of the owner or legal occupant thereof; or destroying or removing, or causing to be removed or destroyed, any stakes, marks, fences, or signs intended to designate the boundaries and limits of any such lands, is guilty of a misdemeanor."

1905 Amendment: 

(1) Substituted "land in any city or town" for "any land in any of the cities of the State" in subd 5; (2) added subd 8 to read: "8. Willfully opening, tearing down, or otherwise destroying any fence on the inclosed land of another, or opening any gate, bar, or fence of another and willfully leaving it open without the permission of the owner, or maliciously tearing down, mutilating, or destroying any sign, signboard, or other notice forbidding shooting on private property; or"; and (3) added subd 9 to read: "9. Entering any inclosure belonging to, or occupied by, another for the purpose of hunting, shooting, killing, or destroying any kind of game within such inclosure, without having first obtained permission from the owner of such inclosure."

1917 Amendment: 

Amended the section to read: "Every person who wilfully commits any trespass by either:

"(a) Cutting down, destroying, or injuring any kind of wood or timber standing or growing upon the lands of another;

"(b) Carrying away any kind of wood or timber lying on such lands;

"(c) Maliciously injuring or severing from the freehold of another anything attached thereto, or the produce thereof;

"(d) Digging, taking, or carrying away from any lot situated within the limits of any incorporated city, without the license of the owner or legal occupant thereof, any earth, soil, or stone;

"(e) Digging, taking, or carrying away from land in any city or town, laid down on the map or plan of such city, or otherwise recognized or established as a street, alley, avenue, or park, without the license of the proper authorities, any earth, soil or stone;

"(f) Maliciously tearing down, damaging, mutilating or destroying any sign, signboard or notice placed upon, or affixed to, any property belonging to the state, or to any city, county, city and county, town or village, by the state or by an automobile association, which sign, signboard or notice in intended to indicate or designate a road or roads, or a highway or highways, or is intended to direct travelers from one point to another; or putting up, affixing, fastening, printing, or painting upon any property belonging to the state, or to any city, county, town, or village, or dedicated to the public, or upon any property of any person, without license from the owner, any notice, advertisement, or designation of, or any name for any commodity, whether for sale or otherwise, or any picture, sign, or device intended to call attention thereto;

"(g) Entering upon any lands owned by any other person whereon oysters or other shellfish are planted or growing; or injuring, gathering, or carrying away any oysters or other shellfish planted, growing, or being on any such lands, whether covered by water or not, without the license of the owner or legal occupant thereof; or destroying or removing, or causing to be removed or destroyed, any stakes, marks, fences, or signs intended to designate the boundaries and limits of any such lands;

"(h) Wilfully opening, tearing down, or otherwise destroying any fence on the inclosed land of another, or opening any gate, bar, or fence of another and wilfully leaving it open without the permission of the owner, or maliciously tearing down, mutilating, or destroying any sign, signboard, or other notice forbidding shooting on private property; or

"(i) Entering any inclosure belonging to, or occupied by another, for the purpose of hunting, shooting, killing, or destroying any kind of game within such inclosure, without having first obtained permission from the owner of such inclosure;

"Is guilty of a misdemeanor."

1927 Amendment: 

(1) Added subd (i) to read: "(i) Building fires upon any lands owned by another where signs forbidding trespass are displayed at intervals not greater than one-third mile along the exterior boundaries or along roads and trails passing through such lands, without first having obtained permission of the owner of such lands or his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof; or."; and (2) redesignated former subd (i) to be subd (j).

1929 Amendment: 

(1) Amended subd (i) to read: "(i) Building fires upon any lands owned by another where signs forbidding trespass are displayed at intervals not greater than one-third mile along the exterior boundaries and at all roads and trails entering such lands, without first having obtained written permission from the owner of such lands or his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof"; and (2) amended subd (j) to read: "(j) Entering any lands belonging to or occupied by another where signs forbidding trespass are displayed at intervals not less than three to the mile along all exterior boundaries and at all roads and trails entering such lands, for the purpose of hunting, shooting, killing or destroying any animal or bird on such lands, without having first obtained written permission from the owner of such lands, or his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof."

1931 Amendment: 

(1) Amending subd (f) to read as at present except for the 1949 and 1977 Amendments; and (2) amended subd (j) to read: "(j) Entering any lands under cultivation or enclosed by fence, belonging to, or occupied by, another; or entering upon uncultivated or unenclosed lands where signs forbidding trespass are displayed at intervals not less than three to the mile along all exterior boundaries and at all roads and trails entering such lands, for the purpose of hunting, shooting, killing, or destroying any animal, or bird on such lands, without having first obtained written permission from the owner of such lands, or his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof."

1941 Amendment: 

(1) Substituted "land in any city or town laid down on" for "and lot situated within the limits of" in subd (e); (2) redesignated former subd (j) to be subd (k); and (3) added a new subd (j).

1945 Amendment: 

Added subd (l).

1947 Amendment: 

(1) Substituted "one" for "one-third" before "mile along the exterior boundaries" in subd (i); and (2) added subd (m).

1949 Amendment: 

Added "or upon any property of any person" after "town or village" in subd (f).

1957 Amendment: 

Added subd (n).

1963 Amendment: 

Added subd (o).

1967 Amendment: 

(1) Amended subd (k) by (a) deleting "for the purpose of hunting, shooting, killing, or destroying any animal," after "entering such lands"; (b) substituting "the" for "having first obtained" before "written permission"; and (c) substituting "of" for "from" after "written permission"; (2) substituted "and" for "thereof;" at the end of subd (k); (3) added subds (k)(1)-(k)(4); (4) deleted former subd (n) which read: "(n) Entering any privately owned lands described in paragraph (k) without the written permission of the owner of such land, his agent or of the person in lawful possession, and (1) Discharging any firearm, or (2) Refusing or failing to leave such lands immediately upon being requested by the owner of such land, his agent or by the person in lawful possession to leave such lands, or (3) Tearing down, mutilating or destroying any sign, signboard or notice forbidding entry on such lands, or (4) Removing, injuring, unlocking, or tampering with any lock or any gate on or leading into such lands;" and (5) redesignated former subd (o) to be subd (n).

1969 Amendment: 

Substituted "4256" for "4126.5" in subd (o).

1970 Amendment: 

(1) Substituted "a" for "any" after "commits" in the introductory clause; (2) substituted "any of the following acts is guilty of a misdemeanor" for "either" in the introductory clause; (3) substituted periods for "; or" at the end of subds (h)-(j); (4) substituted ", or" for a semicolon after "lands" in subd (k)(3); (5) added subds (m) and (n); (6) redesignated former subds (m) and (n) to be subds (o) and (p); and (7) deleted "; is guilty of a misdemeanor" at the end of the section.

1977 Amendment: 

(1) Substituted the periods for semicolons at the end of subds (a)-(g); and (2) added subd (g).

1978 Amendment: 

Added (1) the comma after "another" near the beginning of subd (k); and (2) "(1)" and all that part following "lawful possession thereof" the first time it appears in subd (n).

1981 Amendment: 

Added subd (r).

1982 Amendment: 

Added ", and the occupancy is exempt, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1940 of the Civil Code, from Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1940) of Title 5 of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code" at the end of subd (r).

1983 Amendment: 

In addition to making technical changes, substituted (1) ", or a highway" for "or roads, or a highway or highways" after "designate a road" in subd (f); and (2) subd (n) for former subd (n) which read: "(n) Refusing or failing to leave land, real property, or structures belonging to or lawfully occupied by another and not open to the general public, upon being requested to leave by (1) a peace officer and the owner, his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof, or (2) the owner, his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof; provided, however, that clause (2) of this subdivision shall not be applicable to persons engaged in lawful labor union activities which are permitted to be carried out on the property by the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, Part 3.5 (commencing with Section 1140) of Division 2 of the Labor Code, or by the National Labor Relations Act."

1985 Amendment: 

Added subd (s).

1988 Amendment: 

Added the last sentence of subd (n). (As amended Stats 1988, ch 1024, compared to the section as it read prior to 1988. This section was also amended by an earlier chapter, ch 140. See Gov C § 9605.)

1989 Amendment: 

(1) Added "Notwithstanding Section 602.8," at the beginning of the section; (2) substituted "California or United States Constitution" for "State or Federal Constitution" in the last sentence of subd (n); and (3) substituted "person" for "man" after "reasonable" in subd (p).

1990 Amendment: 

Added subd (t).

1993 Amendment: 

(1) Substituted "Except as provided in" for "Notwithstanding" at the beginning of the section; (2) amended subd (m) by adding (a) the commas after "belonging to" and after "another and" in the first sentence; and (b) the second sentence; and (3) added subd (u). (As amended Stats 1993 ch 793, compared to the section as it read prior to 1993. This section was also amended by an earlier chapter, ch 583. See Gov C § 9605.)

1994 Amendment: 

Added the second sentence of subd (r).

2000 Amendment: 

Added ", provided that upon exiting the vehicle, the person proceeds immediately to attempt the service of process, and leaves immediately upon completing the service of process or upon the request of the owner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession" in the second sentence of subd (m).

2002 Amendment: 

(1) Substituted "of those" for "such" wherever it appears in subd (g); (2) substituted "would" for "are such as to" after "the surrounding circumstances" in subd (p); and (3) added "or authorized personnel" at the end of subd (t)(2)(B).

2003 Amendment: 

(1) Added "paragraph (2) of subdivision (v), subdivision (x), and" in the introductory clause; (2) amended subd (g) by substituting (a) "; or damaging, destroying, or" for "; or destroying"; and (b) "to be removed, damaged," for "to be removed"; and (3) added subds (h), (v), and (x) and amended existing subdivision designations in the text to conform thereto.

2005 Amendment: 

(1) Amended the first sentence of subd (u)(1) by adding (a) "or passenger vessel terminal" after "upon any airport"; and (b) ", to the extent, in the case of a passenger vessel terminal, as defined in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3), that the exterior boundary extends shoreside" at the end; (2) added the last sentence in subd (u)(1); (3) substituted "leave the airport or passenger vessel terminal" for "leave the airport operations area" in subd (u)(2)(B); (4) added subd (u)(3)(B); (5) redesignated former subds (u)(3)(B) and (u)(3)(C) to be subds (u)(3)(C) and (u)(3)(D); (6) added the second sentence in subd (u)(3)(C); (7) added "or passenger vessel terminal" after "airport" in the last sentence of subd (v)(1); (8) amended subd (v)(2) by adding (a) "or passenger vessel terminal" after "airport terminal" and (b) "or departures" after "scheduled flights"; and (9) added subd (y). (As amended Stats 2005 ch 378, compared to the section as it read prior to 2005. This section was also amended by an earlier chapter, ch 289. See Gov C §9605.)

2010 Amendment: 

(1) Substituted "subdivision (u)," for "paragraph (2) of" in the introductory clause; (2) amended subd (t) by (a) adding subdivision designations (t)(1)-(t)(3); (b) substituting "crime" for "violent felony, as specified in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5," in subd (t)(2); and (c) adding subd (t)(4); (3) substituted "operations area, passenger vessel terminal, or public transit facility" for "or passenger vessel terminal operations area" in the first sentence of subd (u)(1); (4) amended subds (u)(2)(B) and (u)(2)(C) by substituting (a) "a" for "the" after "imprisonment in"; and (b) "by both that fine and imprisonment" for "both"; (5) amended subd (u)(3) by (a) adding subd (u)(3)(C); (b) redesignating former subds (u)(3)(C) and (u)(3)(D) to be subds (u)(3)(D) and (u)(3)(E); and (c) adding the last sentence of subd (u)(3)(D); (6) amended the first sentence of subd (v)(1) by (a) substituting the comma for "or" after "an airport"; and (b) adding ", or public transit facility, as defined in subdivision (u), if the sterile area is posted with a statement providing reasonable notice that prosecution may result from a trespass described in this subdivision, is a violation of this subdivision, punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for the first offense"; (7) added the second sentence of subd (v)(1); (8) amended subd (v)(2) by (a) substituting "Notwithstanding paragraph (1), if a first violation of this subdivision" for "a violation of this subdivision that"; (b) substituting "passenger vessel terminal, or public transit facility" for "or passenger vessel terminal"; (c) adding ", it" after "or departures"; and (d) deleting "if the sterile area is posted with a statement providing reasonable notice that prosecution may result from a trespass described in this subdivision" at the end; and (9) substituted "by both that fine and imprisonment" for "both" in subds (x)(2)(B) and (x)(2)(C). (As amended Stats 2010 ch 675, compared to the section as it read prior to 2010. This section was also amended by an earlier chapter, ch 531. See Gov C § 9605.)

