The Rule in Kellett[1]

RC Phillips,
DDA (Ret)
Sept. 2018

Kellett is a California Supreme Court case that holds that if a defendant commits a crime that can be charged in different ways, the prosecution must file all the charges together in the initial complaint.   If the prosecution fails to follow this rule and charges interrelated crimes in separate prosecutions, the subsequent charges will very likely be dismissed.

“When ... the prosecution is or should be aware of more than one offense in which the same act or course of conduct plays a significant part, all such offenses must be prosecuted in a single proceeding unless joinder is prohibited … .  Failure to unite all such offenses will result in a bar to subsequent prosecution of any offense omitted if the initial proceedings culminate in either acquittal or conviction and sentence.”  (Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822.)

A common example of a Kellett problem comes up in drunk driving cases.  The defendant is arrested for driving under the influence and for driving on a suspended license.  The police present the case to the charging D.A., but the results of the blood test are not available.  The prosecutor charges the 14601.2, but then waits for the blood alcohol test to come back to see if there is enough evidence to charge a DUI.  The 14601 case goes forward, and the defendant promptly pleads guilty and is sentenced to the usual probationary terms.  A few weeks later, the blood test results come back: defendant was a .20.  The prosecutor now charges the defendant in a separate complaint with DUI violations.   At arraignment, his knowledgeable defense lawyer objects and moves to dismiss the case under Kellett.  The court correctly grants the motion: the 14601 conviction stands, but the DUI is dismissed. 

Kellett problems are not confined to misdemeanors.  In Barriga v. Superior Court, (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 739, the victim was attacked by a group of 3 men who took, among other things, his car.  Four hours later, the police stopped the driver of the victim’s car.  There were two women and three men in the car, including the defendant who was a passenger.  The victim identified the driver and the other male passenger as the people who had assaulted and robbed him, but told the police that the defendant was not one of the robbers.  The defendant was immediately charged with 10851 and other charges relating to the car stop.  He was not charged with carjacking.  Shortly thereafter the defendant pleaded guilty to charges relating to car stop and was sentenced.  About a month later, the police discovered new evidence linking the defendant to the carjacking, and the DA charged him accordingly.  He moved to dismiss the new charges under Kellett and the court granted the motion.  The 10851 conviction remained valid, but the 215 case was not prosecutable against this defendant.

Even murder prosecutions can be at risk.  In People v. Hartman (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 572 the defendant forged one of his coworker’s checks.  The coworker had been killed just days before the forgery.  The defendant was initially charged with and convicted of crimes relating to the forgery, but he was not charged with murder.  The murder was not charged for several years.  When the defendant was eventually charged with murder, he moved to dismiss the charge for Kellett and speedy trial violations.  The trial court denied his motion and he was convicted.  The Court of Appeal reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant’s rights to a speedy trial had been violated. It was unnecessary to decide the case further, but the court stated, “we note that reversal is also required by … Kellett v. Superior Court …”  (170 Cal.App.3d at 572).

Kellett stems from the prohibitions listed in Penal Code section 654.  Penal Code section 654 has two distinct prohibitions.  The first prohibition is against multiple punishment:

            “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law [shall not] be punished under more than one provision.” (Penal Code section 654(a).)

            Most of us are familiar with this concept.  So for example, a DUI defendant can be convicted of both 23152(a), DUI, and 23152(b), driving with over .08% BAC.  But though a defendant may be convicted of both crimes, he or she may not be sentenced for both.

Kellett  is not concerned with double punishment.  Instead, Kellett applies the second prong of section 654, the rule against multiple prosecutions:

            “An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one [provision] bars a prosecution for the same act or commission under any other.” 

            In other words, section 654 prevents the people from filing a series of different cases against a defendant under different code sections relating to the same conduct.   Section 654 also prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same act where the defendant has already been convicted or acquitted.  (Penal Code § 654; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 557.)

            Obviously, Kellett is the leading case with respect to multiple prosecutions.  Kellett held that “When ... the prosecution is or should be aware of more than one offense in which the same act or course of conduct plays a significant part, all such offenses must be prosecuted in a single proceeding unless joinder is prohibited or severance permitted for good cause.  Failure to unite all such offenses will result in a bar to subsequent prosecution of any offense omitted if the initial proceedings culminate in either acquittal or conviction and sentence.” (Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d at 827.)  In other words, Kellett limitations arise when the same act or course of conduct plays a significant part in more than one offense.  (Id. at 136.)

            The purpose of the limit on multiple prosecutions is to prevent undue harassment of a defendant by a series of prosecutions involving substantially the same conduct.  The courts want to guard against the possibility that the prosecution could basically commit an end run around the double jeopardy rule by continually prosecuting the same conduct under a different name until the charges finally stick. 

