From the Classroom
By Raymond Hill
Professor Emeritus, Santa Rosa Junior College
Time and Detentions Part II – 2023 Cases
This is the second article in this series. We previously covered Time and Detentions – The Basics. Given that body of refresher, we will now look at three 2023 cases comparing the facts against existing case precedent – two in which the defense won, and one where prosecutors prevailed.
Where The People Prevailed
First, from San Diego, we have this ruling: During a traffic stop, taking the time to ensure officer safety does not unduly prolong the detention (Peo. v. Esparza (2023) 4DCA 2023 Cal. App. Lexis 741).
At the direction of a gang detective, two San Diego police officers pulled over the defendant’s vehicle for illegally tinted windows. The detective knew the area of the stop was contested gang territory. There were four occupants in the vehicle, including the defendant, Esparza, the driver.
The investigating officer asked for the defendant’s driver’s license, which the defendant initially was unable to produce. Two minutes later, a veteran gang detective arrived on scene and advised that three of the vehicle occupants, including the defendant, were members of the City Heights Juniors gang and a passenger had a known history of weapons possession (“was always strapped,” meaning he carried a weapon). The “always strapped” passenger was frisked and a loaded ghost gun was found in his waistband. The defendant was frisked and a loaded pistol was found in his possession.
On appeal, the defendant argued his detention went beyond the time necessary to complete a traffic stop and was thus unduly prolonged. The Fourth District ruled “the total time between the initial detention of Esparza’s car and his pat down search was about seven minutes.” “Officer Arreola continued to move the mission of the stop forward in that time period while simultaneously attending to legitimate officer safety concerns.”
In Whren v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 806, the court ruled that the traffic stop was legal, even though it may have been a pretext stop. During the defendant’s search for his driver’s license and exchange, investigating officers learned that the defendant and two others in the car were members of a violent street gang travelling in disputed territory and one gang member had a history of weapon possession (“always strapped.”) “Any delay in completing the citation process was prompted by the officer’s concern for his own safety and others at the scene while confronting a potentially dangerous situation,” the ruling said.
See also Robert Phillips’ “The Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure – An Update,” 23rd Edition, Frisks and Officer Safety, pages 242-245, and Pretext Stops, pages 317-328. Also, Pretext Stops: Unduly Prolonged Detentions and Pat Downs (11/19/23) – LU Ref, #CAC00119.
Where The Defense Prevailed
Peo. v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal. App. 5th 659 gives us this: Detouring from the mission of a traffic stop and pursuing other criminal activity was a prolonged detention.
An officer received a report from an undercover officer about a “suspicious vehicle” near a motel known for narcotics activity. The officer made a traffic stop on the car for an unsafe lane change. After receiving the defendant’s driver’s license, for the next four to five minutes the officer asked questions about probation/parole status, sex offender registration status, and if there were any weapons, drugs, needles or sharp instruments in the vehicle. The defendant admitted to being a registered sex offender, but after asking a few questions about residency, the officer never made a records inquiry to verify the defendant’s statements (the defendant was in compliance with 290 P.C.). A record/warrants check was never conducted.
Four to five minutes later, the defendant was ordered from his vehicle and “curbed.” When the defendant asked why he was pulled over, the officer replied, “I’ll get to that” and “I’ll tell you shortly.” After another six minutes, a backup officer arrived and the defendant was told the reason for the traffic stop. A frisk was conducted. Twelve minutes after the stop, Titan, a drug-sniffing dog that had come on scene, checked the vehicle. Titan alerted and methamphetamine, an unloaded handgun, a meth pipe and ammunition were found. The defendant was a convicted felon.
The Fourth District Court of Appeals ruled all the evidence must be suppressed because of a prolonged detention. After making the traffic infraction stop, the officer immediately began questioning the defendant about matters unrelated to the traffic stop. Only after six minutes had passed was the defendant advised of the reason for the stop. “What began as a lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment shield against unreasonable searches and seizures when the officers detoured from the traffic stop’s mission by conducting the dog sniff and inquiring into matters unrelated to the traffic violation,” the ruling stated.
