I don’t typically brief sentencing cases, and I’m not an expert by any means on juvenile law, so I’m kind of speaking out of school here.  But for those of you who have to deal with those little buggers, I thought you might be interested in the U.S. Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement on the rules for sentencing minors to life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) when tried in adult court and convicted of first degree murder.  First a little history:  In Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U. S. 460, the Supreme Court held that an individual who commits a homicide when he or she is under the age of 18 may be sentenced to life without parole.  However, recognizing that all but a small minority of juvenile offenders are permanently incorrigible, imposing an LWOP sentence on a juvenile is constitutional only if the sentence, under local statutes, is not mandatory, and only if the sentencer is given the discretion to impose a lesser punishment.  Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U. S. 190, made the rule retroactive, at least when considered on collateral review (i.e., other than in a direct appeal from the conviction).  Now, within the last month, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Jones v. Mississippi (Apr. 22, 2021) __ U.S. __ [2021 U.S. LEXIS 2110; 2021 WL 1566605], where it was held that it is not required that the sentencing judge make an on-the-record factual finding—either explicitly or implicitly—of the defendant’s permanent incorrigibility before imposing a life-without-parole sentence.  In Jones, the sentencing judge did in fact make comments to the effect that he was aware of his discretion in sentencing the defendant to a lesser sentence before he imposed an LWOP sentence.  But the Jones Court notes only “‘that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing’ a life-without-parole sentence.”  (quoting Miller v. Alabama, supra, at p. 483.) It does not say that the court’s analysis has to be expressed on the record.  And while it does not say in Jones that it is even necessary for a sentencing judge to state on the record that he or she is aware of, and is exercising the court’s discretion, having that discretion and being aware of it being a constitutional requirement, it is strongly recommended that a sentencing judge put something on the record to reflect his or her knowledge of this fact.  What’s interesting to note is that Brett Jones was only 15 years old when he stabbed his grandfather some eight times with a kitchen knife during an argument over whether the little fart had a right to shack up with his girlfriend in his grandfather’s house.  In California, as the law stands today, Jones (as a 15-year-old) could only have been prosecuted in juvenile court, with a potential release date of sometime before his 25th birthday.  (See the Admin. Note in the California Legal Update, Vol. 26, #3, Mar. 6, 2021, discussing SB 1391 (effective Jan. 1, 2019), W&I §§ 707(a)(1)-(2), 607(c), and O.G. v. Superior Court (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 626.)  But in Mississippi, he’s going away forever absent a later change in circumstances and modification of his sentence.  Just goes to show that if you’re a minor under the age of 16 and are intent upon stabbing your grandfather to death, do it in California and not Mississippi.