2011 Amendment: 

(1) Amended subd (f) by (a) adding the comma after "which sign, signboard"; and (b) deleting the comma after "designate a road"; (2) added the commas after "the owner's agent" in subd (k) and the first paragraph of subd (l); (3) added the comma after "owner, owner's agent" in the third sentence of subd (o); (4) amended the fifth sentence of subd (o) by substituting (a) "Alatorre-Zenovich-Dunlap-Berman Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975" for "California Agricultural Labor Relations Act,"; and (b) the closing parenthesis for the comma after "the Labor Code"; (5) substituted "watchperson," for "watchman" in subd (q); and (6) added the comma after "this subdivision" in the introductory clause of subd (u)(3).

Note 

Stats 2003 ch 805 provides:

SEC. 3. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.

Case Notes
 1. Generally
 2. Constitutionality
 3. Construction
 4. Trespass to Real Property
 5. Miscellaneous Acts Constituting Offenses
 6. Acts Not Constituting Offense
 7. Prosecutions
 8. Sentencing Enhancements

 1. Generally

The purpose of this section is to protect trees and timber on private land. Swall v. Anderson (1943, Cal App) 60 Cal App 2d 825, 141 P2d 912, 1943 Cal App LEXIS 591.

Declaratory relief would not issue nullifying subsection (l) and (n) of this section, in action brought by native American Indians seeking declaration of their right to enter surplus government property adjoining certain military property to express grievances over dispossession of California Indians from their tribal lands. Knight v. Anderson (1973, 9th Cir Cal) 480 F2d 8, 1973 US App LEXIS 9774.

Pen C § 602, subd. (n), which defines one variety of trespass as a refusal to leave after request by the property owner and a peace officer, was intended to encourage a property owner to summon the authorities in order to avoid the violent confrontations that might occur in the absence of a peace officer. People v. Medrano (1978, Cal App 3d Dist) 78 Cal App 3d 198, 144 Cal Rptr 217, 1978 Cal App LEXIS 1297

In an action for malicious prosecution against defendant who had filed a misdemeanor complaint against plaintiff for violation of the statute against disturbing the peace (Pen C § 415) as the result of plaintiff's alleged wrongful conduct in refusing to leave the premises of the corporation of which defendant was the executive director after defendant requested that he do so, there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had acted with malice and without probable cause, even though the jury found for plaintiff on defendant's cross-complaint against him for trespass, where there was no evidence in the record that defendant did anything more than truthfully recount his observations to the police and prosecutor. Gomez v. Garcia (1980, Cal App 2d Dist) 112 Cal App 3d 392, 169 Cal Rptr 350, 1980 Cal App LEXIS 2462.

Under the test for determining whether an ordinance is invalid as having been preempted by state law, a county ordinance proscribing the driving of a motor vehicle over another's land without permission was not invalid despite the prior enactment of Pen C § 602, subd. (m), the statute that makes it a misdemeanor trespass to drive any vehicle, as defined by Veh C § 670, subd. (m), on "real property belonging to or lawfully occupied by another and known not to be open to the general public, without the consent of the owner, his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof." The subject dealt with by the ordinance was not so completely covered by general law as to indicate the subject had become exclusively a matter of state concern. Pen C § 602, subd. (m), did not address the problem of trespass on wide, open, remote, unfenced, unprotected, unposted desert lands, the precise problem covered by the ordinance. Moreover, the subject dealt with by the ordinance was not one that was partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly a paramount state concern would not tolerate further or additional local action or that was of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighed the possible benefit to the municipality. The ordinance dealt with a trespass problem unique to those counties covering the California desert--not a matter of paramount state concern, and the burden on nonresidents was minimal. Sports Committee Dist. 37 A.M.A., Inc. v. County of San Bernardino (1980, Cal App 4th Dist) 113 Cal App 3d 155, 169 Cal Rptr 652, 1980 Cal App LEXIS 2530.

Habeas corpus was an appropriate remedy to review the contention by union representatives that Pen C § 602, subd. (k)(1), criminal trespass, did not prohibit their conduct in entering and refusing to leave a construction site to inspect safety conditions and prepare a shop steward's report, where the representatives were convicted of criminal trespass under the statute and sentenced to pay a $100 fine or serve time in the county jail, and where there was no material dispute as to facts relating to the conviction. The union representatives were under sufficient custodial restraint to permit them to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. In re Catalano (1981) 29 Cal 3d 1, 171 Cal Rptr 667, 623 P2d 228, 1981 Cal LEXIS 127.

Conviction for vandalism was proper after defendant caused more than $15,000 in damage to his wife's house and belongings. The court distinguished vandalism from burglary and trespass, crimes that could not be committed against one's own home. People v. Wallace (2004, Cal App 5th Dist) 123 Cal App 4th 144, 19 Cal Rptr 3d 790, 2004 Cal App LEXIS 1736, review denied, (2005) 2005 Cal. LEXIS 957.

 2. Constitutionality

The statute on trespass in a public building (Pen C § 602, subd (n), formerly subd (o)) was enforceable, and its enforcement did not entrench upon any activity constitutionally protected (U. S. Const., First Amend.) or constitute a trap for the unwary, where, even though on a prior occasion public officials had desisted from enforcement of the statute when defendant had remained in a public building beyond closing hours until he secured a promise of certain action on the part of certain county officials in connection with his work, defendant was requested by the proper officials to leave the same building after closing hours after his demand for a similar promise of action was denied by the officials involved, and he refused to leave the building without exacting the promise. Parrish v. Municipal Court for Modesto Judicial Dist. (1968, Cal App 5th Dist) 258 Cal App 2d 497, 65 Cal Rptr 862, 1968 Cal App LEXIS 2437.

Defendant's conviction under Pen C § 602, subd. (j) of willfully and unlawfully entering land with the intention of interfering with lawful business carried on by the owner by setting up a table in a passenger tram unloading area of the Disneyland parking lot for the purpose of gathering signatures and soliciting for an antipollution initiative did not constitute an unconstitutional abridgment of his First Amendment rights, where there was substantial evidence that defendant's activities did, in fact, interfere with the business being conducted on the property. There is no concept of constitutional law giving people who want to propagandize protests or views a right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please. In re Ball (1972, Cal App 4th Dist) 23 Cal App 3d 380, 100 Cal Rptr 189, 1972 Cal App LEXIS 1218.

On habeas corpus by one convicted under Pen C § 602, subd. (j) of wilfully and unlawfully entering land with the intention of interfering with the lawful business carried on by the owner, petitioner could not successfully raise a claim of unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth of the statute on the basis of a clause therein referring to entry for the purpose of injuring "property rights." The allegedly unconstitutional clause and the clause under which petitioner was charged and convicted on substantial evidence are separated by the disjunctive "or" and are thus severable. A person cannot be convicted of an offense not charged, and, it is presumed, under Evid. Code, § 664, that official duty has been regularly performed. In re Ball (1972, Cal App 4th Dist) 23 Cal App 3d 380, 100 Cal Rptr 189, 1972 Cal App LEXIS 1218.

 3. Construction

The paramount purpose of subd (c) is to prescribe a penalty for any trespass by which the freehold of another is maliciously injured in any of the ways expressly pointed out by said subdivision, or by any act within the contemplation of the language. Hogan v. Superior Court of California (1911, Cal App) 16 Cal App 783, 117 P 947, 1911 Cal App LEXIS 232.

In construing subd (j) as it appeared in 1931, the subdivision should be read as a whole in the light of the acts sought to be prohibited, and the use of a semicolon after the word "another" is not controlling where it leads to an absurd interpretation and goes outside of the offenses sought to be prohibited. In re Application of Davis (1936, Cal App) 18 Cal App 2d 291, 63 P2d 853, 1936 Cal App LEXIS 208.

Sections 552-555.5, excepting lawful activities of labor union members from prohibition against trespassing on certain posted industrial properties, must be read together with subd (1), which is also subject to labor activity exception when unposted property of type designated in posting law is entered. In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal 2d 666, 36 Cal Rptr 286, 388 P2d 182, 1964 Cal LEXIS 276, 10 ALR3d 840.

Pen C § 602, subd. (j), prohibiting entering of any land with intention of interfering with lawful business carried on by owner or person in possession of such land, applies to urban land occupied by building which public is entitled to enter. , People v. Brown (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 915, 47 Cal Rptr 662, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 891, superseded by statute as stated in In re Lundgren (1987, Cal App 4th Dist) 189 Cal App 3d 381, 234 Cal Rptr 110, 236 Cal Rptr 307, 1987 Cal App LEXIS 1374.

Offenses encompassed by Pen C § 602, subd (o), failure to leave public building after closing time, and § 409, unlawful assembly, are separate and distinct offenses, and where university students conducted "sit-in" in university building after being requested to leave at closing time prior to being arrested, punishments prescribed for their failure to leave and their unlawful assembly are not same as punishment prescribed for resisting arrest. In re Bacon (1966, Cal App 1st Dist) 240 Cal App 2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr 322, 1966 Cal App LEXIS 1313.

Reasonable interpretation of Pen C § 602, subd (o), making it misdemeanor for person to wilfully trespass by refusing or failing to leave a public building of public agency during hours building is regularly closed after request to leave, does not require that each person inside building be personally requested to leave; blanket request over public address system suffices, particularly where all trespassers hear request to leave at once. In re Bacon (1966, Cal App 1st Dist) 240 Cal App 2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr 322, 1966 Cal App LEXIS 1313

Under Pen C § 602, subd (o), making it misdemeanor to refuse or fail to leave public building of public agency during hours building is regularly closed after public agency's custodian requests departure, term "custodian" means one in charge of building at time; request by university's chancellor and police officer that students leave university building constituted substantial compliance with statute. In re Bacon (1966, Cal App 1st Dist) 240 Cal App 2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr 322, 1966 Cal App LEXIS 1313.

Pen C § 602, subd (o), is simply trespass law intended to preserve security of public buildings during hours when they are regularly closed against individuals who remain without lawful purpose; section clearly sets forth type of conduct forbidden, specifically describes nature of required warning to leave, and is sufficiently definite so that person of ordinary understanding would know when he is violating it. In re Bacon (1966, Cal App 1st Dist) 240 Cal App 2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr 322, 1966 Cal App LEXIS 1313

In Pen C § 602 subd (l), the word "occupy" was intended to mean a nontransient, continuous type of possession, and to commit a trespass under the statute, some degree of dispossession and permanency must be intended.People v. Wilkinson (1967, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 248 Cal App 2d Supp 906, 56 Cal Rptr 261, 1967 Cal App LEXIS 1703.

A trespass statute (Pen C § 602, subd. (n), refusal to leave private property), was unconstitutional as applied to farm labor organizers who refused to leave a farm labor camp after a request by both the operator and sheriff's deputies, where the purpose of the entrants was communication with employee-tenants concerning an election to be held the following day. The incident occurred at a time during which the Agricultural Labor Relations Board was enjoined from enforcing a regulation assuring organizer access to employer property, and the organizers had been given notice on a Saturday of the election, which was to be held the following day (Sunday)People v. Medrano (1978, Cal App 3d Dist) 78 Cal App 3d 198, 144 Cal Rptr 217, 1978 Cal App LEXIS 1297

A municipal ordinance prohibiting entry of a fenced area of airport grounds without express written consent, violation of which defendant was convicted, was not preempted by Pen C § 602, subd. (t), since the municipal code dealt with access to any fenced or enclosed and posted area of the airport, while the state law dealt only with trespass in areas of airport "operations." The subject of airport access was thus obviously not fully and completely covered by the general law. Moreover, there was nothing in the general law to indicate that a paramount state concern would not tolerate additional local action, nor was the subject such that the adverse effects of the municipal ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighed the benefit to the municipality. The different posting requirements of the ordinance and the statute did not conflict, as they applied to different areas of the airport. Similarly, the different punishments prescribed by the state and municipality applied to trespasses upon different areas of the airport. In any event, a city is free to devise a penalty it deems appropriate to the seriousness of the problems addressed by the ordinance. Trespass has long been an area in which local units have legislated, and such an area may involve special local problems of facilities and geography with which a state legislature could cope only with difficulty. Batiste v. Superior Court (1992, Cal App 2d Dist) 4 Cal App 4th 460, 5 Cal Rptr 2d 694, 1992 Cal App LEXIS 307, review denied, (1992, Cal) 1992 Cal LEXIS 2825.