The officer detoured from the traffic stop’s mission almost immediately. Nothing in the court record shows the officer undertook any actions to address the traffic infraction. Instead, after 12 minutes, Titan was used to sniff the defendant’s truck for drugs. This action was unrelated to any investigation of the traffic violation or the defendant’s sex offender registration status. “The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification,” said Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491.
Note: The Attorney General argued that the reason for the detention could be extended because there was additional reason to believe the defendant was involved in drug activity and may not have been in compliance with his sex offender registration requirements.
Any information regarding drug activity came from an undercover officer, who told the officer to be on the lookout for the defendant’s truck because it had been at the Tampico Motel, a known location for drug trafficking. These facts were insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion defendant was “involved with drugs,” the court said. The defendant’s presence at the Tampico Motel, without more information, did not raise a reasonable suspicion he was engaged in criminal activity. “An individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime” (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119).
No evidence was presented at the suppression hearing that the defendant exhibited symptoms of being under the influence of narcotics or that the officer learned from a records check that he had prior drug convictions. It was a mere hunch that the defendant was engaged in criminal drug activity. A hunch or speculation is an inadequate basis to prolong his detention. (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078).
In fact, a routine records check could have been conducted to check the defendant’s sex offender status, but the investigating officer never followed up on a radio or computer check.
Another one for the Defense
Lesson: Complete your “fundamentals” first, then “go fishing” during the time you have to complete your traffic stop. Because once an officer realizes no traffic infraction has occurred, any detention must end, Peo. v. Suggs (2023) 93 Cal. App. 5th 1360 determined this year.
In this case, an officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle for displaying only paper plates and no temporary registration. Upon approach, he spotted the temporary registration in the tinted rear window. The officer explained the reason for the stop, obtained the defendant’s driver license, returned to his vehicle, and conducted a records/warrants check. He learned the defendant was on probation with a search clause. A car search yielded a gun. The appeals court ruled that once the officer saw the temporary registration, the reason for the stop ended because no Vehicle Code violation had occurred. The officer could approach and explain the reason for the stop, but further inquiries or computer checks to determine further evidence of criminal wrongdoing must be based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The gun was suppressed.
Author’s Notes
No doubt the officer was acting in “good faith.” But he or she didn’t know about the probation search condition until after any reason for a continued detention had ended. I’m hopeful that the gun can be used in a probation revocation hearing. The bottom line is there was no criminal violation, so no need to continue with the “fundamentals” of a traffic stop, including a records/warrants check.
The stop could have been made for a tinted window violation, but that reason was not presented on the record.
Here is a great case for a reasonable suspicion traffic stop for 26708 V.C. and expressing your opinion on the physical properties of the window (800 E.C.):
A San Diego police officer stopped the defendant’s car because he believed the windows were illegally tinted. The officer testified it was difficult to see the occupants inside the Ford Expedition because of the darkness of the tinting. “We don’t call upon the officers to be scientists or carry around and use burdensome equipment to measure light transmittance...rather, if an officer forms an opinion in a commonsense examination of a vehicle that light is obstructed in the fashion contemplated by the statute, such evidence will be sufficient to support the stop.” (U.S. v. Wallace (2000) 9th Circ. 213 F, 3d 1216).
Here are some additional cases on temporary registration display:
An officer cannot stop a vehicle solely to check the authenticity of a displayed “New Dealer Notice Temporary Identification” “because such permits are often forged” or “could have been issued for a different vehicle” (Peo. v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal. 4th 295).
However, a traffic stop can be made when the permit is not properly displayed or is unreadable, as in Peo. v. Verdugo (2007) 150 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, where the permit could not be easily seen because the window was heavily tinted. However, given the Suggs decision above, if the permit is it fact there, that reason for the stop ends.
Consider combining the stop with investigating a tinted window violation (See Wallace case above).
When a permit was displayed but DMV records showed the vehicle registration had expired two years earlier, a stop was permitted to confirm the permit belonged on the vehicle (Peo. v. Greenwood (2010) 189 Cal. App. 4th 742).
Stay Safe,
RH