            A second concern is the waste of public resources.  We all know how time consuming and costly criminal trials can be.  The Kellett rule seeks to limit the needless expense of repeated trials dealing with the same or very similar conduct.

            What do the courts mean by “the same act?”

The “same act” is pretty self-explanatory.  Let’s look back at our first example:  the drunk driver with the suspended license.  In this case there is but one act:  driving.  That driving plays a significant role in both the DUI and the 14601.  If the one act is charged by separate offenses in separate prosecutions, we have a Kellett problem. 

            The same act can also come up in a felony context.  In People v. Britt (2004) 32 Cal.4th 944, the defendant, a 290 registrant, moved his residence from Sacramento County to El Dorado County.  He failed to inform the authorities in Sacramento County that he was changing address, a violation of 290 law.  Upon moving in, he failed to register his new address with the authorities in El Dorado County.  Each county filed a separate 290 charge.  The defendant objected on Kellett grounds.  The California Supreme Court agreed.  In the court’s view, both crimes flowed from a single unreported move.  This was but one act, and therefore there could be but one prosecution. 

            What do the courts mean by “the same course of conduct?”

In People v. Ochoa (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 15, authorities were conducting two separate investigations of the same defendant for conspiracy to sell methamphetamine during roughly the same time period.  One investigation focused on methamphetamine distribution, and the second investigation focused on the defendant’s involvement with the Nuestra Familia Gang.  The conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine was common to both investigations.  The court noted that ‘[t]he conduct at issue here involves defendant's participation in the alleged conspiracies to distribute methamphetamine as well as the ancillary substantive offenses he committed to further the [drug] conspiracy, such as possessing and transporting methamphetamine. The question is whether the defendant's conduct as part of the Nuestra Familia conspiracy is a significant part of the course of conduct that formed the basis for the [drug] conspiracy or the substantive offenses charged in the [drug] complaint.”  (Ochoa, 248 Cal.App.4th at

31–32.)  The court went on to say, “The evidence shows that defendant's course of conduct in both cases took place at the same times and in the same places. By agreeing to receive methamphetamine from [non gang members] and storing them on his property, defendant was simultaneously furthering the Nuestra Familia conspiracy because the same drugs were intended to be sold to … Nuestra Familia members. Conversely, by agreeing to supply the methamphetamine to Nuestra Familia, defendant was simultaneously furthering the [non-gang drug] conspiracy because the same money paid to him by [gang members] could be used to buy the drugs from [suppliers unaffiliated with the gang]. We conclude from this evidence that … defendant's course of conduct formed a significant part of the offenses charged in both prosecutions.”  (Ochoa, 248 Cal.App.4th at 35–36.)

There are two approaches taken by courts in deciding whether different offenses constitute the “same course of conduct” for Kellett purposes.  1) whether the offenses occur at different locations and times (People v. Ward, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at 136); and 2) whether there is significant evidentiary overlap (People v. Hurtado (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 633, 636-37). 

            1.  Whether offenses were committed at different times and locations.

            “Kellett does not require, nor do the cases construing it, that offenses committed at different times and at different places must be prosecuted in a single proceeding.”  (People v. Cuevas (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 620, 624.)  Two crimes would not be part of the same course of conduct if they are committed at different locations, different times, against different victims, and with different objectives.  (People v. Ward, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at 136.)  

            In People v. Ward, the defendant was giving a woman a ride home when he instead stopped a block from the woman’s Los Angeles home and raped her at knifepoint.  He forced her into the trunk of his car.  He continued driving to the woman’s home where he found the victim’s daughter.  He tricked the daughter into riding with him in the same car.  With the mother in the trunk, he drove the daughter to a location in San Bernardino County and raped her.  He released the mother from the trunk and told both victims he was taking them to Florida.  He was ultimately arrested and charged in San Bernardino County with the sexual assault of the daughter.  He was charged in Los Angeles County with the sexual assault and kidnaping of the mother.  He pleaded guilty to the San Bernardino charges, then argued that the Los Angeles charges were barred by Penal Code section 654 and Kellett.  In support of his claim, he argued that he had a single overriding motive in both crimes: to force the mother to come with him to Florida.  The court of appeal rejected the argument.  The court found that Kellett did not apply in part because the conduct committed against the mother did not play a significant part in the offense against the daughter.   “The crimes were committed at different locations, at different times, against different victims, and with different objectives.  The mere fact that they occurred in defendant’s vehicle during the same night does not connect them as parts of a continuous course of conduct.”  (People v. Ward, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at 136.) 

            2.  Overlapping evidence test.

            When the “evidence needed to prove one offense necessarily supplies proof of the other” the two crimes are part of the same course of conduct.  (People v. Hurtado (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 633, 636.)  A trivial overlap in evidence, however, not preclude dual prosecution.  (Id. at 637.)