H & S C § 11362.5(d)'s grant of limited immunity from prosecution does not operate, as does that of Ins C § 12924(b), for reasons extrinsic to the criminality of the underlying conduct. Rather, it operates, in the manner of Pen C § 602(n), to render noncriminal certain conduct that otherwise would be criminal. People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal 4th 457, 122 Cal Rptr 2d 326, 49 P3d 1067, 2002 Cal LEXIS 4520.

 4. Trespass to Real Property

A discharged employee, who was engaged in securing his personal belongings from the premises of the employer, after a request for permission to do so which was not refused, was not a trespasser within the meaning of subd (j). People v. Corlett (1944, Cal App) 67 Cal App 2d 33, 153 P2d 595, 1944 Cal App LEXIS 1271, reh'g denied, (1944, Cal App) 67 Cal App 2d 33, 153 P2d 964

Prosecutions for entering bank premises in urban area with intention to interfere with or obstruct bank's business were properly brought under Pen C § 602, subd (j). People v. Brown (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 915, 47 Cal Rptr 662, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 891, superseded by statute as stated in In re Lundgren (1987, Cal App 4th Dist) 189 Cal App 3d 381, 234 Cal Rptr 110, 236 Cal Rptr 307, 1987 Cal App LEXIS 1374.

Convictions of trespass by entering bank with intention of interfering with or obstructing bank's business (Pen C § 602, subd (j)) were supported by evidence that three defendants entered bank, engaged in various transactions at counters, such as coin changing and coin counting, for period of approximately two hours for general purpose of protesting hiring practices of bank, and, by such conduct, made it necessary for some of customers to be served by tellers reaching over, around and between demonstrators, and by testimony of one defendant that he intended to injure bank and cause it to lose business. People v. Brown (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 915, 47 Cal Rptr 662, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 891, superseded by statute as stated in In re Lundgren (1987, Cal App 4th Dist) 189 Cal App 3d 381, 234 Cal Rptr 110, 236 Cal Rptr 307, 1987 Cal App LEXIS 1374.

Convictions of wilful disobedience of court order and of trespass by entering bank with intention of interfering with or obstructing bank's business (Pen C § 602, subd (j)) were supported by evidence that defendants were members of group protesting bank's hiring practices and that, in violation of restraining order personally served on each defendant prior to arrest, they joined other demonstrators in standing in entrance to bank for at least 10 minutes before they were arrested, and by one defendant's testimony that he made deposit and withdrawal at branches of bank on day of his arrest as protest against bank's discriminatory hiring practices. People v. Von Blum (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 922, 47 Cal Rptr 666, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 892.

Convictions of wilful disobedience of court order and of trespass by entering bank with intention of interfering with or obstructing bank's business (Pen C § 602, subd (j)) were supported by evidence where defendant was shown to have been standing at one time at lobby entrance doorway of bank and at another time in doorway leading to bank's lobby, where films showed that defendant interfered with or obstructed bank's course of business, and where defendant was arrested on bank's premises five minutes after being served with copy of court order restraining defendant from trespassing on bank's property and after advice from bank officer that he had been served with order and was in violation of it by remaining on bank's premises.People v. Brindley (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 925, 47 Cal Rptr 668, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 893.

Conviction of trespass by entering bank with intention of interfering with or obstructing bank's business (Pen C § 602, subd (j)) was not supported by evidence where it appeared that defendant was briefly in and near doorway of bank and that she was inside building at time of her arrest but where there was lack of evidence as to her connection with group of persons who were demonstrating about bank and no evidence as to her participation in any improper activities on bank premises.People v. Brindley (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 925, 47 Cal Rptr 668, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 893.

A person may violate the provisions of Pen C § 602, subd (l), by entry and occupation of unfenced and unposted land. People v. Wilkinson (1967, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 248 Cal App 2d Supp 906, 56 Cal Rptr 261, 1967 Cal App LEXIS 1703.

In an action for false arrest of two plaintiffs for trespass (Pen C § 602, subd[j]), and malicious prosecution of one of them, the evidence was sufficient to support the determination of the trial court that citizens' arrests of plaintiffs were made on probable cause and were legal and that the prosecution was in good faith and without malice despite plaintiffs' subsequent acquittal of the charge, where the arrests arose out of a controversy over defendant's property, kept alive by the affirmative and aggressive actions of one of the plaintiffs while defendant's conduct indicated that he was on the defensive and anxious to escape from the conflict, where defendant had warned plaintiffs not to enter his property on penalty of arrest, and where there was no evidence whatever that he had any motive or desire except to protect his property until he could sell it. Shakespeare v. Zervos (1968, Cal App 2d Dist) 262 Cal App 2d 171, 68 Cal Rptr 481, 1968 Cal App LEXIS 2297, cert. denied, (1969) 394 US 319, 22 L Ed 2d 306, 89 S Ct 1186, 1969 US LEXIS 2164.

The evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of trespass (Pen C § 602, subd (j)), where defendant was seen in the office of an antique store kneeling on the floor with his head and hands in the safe, where, on being approached by an employee, defendant got up, appeared to put something in his jacket pocket, talked to the employee about several items in a manner that indicated he was not interested in buying, and left the store, and where the safe and a drawer inside (found pulled out after defendant left) had been closed when previously observed. People v. Wright (1969, Cal App 2d Dist) 272 Cal App 2d 53, 76 Cal Rptr 859, 1969 Cal App LEXIS 2243.

On appeal from a conviction of trespass (Pen C § 602, subd (j)), it was not necessary to decide whether trespass was a lesser offense included in the crime of burglary (Pen C § 459), with which defendant was charged, where defendant himself requested the court to instruct on trespass as a lesser included offense; having invited the error, if any, defendant could not complain that the court did as he requested. People v. Wright (1969, Cal App 2d Dist) 272 Cal App 2d 53, 76 Cal Rptr 859, 1969 Cal App LEXIS 2243.

Pen C § 602, subd (j), proscribing the entry of lands to injure property or property rights or with the intent to interfere with, obstruct, or injure any lawful business of the landowner, does not prohibit distribution at a county fair of leaflets protesting the effects on farm workers of the automation of agriculture where the distribution is made without physical contact with the fair patrons and the distributors and without obstructing the business of the fair or the intent to do so. In re Wallace (1970) 3 Cal 3d 289, 90 Cal Rptr 176, 475 P2d 208, 1970 Cal LEXIS 207.

There was substantial evidence supporting defendant's conviction under Pen C § 602, subd. (j) of willfully and unlawfully entering land with the intention of interfering with lawful business carried on by the owner, where defendant set up a table in a passenger tram unloading area of the Disneyland parking lot for the purpose of gathering signatures and soliciting donations for an antipollution initiative, where he had previously been denied permission to conduct such activity in the parking lot, where he was several times asked to leave, but refused to do so and left only after he was issued a citation by a police officer, and where there was testimony that unloading of the tram had to be diverted to another area as a result of defendant's activities. The fact that the police report did not mention the necessity of diverting the tram, assuming such report was received in evidence, created at most, a conflict to be resolved by the trial court. In re Ball (1972, Cal App 4th Dist) 23 Cal App 3d 380, 100 Cal Rptr 189, 1972 Cal App LEXIS 1218.

A First Amendment claim by plaintiffs, removed from a baseball game, failed as a matter of law; the city did not remove them in order to prevent or stop speech or expressive conduct. A Fourth Amendment claim failed because there was probable cause to believe they were committing misdemeanor trespass in violation of Pen C § 602(n). Legal contentions that the ball field was open to the public for purposes of Pen C § 602(n) and that 602(n) could not be constitutionally applied because plaintiffs were expressing support for their team were without merit. Attendance at a baseball game is not, by itself, constitutionally protected speech. Tickets were required to enter the field during the game at which plaintiffs were seized. The field was not open to the public without permission from the baseball team. James v. City of Long Beach (1998, CD Cal) 18 F Supp 2d 1078, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 19035.

The "title" acquired by an adverse possessor is that conferred by occupancy. The title conferred by occupancy is not factually inconsistent with the crime of trespass. One taking possession under color of right established by physical presence on the property as an occupant, is in possession as a naked trespasser. If that trespass is unchallenged by the true property owner for a period of five years, the possession ripens into actual title. Thus, an adverse possessor is merely a trespasser, i.e., a person who enters on the land of another with the specific intent of injuring, interfering with, or obstructing that other person's property rights. People v. Lapcheske (1999, Cal App 4th Dist) 73 Cal App 4th 571, 86 Cal Rptr 2d 565, 1999 Cal App LEXIS 656, reh'g denied, (1999, Cal App 4th Dist) 73 Cal App 4th 1264d, 1999 Cal App LEXIS 713, review denied, (1999, Cal) 1999 Cal LEXIS 6976.

Although police officers lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff for violating Pen C § 602(l)--later § 602(m)--the statute under which they cited him, probable cause existed to arrest him under another trespass provision, Pen C § 602.8(a). On appeal, the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to the officers on plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 unlawful arrest claim was affirmed. Edgerly v. City & County of San Francisco (2010, CA9 Cal) 599 F 3d 946, 2010 US App LEXIS 5697.

(Unpublished) Summary judgment was properly entered on a false arrest claim where defendant police officers had probable cause to make an arrest for trespassing in violation of Pen C § 602(o) where the arrestee acknowledged that he refused to leave a hotel after being asked to do so by both the owner's agent and the police officers; he also acknowledged that access to the hotel was regulated by a door buzzer. The arrestee could not defeat summary judgment when he presented no evidence that the hotel was open to the public, and likewise presented no evidence that the owner's agent did not have authority to bar him from the premises. McInerney v. City & County of San Francisco (2012, CA9 Cal) 2012 US App LEXIS 693.

 5. Miscellaneous Acts Constituting Offenses

A subtenant in possession of demised premises who broke through a fence to make passage to a crop planted by him upon the land, under a reasonable belief that he had the legal right to do so, is not guilty of a violation of this section. Seabridge v. McAdam (1895) 108 Cal 345, 41 P 409, 1895 Cal LEXIS 864.

A person engaged in cutting for his own use the limbs of a fallen tree belonging to another is guilty of a trespass under this section, even though an actual unauthorized entry was not made upon the land of the owner. Roberts v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1929, Cal App) 102 Cal App 422, 283 P 353, 1929 Cal App LEXIS 193.

Activity of union member who, while on strike against manufacturing corporation, entered railroad company's right-of-way and stationed himself at or near junction of railroad company's main line and a spur track leading to manufacturing corporation, was not prohibited by subd (l) of this section, in view of §§ 552-555.5, excepting lawful activities of labor union members from prohibition against trespassing on certain posted industrial properties, including railroad rights-of-way. In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal 2d 666, 36 Cal Rptr 286, 388 P2d 182, 1964 Cal LEXIS 276, 10 ALR3d 840.

Conviction under Pen C § 602, subd (l)prohibiting entering and occupying of real property without consent of owner, was improper where property entered was bank open to public including defendants, thus making defendants' entry and entry with consent of owner, and such consent could not be terminated retroactively. People v. Brown (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 915, 47 Cal Rptr 662, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 891, superseded by statute as stated in In re Lundgren (1987, Cal App 4th Dist) 189 Cal App 3d 381, 234 Cal Rptr 110, 236 Cal Rptr 307, 1987 Cal App LEXIS 1374.

Students who gathered in university building to express to administration their grievance with university rules for content of student speech, assembly and petition on campus and who remained when building was closed for day and after they were advised that those who remained would be guilty of unlawful assembly committed conduct clearly encompassed within proscription of Pen C § 602, subd (o). In re Bacon (1966, Cal App 1st Dist) 240 Cal App 2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr 322, 1966 Cal App LEXIS 1313

Assuming it was lawful business for students to enter university building open to public to express grievances with university rules, that business ceased when building became regularly closed and addressees of grievances were entitled to cease active school duties for day. Where grievances were clearly and vocally made known to addressees during hours building was open to public, circumstances were not such as to indicate to reasonable man that building need be kept open beyond regular closing time for expression of grievances by student "sit-in." In re Bacon (1966, Cal App 1st Dist) 240 Cal App 2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr 322, 1966 Cal App LEXIS 1313

The standard set out in the statute on trespass in a public building (Pen C § 602, subd (n), formerly subd (o)) that a person failing or refusing to leave a public building after closing hours on proper request to do so will be guilty of violation thereof "if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that such person has no apparent lawful business to pursue," is an objective standard rather than a subjective standard, and it was for the jury and not the right of the court to determine whether defendant acted as a reasonable man in the circumstances, where defendant, in the belief that he had lawful business to pursue, refused to leave a public building long after closing hours on request of public officials and there was no one assigned to listen any further that night to defendant's complaints. Parrish v. Municipal Court for Modesto Judicial Dist. (1968, Cal App 5th Dist) 258 Cal App 2d 497, 65 Cal Rptr 862, 1968 Cal App LEXIS 2437.

A necessarily included offense is that which occurs when an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing another; and the crime of criminal trespass (Pen C § 602 subd (l)) is not a lesser included offense in a charge of burglary (Pen C § 459a) since a burglar does not have the intent to occupy required by the criminal trespass statute and, in any event, criminal trespass may be on vacant property, while burglary is limited to the entry of a structure or other specified enclosure. People v. Harper (1969, Cal App 2d Dist) 269 Cal App 2d 221, 74 Cal Rptr 859, 1969 Cal App LEXIS 1637.

The offenses of attempted burglary (Pen C §§ 459, 663), disorderly conduct (Pen C § 647, subd (g)), trespass (Pen C § 602), and assault and battery (Pen C §§ 240, 242) were shown to have been committed in the presence of a citizen who arrested the suspect, where the arresting citizen saw the suspect looking through the window of an apartment on premises upon which he had no visible or lawful business, where the suspect attempted to flee when the arresting citizen approached him, where his conduct when queried as to his presence on the premises was equivocal, where he was wearing gloves, where he again attempted to flee when told that the police would be called, and where, after the arrest was effected, the suspect struck the citizen on the chest and arms. People v. Garcia (1969, Cal App 1st Dist) 274 Cal App 2d 100, 78 Cal Rptr 775, 1969 Cal App LEXIS 2028.

Summary dismissal of plaintiff Indians' declaratory judgment action, alleging violation of First Amendment rights by anticipated application of trespass provisions of Pen C § 602(l) and (n) to their forcible entry onto surplus federal property to protest purportedly fraudulent land transactions by Congress, affirmed on ground that Indians were not entitled access to said property. Knight v. Anderson (1973, 9th Cir Cal) 480 F2d 8, 1973 US App LEXIS 9774.

In a prosecution under Pen C § 602, subd. (k)(1), providing that any person who wilfully commits a trespass by entering any land enclosed by a fence without the written permission of the owner and who refuses to leave the land upon being requested to do so by the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor, of a person who climbed a fence which encroached on a public easement granted for highway purposes through private land to launch his kayak in a river over which the public highway passed, the prosecution failed to prove that defendant was committing a trespass against the landowner when the landowner's agent requested him to leave, where the prosecution presented no evidence to show who had fenced the unimproved strip of land within the easement upon which defendant had been walking when sighted, or, if the landowner had done so, whether he had obtained permission from the county before building the fence. People v. Sweetser (1977, Cal App 5th Dist) 72 Cal App 3d 278, 140 Cal Rptr 82, 1977 Cal App LEXIS 1713.

Pen C § 602, subd. (n), which defines one variety of trespass as a refusal to leave private property upon request, requires two separate requests to leave the premises, one from a peace officer and another from the property possessor. People v. Medrano (1978, Cal App 3d Dist) 78 Cal App 3d 198, 144 Cal Rptr 217, 1978 Cal App LEXIS 1297

A union representative who remains on a jobsite to complete lawful union activity although requested to leave by the owner does not violate the criminal trespass provisions of Pen C § 602, subd. (k)(1). Regardless of whether property is "posted industrial property," property subject to posting, or other, less sensitive property, trespass statutes do not apply to lawful union activity. In re Catalano (1981) 29 Cal 3d 1, 171 Cal Rptr 667, 623 P2d 228, 1981 Cal LEXIS 127.

Union representatives who, in accord with a collective bargaining agreement, were conducting safety inspections and preparing steward's reports at a construction jobsite, were engaged in lawful union activity and exempt from prosecution under the criminal trespass provisions of Pen C § 602. Union representatives performing lawful union activity at the jobsite do not violate Pen C § 602, by refusing to accede to an arbitrary request by the owner to leave. In re Catalano (1981) 29 Cal 3d 1, 171 Cal Rptr 667, 623 P2d 228, 1981 Cal LEXIS 127.

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for trespass in a marina, even if defendant did not injure the marina or any of the boat slip tenants, because it supported a finding defendant acted with the purpose of injuring the city's right to exclude unauthorized persons. People v. Pennington (2014, 2d Dist) 2014 Cal App LEXIS 860.

 6. Acts Not Constituting Offense

The doing of extra work upon a street, ordered by a city board of trustees, would not constitute malicious mischief under this section as being "digging" in the street without a proper license. Bernstein v. Downs (1896) 112 Cal 197, 44 P 557, 1896 Cal LEXIS 666.

Necessity often justifies action which would otherwise constitute trespass, as where act is prompted by motive of preserving life or property and reasonably appears to the actor to be necessary for that purpose. People v. Roberts (1956) 47 Cal 2d 374, 303 P2d 721, 1956 Cal LEXIS 285.

One invited to enter a home is not a trespasser; his entry does not become trespass because he may be alerted to learn facts or to hear damaging declarations either by his natural faculties of hearing and sight, or with mechanical and electronic aids of science. People v. Avas (1956, Cal App 4th Dist) 144 Cal App 2d 91, 300 P2d 695, 1956 Cal App LEXIS 1690.

It was not trespass for police officer, in early morning, to approach parked automobile in driveway to enable him to obtain careful view of occupant lying therein, particularly where there was no showing of ownership of driveway. People v. Wright (1957, Cal App 1st Dist) 153 Cal App 2d 35, 313 P2d 868, 1957 Cal App LEXIS 1452.

It is not a violation of Pen C § 602 subd (l), to enter private property without consent unless such entry is followed by occupation thereof without consent; nor is it a violation to occupy without consent if the entry be made with consent. People v. Wilkinson (1967, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 248 Cal App 2d Supp 906, 56 Cal Rptr 261, 1967 Cal App LEXIS 1703.

The transient overnight use of four 3 x 7 foot areas in a very large ranch for sleeping bags and campfire purposes was not the type of conduct which the Legislature intended to prevent by use of the word "occupy" in Pen C § 602 subd (l), and did not constitute a trespass within the meaning of that statute. People v. Wilkinson (1967, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 248 Cal App 2d Supp 906, 56 Cal Rptr 261, 1967 Cal App LEXIS 1703.

Police officers knew only that an arrestee was not a resident of the housing cooperative where he was standing and that he had been on the property for a matter of minutes. On the basis of these facts, a reasonable officer would not have believed that the arrestee had violated or was about to violate Pen C § 602. Edgerly v. City & County of San Francisco (2007, 9th Cir Cal) 495 F3d 645, 2007 US App LEXIS 16949, op. withdrawn, (2008, 9th Cir.) 527 F.3d 841, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10882.

Evidence was insufficient to show that defendant "occupied" the clubhouse in a condominium complex because it was only a transient use of the property when she and her boyfriend were in the clubhouse bathroom from up to several hours; that conclusion was not altered by evidence that the boyfriend broke into and damaged two locked doors or that they used the shower and trashed the place. In re Y.R. (2014, 4th Dist) 226 Cal App 4th 1114, 172 Cal Rptr 3d 554, 2014 Cal App LEXIS 489.

 7. Prosecutions

To bring the act of injuring or destroying "standing crops, grain, cultivated fruits or vegetables," as defined by § 604, within the terms of subd (c) of this section, it would be necessary to show, by direct averment, that such act was a trespass by which a thing attached to the freehold, or "the produce thereof," was maliciously injured or severed. Hogan v. Superior Court of California (1911, Cal App) 16 Cal App 783, 117 P 947, 1911 Cal App LEXIS 232.

To charge an offense under this section it is sufficient to follow the language of the particular subdivision under which the charge falls, and it is not necessary to allege that the act was done maliciously. Messick v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County (1922, Cal App) 57 Cal App 340, 207 P 58, 1922 Cal App LEXIS 335.

Alleged error in failing to give instruction with respect to this section, in attempted burglary case, was harmless where defendant admitted that trial court's attention was not directly called to matter and that it was merely requested to give instructions, without mentioning any specific crime, relating to included offenses. People v. Bletson (1953, Cal App) 117 Cal App 2d 731, 256 P2d 614, 1953 Cal App LEXIS 1874.

Criminal trespass is not offense necessarily included in information charging burglary of theater, since intent to commit theft does not embrace any intent necessary for conviction of criminal trespass, that is, purpose to injure property or property rights or intent to interfere with, obstruct, or injure lawful business carried on by owner of property, his agent or by person in lawful possession. People v. Harris (1961, Cal App 2d Dist) 191 Cal App 2d 754, 12 Cal Rptr 916, 1961 Cal App LEXIS 2119.

In prosecution under Pen C § 602, subd (j), proscribing entering land with intention to interfere with or obstruct business, it was proper to instruct jury that word "lands" in subd. (j) includes buildings and fixtures and is synonymous with real property. People v. Brown (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 915, 47 Cal Rptr 662, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 891, superseded by statute as stated in In re Lundgren (1987, Cal App 4th Dist) 189 Cal App 3d 381, 234 Cal Rptr 110, 236 Cal Rptr 307, 1987 Cal App LEXIS 1374.

In prosecution for burglary of automobile, it was not error for court to refuse to instruct on its own motion on trespass as lesser included offense in crime charged, since trespass, as described in Pen C § 602, subd (l), has reference to trespass to real property and victim's car was neither real property nor "structure" within meaning of that term as used in statute. People v. Banks (1965, Cal App 1st Dist) 238 Cal App 2d 43, 47 Cal Rptr 499, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 1109.

In a prosecution under Pen C § 602 subd (l), making it a misdemeanor to wilfully commit any trespass by entering and occupying real property or structures of any kind without the consent of the owner, his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof, an instruction defining "occupy" as "to take or enter upon, possession of, to hold possession of, to hold or keep for use, to possess, to tenant, to do business in," while difficult to follow literally, is not per se erroneous. People v. Wilkinson (1967, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 248 Cal App 2d Supp 906, 56 Cal Rptr 261, 1967 Cal App LEXIS 1703.

A communication is eligible for constitutional protection from the imposition of trespass laws when its purpose is related to the purpose for which the prospective audience has been invited onto the land. Thus, in a prosecution for criminal trespass (Pen C § 602, subd. (n)), in which defendant union organizers asserted a free speech defense, an instruction that required, as a condition of the defense, a finding that the purpose of defendants' entry onto labor camp property was dissemination of thoughts or ideas relating to that property, was erroneous. People v. Medrano (1978, Cal App 3d Dist) 78 Cal App 3d 198, 144 Cal Rptr 217, 1978 Cal App LEXIS 1297

Defendant was convicted of burglary (Pen C § 459) after his request for instructions on trespass (Pen C § 602) as a "lesser related offense" was refused. (Pen C § 1159.) The Court of Appeal erred in ruling that denial of the instructional request was prejudicial error under People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal 3d 510, 199 Cal Rptr 45, 674 P2d 1303, 1984 Cal LEXIS 151, 50 ALR4th 1055, overruled on other grounds, People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal 4th 108, 77 Cal Rptr 2d 848, 960 P2d 1073, 1998 Cal LEXIS 5591, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal 4th 93, 2 Cal Rptr 3d 186, 72 P3d 1166, 2003 Cal LEXIS 4823, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Valentine (2006, Cal App 2d Dist) 143 Cal App 4th 1383, 49 Cal Rptr 3d 948, 2006 Cal App LEXIS 1615, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Govan (2007, Cal App 4th Dist) 150 Cal App 4th 1015, 58 Cal Rptr 3d 829, 2007 Cal App LEXIS 752, overruled on other grounds as stated in Burleson v. Kernan (2007, N.D. Cal.) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86964, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Rundle (2008, Cal) 43 Cal 4th 76, 74 Cal Rptr 3d 454, 180 P 3d 224, 2008 Cal LEXIS 3795, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Foster (2010, Cal) 50 Cal 4th 1301, 117 Cal Rptr 3d 658, 242 P 3d 105, 2010 Cal LEXIS 11680, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Nelson (2011, Cal) 51 Cal 4th 198, 120 Cal Rptr 3d 406, 246 P 3d 301, 2011 Cal LEXIS 463, and overturned the burglary conviction. The rule in Geiger represents an unwarranted extension of the right to instructions on lesser offenses. Geiger's rationale has since been expressly repudiated for federal purposes by the United States Supreme Court, and it continues to find little support in other jurisdictions. The Geiger rule can be unfair to the prosecution, and actually promotes inaccurate fact-finding, because it gives the defendant a superior trial right to seek and obtain conviction for a lesser uncharged offense whose elements the prosecution has neither pled nor sought to prove. Moreover, serious questions arise whether the holding of Geiger, ostensibly based on the due process clause of the California Constitution, can be reconciled with other provisions of the same charter. By according the defendant the power to insist, over the prosecution's objection, that an uncharged, nonincluded offense be placed before the jury, the Geiger rule may usurp the prosecution's exclusive charging discretion, and may therefore violate the Constitution's separation of powers clause. People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal 4th 108, 77 Cal Rptr 2d 848, 960 P2d 1073, 1998 Cal LEXIS 5591.

 8. Sentencing Enhancements

Defendant did not fall outside spirit of three strikes law, and therefore the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to strike his priors and sentencing him to 26 years to life for failure to register as a sex offender, where defendant had been reminded of the requirement to register and where he appeared to be a revolving-door career criminal. His lengthy adult criminal record included numerous convictions for offenses such as trespassing, in addition to his three strike offenses and his two prior convictions for failure to register. People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal 4th 367, 14 Cal Rptr 3d 880, 92 P3d 369, 2004 Cal LEXIS 6235.

Under the Three Strikes law, a trial court improperly based its dismissal of a prior-conviction allegation on a magistrate's preliminary finding that there was insufficient evidence as to willful discharge of a firearm; defendant had subsequently entered a negotiated no-contest plea on that charge; the court noted that defendant's prior offenses as a juvenile included discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner, driving with willful disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing a pursuing officer, resisting arrest, and trespassing. People v. Wallace (2004) 33 Cal 4th 738, 16 Cal Rptr 3d 96, 93 P3d 1037, 2004 Cal LEXIS 6770.

Opinion Notes

Attorney General’s Opinions:

Entering cultivated or inclosed land without permission for purpose of hunting where land is not posted. 12 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 257.

Person who fails to leave common areas of public housing project when requested to leave by peace officer acting at request of housing authority board of commissioners violates Pen C § 602, subd. (n), if area is in fact not open to general public and person has no lawful right to be there. 71 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 225.

Trespass provisions of Pen C § 602(n) may be constitutionally applied to person picketing or distributing leaflets on privately owned parking lot of small medical clinic providing family planning services including abortions, if signs are posted stating that use of lot is restricted to patients and staff and person refuses to leave at request of clinic owner. 73 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 213.

A violation of an exclusion order issued by the tribal council of an Indian tribe, prohibiting an individual from entering or occupying real property or structures on the reservation, would not constitute a misdemeanor under the terms of Pen C § 602(l). A county sheriff would not be required to take any action to enforce the exclusion order. 80 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 46.

The owner of a mobile home park, the owner of an apartment complex, and the homeowners' association of a condominium project may prohibit uninvited, nonresident political candidates from distributing their campaign materials door-to-door. 81 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 71.

Research References & Practice Aids

Cross References: 

"Misdemeanor": Pen C § 17.

Punishment for misdemeanor: Pen C §§ 19 et seq.

Trespass by driving vehicle upon property as another as an infraction: Pen C § 19.8.

Killing or injuring animal of another while hunting on inclosed land: Pen C § 384h.

Arson: Pen C §§ 450 et seq.

Burglary: Pen C § 459.

Theft: Pen C §§ 484 et seq.

Lawful activities of labor union members: Pen C §§ 552.1, 555.5.

Injuring mile posts or guide posts: Pen C § 590.

Ordinances requiring permission to enter vacant land: Pen C § 602.2.

Penalties for violation: Pen C § 602.8.

Punishment of trespass for purpose of invading privacy of communications: Pen C § 634.

Disorderly conduct by loitering on private property or by lodging without permission: Pen C § 647.

Injuries to trees by trespasser: CC § 3346.

Trespass for cutting or carrying away trees, etc.: CCP § 733.

Trespasses upon cooperative hunting areas: F & G C § 1571.

Causing damage to property while hunting or fishing: F & G C § 2004.

Trespass on posted lands for purpose of hunting: F & G C §§ 2016, 2017.

Destroying signboards forbidding hunting: F & G C § 2018.

Confiscation of game taken on conviction of violation of section: F & G C § 12164.

Entry into explosive manufacturing plant, etc.: H & S C § 12083.

Liability in relation to fires: H & S C §§ 13000 et seq.

Trespass on military premises: Mil & Vet C § 398.

Protection of property used for defense preparation: Mil & Vet C §§ 1650 et seq.

Unauthorized diversion or use of water as trespass: Wat C § 1052.

Authority of traffic hearing officer, subject to orders of juvenile court, to hear and dispose of cases charging minors with violation of section: W & I C § 256.

Collateral References: 

Cal. Points & Authorities (Matthew Bender(R)) ch 217 "Statutory Interpretation," § 217.61.

Cal. Forms Pleading & Practice (Matthew Bender(R)) ch 14 "Advertising".

Cal. Forms Pleading & Practice (Matthew Bender(R)) ch 16 "Airplanes and Airports".

Cal. Forms Pleading & Practice (Matthew Bender(R)) ch 23 "Animals: Civil Liability".

Cal. Forms Pleading & Practice (Matthew Bender(R)) ch 266 "Fences".

Cal. Forms Pleading & Practice (Matthew Bender(R)) ch 267 "Fires".

Cal. Forms Pleading & Practice (Matthew Bender(R)) ch 332 "Landlord And Tenant: The Tenancy".

Cal. Forms Pleading & Practice (Matthew Bender(R)) ch 550 "Trespass".

Witkin & Epstein, Criminal Law (3d ed), Crimes Against Property §§ 112, 247, 248, 253, 254, 260, 261.

Witkin & Epstein, Criminal Law (3d ed), Criminal Judgment §§ 63, 64, 65.

Witkin & Epstein, Criminal Law (3d ed), Defenses § 249.

Witkin & Epstein, Criminal Law (3d ed), Introduction To Crimes §§ 57, 74.

Witkin & Epstein, Criminal Law (3d ed), Pretrial Proceedings §§ 54, 55, 56, 57.

6 Witkin Summary (10th ed) Torts §§ 439, 693.

10 Witkin Summary (10th ed) Parent and Child § 479.

Cal Jur 3d (Rev) Criminal Law §§ 1444, 1465, 2496; Delinquent and Dependent Children § 147.

Miller & Starr, Cal Real Estate 3d § 17:37.

Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (LexisNexis Matthew Bender), CALCRIM No. 2930, Trespass: To Interfere With Business

Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (LexisNexis Matthew Bender), CALCRIM No. 2931, Trespass: Unlawfully Occupying Property

Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (LexisNexis Matthew Bender), CALCRIM No. 2952, Defenses: Negligent Control of Attack Dog

Law Review Articles: 

Trespass--right not to listen. 51 ABAJ 656.

Student rights and campus rules: symposium. 54 Cal LR 1.

Journalists, trespass, and officials who invite journalists to accompany them on searches, investigations or arrests: Closing the door on Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher. Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher.16 Pepperdine LR 259.

Hierarchy Notes: 

Pt. 1, Tit. 14 Note

SUGGESTED FORMS

Allegation Charging Trespass on Lands

DEERING'S CALIFORNIA CODES ANNOTATED
Copyright © 2014 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.

The purpose of this section is to protect trees and timber on private land. Swall v. Anderson (1943, Cal App) 60 Cal App 2d 825, 141 P2d 912, 1943 Cal App LEXIS 591.

Declaratory relief would not issue nullifying subsection (l) and (n) of this section, in action brought by native American Indians seeking declaration of their right to enter surplus government property adjoining certain military property to express grievances over dispossession of California Indians from their tribal lands. Knight v. Anderson (1973, 9th Cir Cal) 480 F2d 8, 1973 US App LEXIS 9774.

Pen C § 602, subd. (n), which defines one variety of trespass as a refusal to leave after request by the property owner and a peace officer, was intended to encourage a property owner to summon the authorities in order to avoid the violent confrontations that might occur in the absence of a peace officer. People v. Medrano (1978, Cal App 3d Dist) 78 Cal App 3d 198, 144 Cal Rptr 217, 1978 Cal App LEXIS 1297

In an action for malicious prosecution against defendant who had filed a misdemeanor complaint against plaintiff for violation of the statute against disturbing the peace (Pen C § 415) as the result of plaintiff's alleged wrongful conduct in refusing to leave the premises of the corporation of which defendant was the executive director after defendant requested that he do so, there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had acted with malice and without probable cause, even though the jury found for plaintiff on defendant's cross-complaint against him for trespass, where there was no evidence in the record that defendant did anything more than truthfully recount his observations to the police and prosecutor. Gomez v. Garcia (1980, Cal App 2d Dist) 112 Cal App 3d 392, 169 Cal Rptr 350, 1980 Cal App LEXIS 2462.

Under the test for determining whether an ordinance is invalid as having been preempted by state law, a county ordinance proscribing the driving of a motor vehicle over another's land without permission was not invalid despite the prior enactment of Pen C § 602, subd. (m), the statute that makes it a misdemeanor trespass to drive any vehicle, as defined by Veh C § 670, subd. (m), on "real property belonging to or lawfully occupied by another and known not to be open to the general public, without the consent of the owner, his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof." The subject dealt with by the ordinance was not so completely covered by general law as to indicate the subject had become exclusively a matter of state concern. Pen C § 602, subd. (m), did not address the problem of trespass on wide, open, remote, unfenced, unprotected, unposted desert lands, the precise problem covered by the ordinance. Moreover, the subject dealt with by the ordinance was not one that was partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly a paramount state concern would not tolerate further or additional local action or that was of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighed the possible benefit to the municipality. The ordinance dealt with a trespass problem unique to those counties covering the California desert--not a matter of paramount state concern, and the burden on nonresidents was minimal. Sports Committee Dist. 37 A.M.A., Inc. v. County of San Bernardino (1980, Cal App 4th Dist) 113 Cal App 3d 155, 169 Cal Rptr 652, 1980 Cal App LEXIS 2530.

Habeas corpus was an appropriate remedy to review the contention by union representatives that Pen C § 602, subd. (k)(1), criminal trespass, did not prohibit their conduct in entering and refusing to leave a construction site to inspect safety conditions and prepare a shop steward's report, where the representatives were convicted of criminal trespass under the statute and sentenced to pay a $100 fine or serve time in the county jail, and where there was no material dispute as to facts relating to the conviction. The union representatives were under sufficient custodial restraint to permit them to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. In re Catalano (1981) 29 Cal 3d 1, 171 Cal Rptr 667, 623 P2d 228, 1981 Cal LEXIS 127.

Conviction for vandalism was proper after defendant caused more than $15,000 in damage to his wife's house and belongings. The court distinguished vandalism from burglary and trespass, crimes that could not be committed against one's own home. People v. Wallace (2004, Cal App 5th Dist) 123 Cal App 4th 144, 19 Cal Rptr 3d 790, 2004 Cal App LEXIS 1736, review denied, (2005) 2005 Cal. LEXIS 957.

 2. Constitutionality

The statute on trespass in a public building (Pen C § 602, subd (n), formerly subd (o)) was enforceable, and its enforcement did not entrench upon any activity constitutionally protected (U. S. Const., First Amend.) or constitute a trap for the unwary, where, even though on a prior occasion public officials had desisted from enforcement of the statute when defendant had remained in a public building beyond closing hours until he secured a promise of certain action on the part of certain county officials in connection with his work, defendant was requested by the proper officials to leave the same building after closing hours after his demand for a similar promise of action was denied by the officials involved, and he refused to leave the building without exacting the promise. Parrish v. Municipal Court for Modesto Judicial Dist. (1968, Cal App 5th Dist) 258 Cal App 2d 497, 65 Cal Rptr 862, 1968 Cal App LEXIS 2437.

Defendant's conviction under Pen C § 602, subd. (j) of willfully and unlawfully entering land with the intention of interfering with lawful business carried on by the owner by setting up a table in a passenger tram unloading area of the Disneyland parking lot for the purpose of gathering signatures and soliciting for an antipollution initiative did not constitute an unconstitutional abridgment of his First Amendment rights, where there was substantial evidence that defendant's activities did, in fact, interfere with the business being conducted on the property. There is no concept of constitutional law giving people who want to propagandize protests or views a right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please. In re Ball (1972, Cal App 4th Dist) 23 Cal App 3d 380, 100 Cal Rptr 189, 1972 Cal App LEXIS 1218.

On habeas corpus by one convicted under Pen C § 602, subd. (j) of wilfully and unlawfully entering land with the intention of interfering with the lawful business carried on by the owner, petitioner could not successfully raise a claim of unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth of the statute on the basis of a clause therein referring to entry for the purpose of injuring "property rights." The allegedly unconstitutional clause and the clause under which petitioner was charged and convicted on substantial evidence are separated by the disjunctive "or" and are thus severable. A person cannot be convicted of an offense not charged, and, it is presumed, under Evid. Code, § 664, that official duty has been regularly performed. In re Ball (1972, Cal App 4th Dist) 23 Cal App 3d 380, 100 Cal Rptr 189, 1972 Cal App LEXIS 1218.

 3. Construction

The paramount purpose of subd (c) is to prescribe a penalty for any trespass by which the freehold of another is maliciously injured in any of the ways expressly pointed out by said subdivision, or by any act within the contemplation of the language. Hogan v. Superior Court of California (1911, Cal App) 16 Cal App 783, 117 P 947, 1911 Cal App LEXIS 232.

In construing subd (j) as it appeared in 1931, the subdivision should be read as a whole in the light of the acts sought to be prohibited, and the use of a semicolon after the word "another" is not controlling where it leads to an absurd interpretation and goes outside of the offenses sought to be prohibited. In re Application of Davis (1936, Cal App) 18 Cal App 2d 291, 63 P2d 853, 1936 Cal App LEXIS 208.

Sections 552-555.5, excepting lawful activities of labor union members from prohibition against trespassing on certain posted industrial properties, must be read together with subd (1), which is also subject to labor activity exception when unposted property of type designated in posting law is entered. In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal 2d 666, 36 Cal Rptr 286, 388 P2d 182, 1964 Cal LEXIS 276, 10 ALR3d 840.

Pen C § 602, subd. (j), prohibiting entering of any land with intention of interfering with lawful business carried on by owner or person in possession of such land, applies to urban land occupied by building which public is entitled to enter. , People v. Brown (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 915, 47 Cal Rptr 662, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 891, superseded by statute as stated in In re Lundgren (1987, Cal App 4th Dist) 189 Cal App 3d 381, 234 Cal Rptr 110, 236 Cal Rptr 307, 1987 Cal App LEXIS 1374.

Offenses encompassed by Pen C § 602, subd (o), failure to leave public building after closing time, and § 409, unlawful assembly, are separate and distinct offenses, and where university students conducted "sit-in" in university building after being requested to leave at closing time prior to being arrested, punishments prescribed for their failure to leave and their unlawful assembly are not same as punishment prescribed for resisting arrest. In re Bacon (1966, Cal App 1st Dist) 240 Cal App 2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr 322, 1966 Cal App LEXIS 1313.

Reasonable interpretation of Pen C § 602, subd (o), making it misdemeanor for person to wilfully trespass by refusing or failing to leave a public building of public agency during hours building is regularly closed after request to leave, does not require that each person inside building be personally requested to leave; blanket request over public address system suffices, particularly where all trespassers hear request to leave at once. In re Bacon (1966, Cal App 1st Dist) 240 Cal App 2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr 322, 1966 Cal App LEXIS 1313

Under Pen C § 602, subd (o), making it misdemeanor to refuse or fail to leave public building of public agency during hours building is regularly closed after public agency's custodian requests departure, term "custodian" means one in charge of building at time; request by university's chancellor and police officer that students leave university building constituted substantial compliance with statute. In re Bacon (1966, Cal App 1st Dist) 240 Cal App 2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr 322, 1966 Cal App LEXIS 1313.

Pen C § 602, subd (o), is simply trespass law intended to preserve security of public buildings during hours when they are regularly closed against individuals who remain without lawful purpose; section clearly sets forth type of conduct forbidden, specifically describes nature of required warning to leave, and is sufficiently definite so that person of ordinary understanding would know when he is violating it. In re Bacon (1966, Cal App 1st Dist) 240 Cal App 2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr 322, 1966 Cal App LEXIS 1313

In Pen C § 602 subd (l), the word "occupy" was intended to mean a nontransient, continuous type of possession, and to commit a trespass under the statute, some degree of dispossession and permanency must be intended.People v. Wilkinson (1967, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 248 Cal App 2d Supp 906, 56 Cal Rptr 261, 1967 Cal App LEXIS 1703.

A trespass statute (Pen C § 602, subd. (n), refusal to leave private property), was unconstitutional as applied to farm labor organizers who refused to leave a farm labor camp after a request by both the operator and sheriff's deputies, where the purpose of the entrants was communication with employee-tenants concerning an election to be held the following day. The incident occurred at a time during which the Agricultural Labor Relations Board was enjoined from enforcing a regulation assuring organizer access to employer property, and the organizers had been given notice on a Saturday of the election, which was to be held the following day (Sunday)People v. Medrano (1978, Cal App 3d Dist) 78 Cal App 3d 198, 144 Cal Rptr 217, 1978 Cal App LEXIS 1297

A municipal ordinance prohibiting entry of a fenced area of airport grounds without express written consent, violation of which defendant was convicted, was not preempted by Pen C § 602, subd. (t), since the municipal code dealt with access to any fenced or enclosed and posted area of the airport, while the state law dealt only with trespass in areas of airport "operations." The subject of airport access was thus obviously not fully and completely covered by the general law. Moreover, there was nothing in the general law to indicate that a paramount state concern would not tolerate additional local action, nor was the subject such that the adverse effects of the municipal ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighed the benefit to the municipality. The different posting requirements of the ordinance and the statute did not conflict, as they applied to different areas of the airport. Similarly, the different punishments prescribed by the state and municipality applied to trespasses upon different areas of the airport. In any event, a city is free to devise a penalty it deems appropriate to the seriousness of the problems addressed by the ordinance. Trespass has long been an area in which local units have legislated, and such an area may involve special local problems of facilities and geography with which a state legislature could cope only with difficulty. Batiste v. Superior Court (1992, Cal App 2d Dist) 4 Cal App 4th 460, 5 Cal Rptr 2d 694, 1992 Cal App LEXIS 307, review denied, (1992, Cal) 1992 Cal LEXIS 2825.

H & S C § 11362.5(d)'s grant of limited immunity from prosecution does not operate, as does that of Ins C § 12924(b), for reasons extrinsic to the criminality of the underlying conduct. Rather, it operates, in the manner of Pen C § 602(n), to render noncriminal certain conduct that otherwise would be criminal. People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal 4th 457, 122 Cal Rptr 2d 326, 49 P3d 1067, 2002 Cal LEXIS 4520.

 4. Trespass to Real Property

A discharged employee, who was engaged in securing his personal belongings from the premises of the employer, after a request for permission to do so which was not refused, was not a trespasser within the meaning of subd (j). People v. Corlett (1944, Cal App) 67 Cal App 2d 33, 153 P2d 595, 1944 Cal App LEXIS 1271, reh'g denied, (1944, Cal App) 67 Cal App 2d 33, 153 P2d 964

Prosecutions for entering bank premises in urban area with intention to interfere with or obstruct bank's business were properly brought under Pen C § 602, subd (j). People v. Brown (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 915, 47 Cal Rptr 662, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 891, superseded by statute as stated in In re Lundgren (1987, Cal App 4th Dist) 189 Cal App 3d 381, 234 Cal Rptr 110, 236 Cal Rptr 307, 1987 Cal App LEXIS 1374.

Convictions of trespass by entering bank with intention of interfering with or obstructing bank's business (Pen C § 602, subd (j)) were supported by evidence that three defendants entered bank, engaged in various transactions at counters, such as coin changing and coin counting, for period of approximately two hours for general purpose of protesting hiring practices of bank, and, by such conduct, made it necessary for some of customers to be served by tellers reaching over, around and between demonstrators, and by testimony of one defendant that he intended to injure bank and cause it to lose business. People v. Brown (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 915, 47 Cal Rptr 662, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 891, superseded by statute as stated in In re Lundgren (1987, Cal App 4th Dist) 189 Cal App 3d 381, 234 Cal Rptr 110, 236 Cal Rptr 307, 1987 Cal App LEXIS 1374.

Convictions of wilful disobedience of court order and of trespass by entering bank with intention of interfering with or obstructing bank's business (Pen C § 602, subd (j)) were supported by evidence that defendants were members of group protesting bank's hiring practices and that, in violation of restraining order personally served on each defendant prior to arrest, they joined other demonstrators in standing in entrance to bank for at least 10 minutes before they were arrested, and by one defendant's testimony that he made deposit and withdrawal at branches of bank on day of his arrest as protest against bank's discriminatory hiring practices. People v. Von Blum (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 922, 47 Cal Rptr 666, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 892.

Convictions of wilful disobedience of court order and of trespass by entering bank with intention of interfering with or obstructing bank's business (Pen C § 602, subd (j)) were supported by evidence where defendant was shown to have been standing at one time at lobby entrance doorway of bank and at another time in doorway leading to bank's lobby, where films showed that defendant interfered with or obstructed bank's course of business, and where defendant was arrested on bank's premises five minutes after being served with copy of court order restraining defendant from trespassing on bank's property and after advice from bank officer that he had been served with order and was in violation of it by remaining on bank's premises.People v. Brindley (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 925, 47 Cal Rptr 668, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 893.

Conviction of trespass by entering bank with intention of interfering with or obstructing bank's business (Pen C § 602, subd (j)) was not supported by evidence where it appeared that defendant was briefly in and near doorway of bank and that she was inside building at time of her arrest but where there was lack of evidence as to her connection with group of persons who were demonstrating about bank and no evidence as to her participation in any improper activities on bank premises.People v. Brindley (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 925, 47 Cal Rptr 668, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 893.

A person may violate the provisions of Pen C § 602, subd (l), by entry and occupation of unfenced and unposted land. People v. Wilkinson (1967, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 248 Cal App 2d Supp 906, 56 Cal Rptr 261, 1967 Cal App LEXIS 1703.

In an action for false arrest of two plaintiffs for trespass (Pen C § 602, subd[j]), and malicious prosecution of one of them, the evidence was sufficient to support the determination of the trial court that citizens' arrests of plaintiffs were made on probable cause and were legal and that the prosecution was in good faith and without malice despite plaintiffs' subsequent acquittal of the charge, where the arrests arose out of a controversy over defendant's property, kept alive by the affirmative and aggressive actions of one of the plaintiffs while defendant's conduct indicated that he was on the defensive and anxious to escape from the conflict, where defendant had warned plaintiffs not to enter his property on penalty of arrest, and where there was no evidence whatever that he had any motive or desire except to protect his property until he could sell it. Shakespeare v. Zervos (1968, Cal App 2d Dist) 262 Cal App 2d 171, 68 Cal Rptr 481, 1968 Cal App LEXIS 2297, cert. denied, (1969) 394 US 319, 22 L Ed 2d 306, 89 S Ct 1186, 1969 US LEXIS 2164.

The evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of trespass (Pen C § 602, subd (j)), where defendant was seen in the office of an antique store kneeling on the floor with his head and hands in the safe, where, on being approached by an employee, defendant got up, appeared to put something in his jacket pocket, talked to the employee about several items in a manner that indicated he was not interested in buying, and left the store, and where the safe and a drawer inside (found pulled out after defendant left) had been closed when previously observed. People v. Wright (1969, Cal App 2d Dist) 272 Cal App 2d 53, 76 Cal Rptr 859, 1969 Cal App LEXIS 2243.

On appeal from a conviction of trespass (Pen C § 602, subd (j)), it was not necessary to decide whether trespass was a lesser offense included in the crime of burglary (Pen C § 459), with which defendant was charged, where defendant himself requested the court to instruct on trespass as a lesser included offense; having invited the error, if any, defendant could not complain that the court did as he requested. People v. Wright (1969, Cal App 2d Dist) 272 Cal App 2d 53, 76 Cal Rptr 859, 1969 Cal App LEXIS 2243.

Pen C § 602, subd (j), proscribing the entry of lands to injure property or property rights or with the intent to interfere with, obstruct, or injure any lawful business of the landowner, does not prohibit distribution at a county fair of leaflets protesting the effects on farm workers of the automation of agriculture where the distribution is made without physical contact with the fair patrons and the distributors and without obstructing the business of the fair or the intent to do so. In re Wallace (1970) 3 Cal 3d 289, 90 Cal Rptr 176, 475 P2d 208, 1970 Cal LEXIS 207.

There was substantial evidence supporting defendant's conviction under Pen C § 602, subd. (j) of willfully and unlawfully entering land with the intention of interfering with lawful business carried on by the owner, where defendant set up a table in a passenger tram unloading area of the Disneyland parking lot for the purpose of gathering signatures and soliciting donations for an antipollution initiative, where he had previously been denied permission to conduct such activity in the parking lot, where he was several times asked to leave, but refused to do so and left only after he was issued a citation by a police officer, and where there was testimony that unloading of the tram had to be diverted to another area as a result of defendant's activities. The fact that the police report did not mention the necessity of diverting the tram, assuming such report was received in evidence, created at most, a conflict to be resolved by the trial court. In re Ball (1972, Cal App 4th Dist) 23 Cal App 3d 380, 100 Cal Rptr 189, 1972 Cal App LEXIS 1218.

A First Amendment claim by plaintiffs, removed from a baseball game, failed as a matter of law; the city did not remove them in order to prevent or stop speech or expressive conduct. A Fourth Amendment claim failed because there was probable cause to believe they were committing misdemeanor trespass in violation of Pen C § 602(n). Legal contentions that the ball field was open to the public for purposes of Pen C § 602(n) and that 602(n) could not be constitutionally applied because plaintiffs were expressing support for their team were without merit. Attendance at a baseball game is not, by itself, constitutionally protected speech. Tickets were required to enter the field during the game at which plaintiffs were seized. The field was not open to the public without permission from the baseball team. James v. City of Long Beach (1998, CD Cal) 18 F Supp 2d 1078, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 19035.

The "title" acquired by an adverse possessor is that conferred by occupancy. The title conferred by occupancy is not factually inconsistent with the crime of trespass. One taking possession under color of right established by physical presence on the property as an occupant, is in possession as a naked trespasser. If that trespass is unchallenged by the true property owner for a period of five years, the possession ripens into actual title. Thus, an adverse possessor is merely a trespasser, i.e., a person who enters on the land of another with the specific intent of injuring, interfering with, or obstructing that other person's property rights. People v. Lapcheske (1999, Cal App 4th Dist) 73 Cal App 4th 571, 86 Cal Rptr 2d 565, 1999 Cal App LEXIS 656, reh'g denied, (1999, Cal App 4th Dist) 73 Cal App 4th 1264d, 1999 Cal App LEXIS 713, review denied, (1999, Cal) 1999 Cal LEXIS 6976.

Although police officers lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff for violating Pen C § 602(l)--later § 602(m)--the statute under which they cited him, probable cause existed to arrest him under another trespass provision, Pen C § 602.8(a). On appeal, the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to the officers on plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 unlawful arrest claim was affirmed. Edgerly v. City & County of San Francisco (2010, CA9 Cal) 599 F 3d 946, 2010 US App LEXIS 5697.

(Unpublished) Summary judgment was properly entered on a false arrest claim where defendant police officers had probable cause to make an arrest for trespassing in violation of Pen C § 602(o) where the arrestee acknowledged that he refused to leave a hotel after being asked to do so by both the owner's agent and the police officers; he also acknowledged that access to the hotel was regulated by a door buzzer. The arrestee could not defeat summary judgment when he presented no evidence that the hotel was open to the public, and likewise presented no evidence that the owner's agent did not have authority to bar him from the premises. McInerney v. City & County of San Francisco (2012, CA9 Cal) 2012 US App LEXIS 693.

 5. Miscellaneous Acts Constituting Offenses

A subtenant in possession of demised premises who broke through a fence to make passage to a crop planted by him upon the land, under a reasonable belief that he had the legal right to do so, is not guilty of a violation of this section. Seabridge v. McAdam (1895) 108 Cal 345, 41 P 409, 1895 Cal LEXIS 864.

A person engaged in cutting for his own use the limbs of a fallen tree belonging to another is guilty of a trespass under this section, even though an actual unauthorized entry was not made upon the land of the owner. Roberts v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1929, Cal App) 102 Cal App 422, 283 P 353, 1929 Cal App LEXIS 193.

Activity of union member who, while on strike against manufacturing corporation, entered railroad company's right-of-way and stationed himself at or near junction of railroad company's main line and a spur track leading to manufacturing corporation, was not prohibited by subd (l) of this section, in view of §§ 552-555.5, excepting lawful activities of labor union members from prohibition against trespassing on certain posted industrial properties, including railroad rights-of-way. In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal 2d 666, 36 Cal Rptr 286, 388 P2d 182, 1964 Cal LEXIS 276, 10 ALR3d 840.

Conviction under Pen C § 602, subd (l)prohibiting entering and occupying of real property without consent of owner, was improper where property entered was bank open to public including defendants, thus making defendants' entry and entry with consent of owner, and such consent could not be terminated retroactively. People v. Brown (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 915, 47 Cal Rptr 662, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 891, superseded by statute as stated in In re Lundgren (1987, Cal App 4th Dist) 189 Cal App 3d 381, 234 Cal Rptr 110, 236 Cal Rptr 307, 1987 Cal App LEXIS 1374.

Students who gathered in university building to express to administration their grievance with university rules for content of student speech, assembly and petition on campus and who remained when building was closed for day and after they were advised that those who remained would be guilty of unlawful assembly committed conduct clearly encompassed within proscription of Pen C § 602, subd (o). In re Bacon (1966, Cal App 1st Dist) 240 Cal App 2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr 322, 1966 Cal App LEXIS 1313

Assuming it was lawful business for students to enter university building open to public to express grievances with university rules, that business ceased when building became regularly closed and addressees of grievances were entitled to cease active school duties for day. Where grievances were clearly and vocally made known to addressees during hours building was open to public, circumstances were not such as to indicate to reasonable man that building need be kept open beyond regular closing time for expression of grievances by student "sit-in." In re Bacon (1966, Cal App 1st Dist) 240 Cal App 2d 34, 49 Cal Rptr 322, 1966 Cal App LEXIS 1313

The standard set out in the statute on trespass in a public building (Pen C § 602, subd (n), formerly subd (o)) that a person failing or refusing to leave a public building after closing hours on proper request to do so will be guilty of violation thereof "if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that such person has no apparent lawful business to pursue," is an objective standard rather than a subjective standard, and it was for the jury and not the right of the court to determine whether defendant acted as a reasonable man in the circumstances, where defendant, in the belief that he had lawful business to pursue, refused to leave a public building long after closing hours on request of public officials and there was no one assigned to listen any further that night to defendant's complaints. Parrish v. Municipal Court for Modesto Judicial Dist. (1968, Cal App 5th Dist) 258 Cal App 2d 497, 65 Cal Rptr 862, 1968 Cal App LEXIS 2437.

A necessarily included offense is that which occurs when an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing another; and the crime of criminal trespass (Pen C § 602 subd (l)) is not a lesser included offense in a charge of burglary (Pen C § 459a) since a burglar does not have the intent to occupy required by the criminal trespass statute and, in any event, criminal trespass may be on vacant property, while burglary is limited to the entry of a structure or other specified enclosure. People v. Harper (1969, Cal App 2d Dist) 269 Cal App 2d 221, 74 Cal Rptr 859, 1969 Cal App LEXIS 1637.

The offenses of attempted burglary (Pen C §§ 459, 663), disorderly conduct (Pen C § 647, subd (g)), trespass (Pen C § 602), and assault and battery (Pen C §§ 240, 242) were shown to have been committed in the presence of a citizen who arrested the suspect, where the arresting citizen saw the suspect looking through the window of an apartment on premises upon which he had no visible or lawful business, where the suspect attempted to flee when the arresting citizen approached him, where his conduct when queried as to his presence on the premises was equivocal, where he was wearing gloves, where he again attempted to flee when told that the police would be called, and where, after the arrest was effected, the suspect struck the citizen on the chest and arms. People v. Garcia (1969, Cal App 1st Dist) 274 Cal App 2d 100, 78 Cal Rptr 775, 1969 Cal App LEXIS 2028.

Summary dismissal of plaintiff Indians' declaratory judgment action, alleging violation of First Amendment rights by anticipated application of trespass provisions of Pen C § 602(l) and (n) to their forcible entry onto surplus federal property to protest purportedly fraudulent land transactions by Congress, affirmed on ground that Indians were not entitled access to said property. Knight v. Anderson (1973, 9th Cir Cal) 480 F2d 8, 1973 US App LEXIS 9774.

In a prosecution under Pen C § 602, subd. (k)(1), providing that any person who wilfully commits a trespass by entering any land enclosed by a fence without the written permission of the owner and who refuses to leave the land upon being requested to do so by the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor, of a person who climbed a fence which encroached on a public easement granted for highway purposes through private land to launch his kayak in a river over which the public highway passed, the prosecution failed to prove that defendant was committing a trespass against the landowner when the landowner's agent requested him to leave, where the prosecution presented no evidence to show who had fenced the unimproved strip of land within the easement upon which defendant had been walking when sighted, or, if the landowner had done so, whether he had obtained permission from the county before building the fence. People v. Sweetser (1977, Cal App 5th Dist) 72 Cal App 3d 278, 140 Cal Rptr 82, 1977 Cal App LEXIS 1713.

Pen C § 602, subd. (n), which defines one variety of trespass as a refusal to leave private property upon request, requires two separate requests to leave the premises, one from a peace officer and another from the property possessor. People v. Medrano (1978, Cal App 3d Dist) 78 Cal App 3d 198, 144 Cal Rptr 217, 1978 Cal App LEXIS 1297

A union representative who remains on a jobsite to complete lawful union activity although requested to leave by the owner does not violate the criminal trespass provisions of Pen C § 602, subd. (k)(1). Regardless of whether property is "posted industrial property," property subject to posting, or other, less sensitive property, trespass statutes do not apply to lawful union activity. In re Catalano (1981) 29 Cal 3d 1, 171 Cal Rptr 667, 623 P2d 228, 1981 Cal LEXIS 127.

Union representatives who, in accord with a collective bargaining agreement, were conducting safety inspections and preparing steward's reports at a construction jobsite, were engaged in lawful union activity and exempt from prosecution under the criminal trespass provisions of Pen C § 602. Union representatives performing lawful union activity at the jobsite do not violate Pen C § 602, by refusing to accede to an arbitrary request by the owner to leave. In re Catalano (1981) 29 Cal 3d 1, 171 Cal Rptr 667, 623 P2d 228, 1981 Cal LEXIS 127.

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for trespass in a marina, even if defendant did not injure the marina or any of the boat slip tenants, because it supported a finding defendant acted with the purpose of injuring the city's right to exclude unauthorized persons. People v. Pennington (2014, 2d Dist) 2014 Cal App LEXIS 860.

 6. Acts Not Constituting Offense

The doing of extra work upon a street, ordered by a city board of trustees, would not constitute malicious mischief under this section as being "digging" in the street without a proper license. Bernstein v. Downs (1896) 112 Cal 197, 44 P 557, 1896 Cal LEXIS 666.

Necessity often justifies action which would otherwise constitute trespass, as where act is prompted by motive of preserving life or property and reasonably appears to the actor to be necessary for that purpose. People v. Roberts (1956) 47 Cal 2d 374, 303 P2d 721, 1956 Cal LEXIS 285.

One invited to enter a home is not a trespasser; his entry does not become trespass because he may be alerted to learn facts or to hear damaging declarations either by his natural faculties of hearing and sight, or with mechanical and electronic aids of science. People v. Avas (1956, Cal App 4th Dist) 144 Cal App 2d 91, 300 P2d 695, 1956 Cal App LEXIS 1690.

It was not trespass for police officer, in early morning, to approach parked automobile in driveway to enable him to obtain careful view of occupant lying therein, particularly where there was no showing of ownership of driveway. People v. Wright (1957, Cal App 1st Dist) 153 Cal App 2d 35, 313 P2d 868, 1957 Cal App LEXIS 1452.

It is not a violation of Pen C § 602 subd (l), to enter private property without consent unless such entry is followed by occupation thereof without consent; nor is it a violation to occupy without consent if the entry be made with consent. People v. Wilkinson (1967, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 248 Cal App 2d Supp 906, 56 Cal Rptr 261, 1967 Cal App LEXIS 1703.

The transient overnight use of four 3 x 7 foot areas in a very large ranch for sleeping bags and campfire purposes was not the type of conduct which the Legislature intended to prevent by use of the word "occupy" in Pen C § 602 subd (l), and did not constitute a trespass within the meaning of that statute. People v. Wilkinson (1967, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 248 Cal App 2d Supp 906, 56 Cal Rptr 261, 1967 Cal App LEXIS 1703.

Police officers knew only that an arrestee was not a resident of the housing cooperative where he was standing and that he had been on the property for a matter of minutes. On the basis of these facts, a reasonable officer would not have believed that the arrestee had violated or was about to violate Pen C § 602. Edgerly v. City & County of San Francisco (2007, 9th Cir Cal) 495 F3d 645, 2007 US App LEXIS 16949, op. withdrawn, (2008, 9th Cir.) 527 F.3d 841, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10882.

Evidence was insufficient to show that defendant "occupied" the clubhouse in a condominium complex because it was only a transient use of the property when she and her boyfriend were in the clubhouse bathroom from up to several hours; that conclusion was not altered by evidence that the boyfriend broke into and damaged two locked doors or that they used the shower and trashed the place. In re Y.R. (2014, 4th Dist) 226 Cal App 4th 1114, 172 Cal Rptr 3d 554, 2014 Cal App LEXIS 489.

 7. Prosecutions

To bring the act of injuring or destroying "standing crops, grain, cultivated fruits or vegetables," as defined by § 604, within the terms of subd (c) of this section, it would be necessary to show, by direct averment, that such act was a trespass by which a thing attached to the freehold, or "the produce thereof," was maliciously injured or severed. Hogan v. Superior Court of California (1911, Cal App) 16 Cal App 783, 117 P 947, 1911 Cal App LEXIS 232.

To charge an offense under this section it is sufficient to follow the language of the particular subdivision under which the charge falls, and it is not necessary to allege that the act was done maliciously. Messick v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County (1922, Cal App) 57 Cal App 340, 207 P 58, 1922 Cal App LEXIS 335.

Alleged error in failing to give instruction with respect to this section, in attempted burglary case, was harmless where defendant admitted that trial court's attention was not directly called to matter and that it was merely requested to give instructions, without mentioning any specific crime, relating to included offenses. People v. Bletson (1953, Cal App) 117 Cal App 2d 731, 256 P2d 614, 1953 Cal App LEXIS 1874.

Criminal trespass is not offense necessarily included in information charging burglary of theater, since intent to commit theft does not embrace any intent necessary for conviction of criminal trespass, that is, purpose to injure property or property rights or intent to interfere with, obstruct, or injure lawful business carried on by owner of property, his agent or by person in lawful possession. People v. Harris (1961, Cal App 2d Dist) 191 Cal App 2d 754, 12 Cal Rptr 916, 1961 Cal App LEXIS 2119.

In prosecution under Pen C § 602, subd (j), proscribing entering land with intention to interfere with or obstruct business, it was proper to instruct jury that word "lands" in subd. (j) includes buildings and fixtures and is synonymous with real property. People v. Brown (1965, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 236 Cal App 2d Supp 915, 47 Cal Rptr 662, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 891, superseded by statute as stated in In re Lundgren (1987, Cal App 4th Dist) 189 Cal App 3d 381, 234 Cal Rptr 110, 236 Cal Rptr 307, 1987 Cal App LEXIS 1374.

In prosecution for burglary of automobile, it was not error for court to refuse to instruct on its own motion on trespass as lesser included offense in crime charged, since trespass, as described in Pen C § 602, subd (l), has reference to trespass to real property and victim's car was neither real property nor "structure" within meaning of that term as used in statute. People v. Banks (1965, Cal App 1st Dist) 238 Cal App 2d 43, 47 Cal Rptr 499, 1965 Cal App LEXIS 1109.

In a prosecution under Pen C § 602 subd (l), making it a misdemeanor to wilfully commit any trespass by entering and occupying real property or structures of any kind without the consent of the owner, his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof, an instruction defining "occupy" as "to take or enter upon, possession of, to hold possession of, to hold or keep for use, to possess, to tenant, to do business in," while difficult to follow literally, is not per se erroneous. People v. Wilkinson (1967, Cal App Dep't Super Ct) 248 Cal App 2d Supp 906, 56 Cal Rptr 261, 1967 Cal App LEXIS 1703.

A communication is eligible for constitutional protection from the imposition of trespass laws when its purpose is related to the purpose for which the prospective audience has been invited onto the land. Thus, in a prosecution for criminal trespass (Pen C § 602, subd. (n)), in which defendant union organizers asserted a free speech defense, an instruction that required, as a condition of the defense, a finding that the purpose of defendants' entry onto labor camp property was dissemination of thoughts or ideas relating to that property, was erroneous. People v. Medrano (1978, Cal App 3d Dist) 78 Cal App 3d 198, 144 Cal Rptr 217, 1978 Cal App LEXIS 1297

Defendant was convicted of burglary (Pen C § 459) after his request for instructions on trespass (Pen C § 602) as a "lesser related offense" was refused. (Pen C § 1159.) The Court of Appeal erred in ruling that denial of the instructional request was prejudicial error under People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal 3d 510, 199 Cal Rptr 45, 674 P2d 1303, 1984 Cal LEXIS 151, 50 ALR4th 1055, overruled on other grounds, People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal 4th 108, 77 Cal Rptr 2d 848, 960 P2d 1073, 1998 Cal LEXIS 5591, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal 4th 93, 2 Cal Rptr 3d 186, 72 P3d 1166, 2003 Cal LEXIS 4823, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Valentine (2006, Cal App 2d Dist) 143 Cal App 4th 1383, 49 Cal Rptr 3d 948, 2006 Cal App LEXIS 1615, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Govan (2007, Cal App 4th Dist) 150 Cal App 4th 1015, 58 Cal Rptr 3d 829, 2007 Cal App LEXIS 752, overruled on other grounds as stated in Burleson v. Kernan (2007, N.D. Cal.) 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86964, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Rundle (2008, Cal) 43 Cal 4th 76, 74 Cal Rptr 3d 454, 180 P 3d 224, 2008 Cal LEXIS 3795, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Foster (2010, Cal) 50 Cal 4th 1301, 117 Cal Rptr 3d 658, 242 P 3d 105, 2010 Cal LEXIS 11680, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Nelson (2011, Cal) 51 Cal 4th 198, 120 Cal Rptr 3d 406, 246 P 3d 301, 2011 Cal LEXIS 463, and overturned the burglary conviction. The rule in Geiger represents an unwarranted extension of the right to instructions on lesser offenses. Geiger's rationale has since been expressly repudiated for federal purposes by the United States Supreme Court, and it continues to find little support in other jurisdictions. The Geiger rule can be unfair to the prosecution, and actually promotes inaccurate fact-finding, because it gives the defendant a superior trial right to seek and obtain conviction for a lesser uncharged offense whose elements the prosecution has neither pled nor sought to prove. Moreover, serious questions arise whether the holding of Geiger, ostensibly based on the due process clause of the California Constitution, can be reconciled with other provisions of the same charter. By according the defendant the power to insist, over the prosecution's objection, that an uncharged, nonincluded offense be placed before the jury, the Geiger rule may usurp the prosecution's exclusive charging discretion, and may therefore violate the Constitution's separation of powers clause. People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal 4th 108, 77 Cal Rptr 2d 848, 960 P2d 1073, 1998 Cal LEXIS 5591.

 8. Sentencing Enhancements

Defendant did not fall outside spirit of three strikes law, and therefore the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to strike his priors and sentencing him to 26 years to life for failure to register as a sex offender, where defendant had been reminded of the requirement to register and where he appeared to be a revolving-door career criminal. His lengthy adult criminal record included numerous convictions for offenses such as trespassing, in addition to his three strike offenses and his two prior convictions for failure to register. People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal 4th 367, 14 Cal Rptr 3d 880, 92 P3d 369, 2004 Cal LEXIS 6235.

Under the Three Strikes law, a trial court improperly based its dismissal of a prior-conviction allegation on a magistrate's preliminary finding that there was insufficient evidence as to willful discharge of a firearm; defendant had subsequently entered a negotiated no-contest plea on that charge; the court noted that defendant's prior offenses as a juvenile included discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner, driving with willful disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing a pursuing officer, resisting arrest, and trespassing. People v. Wallace (2004) 33 Cal 4th 738, 16 Cal Rptr 3d 96, 93 P3d 1037, 2004 Cal LEXIS 6770.

Opinion Notes

Attorney General’s Opinions:

Entering cultivated or inclosed land without permission for purpose of hunting where land is not posted. 12 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 257.

Person who fails to leave common areas of public housing project when requested to leave by peace officer acting at request of housing authority board of commissioners violates Pen C § 602, subd. (n), if area is in fact not open to general public and person has no lawful right to be there. 71 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 225.

Trespass provisions of Pen C § 602(n) may be constitutionally applied to person picketing or distributing leaflets on privately owned parking lot of small medical clinic providing family planning services including abortions, if signs are posted stating that use of lot is restricted to patients and staff and person refuses to leave at request of clinic owner. 73 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 213.

A violation of an exclusion order issued by the tribal council of an Indian tribe, prohibiting an individual from entering or occupying real property or structures on the reservation, would not constitute a misdemeanor under the terms of Pen C § 602(l). A county sheriff would not be required to take any action to enforce the exclusion order. 80 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 46.

The owner of a mobile home park, the owner of an apartment complex, and the homeowners' association of a condominium project may prohibit uninvited, nonresident political candidates from distributing their campaign materials door-to-door. 81 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 71.