            In People v. Hurtado, the defendant was stopped by police for erratic driving.  The police determined that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.  After arresting defendant, the police also discovered that defendant had 20 balloons of heroin in his possession.  The defendant was charged in two separate cases filed the same day: one charging the narcotics offense, the other charging the driving.  He pleaded guilty to the driving offense, then argued that the court was required to dismiss the narcotics charges on Kellett grounds.  The court applied what it termed an “evidentiary test” to determine if Kellett principles had been violated.  “[I]f the evidence needed to prove one offense necessarily supplies proof of the other, ... the two offenses must be prosecuted together, in the interest of preventing needless harassment and waste of public funds.”  (People v. Hurtado, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at 636.)  The court noted that proof of the DUI charge would be supplied primarily by testimony of the highway patrol officers, while proof of the narcotics charges would stem primarily from the discovery of the heroin after the arrest took place.  “Evidence in the two cases ... was for the most part mutually exclusive, the only common ground being that defendant was in the moving automobile in possession of the heroin at the same time that he was under the influence of alcohol.  Such a trivial overlap of the evidence, however, under Kellett ... , does not mandate the joinder of these cases.”  (Id. at 637.)

            The “overlapping evidence” test can be very subjective.  Take the example of the case of People v. Flint (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 333.  (Yes Flint, not Britt.  Mike misspoke on the tape.)  In  Flint the victim left his car parked on the street at 2 in the morning.  Twenty minutes later, the California Highway Patrol found defendant inside the car, drunk.  He was arrested  for DUI.  “That day, May 17, a misdemeanor complaint was filed in the Culver City Municipal Court charging defendant with drunk driving. He pleaded not guilty. On May 20, a felony complaint charging defendant with the theft and joy riding violations was filed in the West Los Angeles Municipal Court. … On June 14, defendant pleaded guilty to the drunk driving charge. In July, defendant was held to answer in this [car theft] case. He then made a motion to dismiss the charges on grounds of multiple prosecution [under Kellett]. The motion was granted.”  (Flint 51 Cal.App.3d at 335.)

            The prosecutor argued essentially a “different time and place” test:  the theft and the DUI were not at the same time and could be charged separately.  The court looked to one of the stated purposes underlying the rule against multiple prosecution under Kellett:  whether there would be an undue consumption of court time because the prosecution would have to prove substantially the same evidence in each separate trial.  The court concluded that the evidence would be substantially the same in DUI trial as it would be in the theft trial, and therefore upheld the trial court’s decision to dismiss under Kellett. “We may readily grant that the car was stolen several minutes before defendant's arrest, but—the formal testimony of the victim aside—the same incident which furnished the evidence that defendant was driving in an intoxicated condition, also supplied proof that what he was driving was an automobile he had stolen.” (Flint 51 Cal.App.3d at 338.)

            Kellett applies when “the prosecution is or should be aware of more than one offense in which the same act or course of conduct plays a significant part.”  (Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d

In People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, the California Supreme Court noted that Kellett would not apply if the prosecutor is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence.

            Kellett does not apply if a crime, though started, is not complete at the time of the initial charging.  Thus, for example, section 654 does not preclude prosecuting a defendant for the murder of a victim who dies only after an earlier prosecution for attempted murder. 

In People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, the defendant assaulted and raped the victim in her home, then set her on fire. While she was still alive, he pleaded guilty to her rape and attempted murder. Later, she died of complications from her burns. A new information charged defendant with her murder under the special circumstances of rape and burglary murder. 

Defendant argued that the subsequent prosecution was barred under the multiple prosecution prong of Penal Code section 654.  He argued that, at the time he pleaded guilty to attempted murder, the prosecution knew or should have known that the victim's death was inevitable. The California Supreme Court rejected this argument.  “What is pertinent is that the fact necessary to the murder charge-the victim's death-had not yet occurred, not that it might, or even inevitably would, occur sometime in the future. A person cannot be prosecuted, and hence cannot be placed in jeopardy, for a crime not yet complete no matter how likely its future completion might be. Defendant finally argues that because he pleaded guilty to and received a substantial prison sentence for the crimes against Violet H., the prosecution did not need to press the charges involving Jensen immediately to prevent his release before she died. This circumstance makes no difference. The rule that a person may be prosecuted for murder after the victim's death despite an earlier prosecution for related crimes applies to all persons, including those who, like defendant, commit additional, unrelated crimes.”  (Scott, 15 Cal.4th at 1203.)

Kellett does not apply if the prosecutor is unable to bring the more serious charge at the outset because the prosecutor does not know and could not know some of the facts necessary to sustain that more serious charge despite the exercise of due diligence.

            In People v. Davis, (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, the victim was kidnapped and robbed of his car.  Just a few days later, the defendant was caught driving the car.  The victim could not identify the defendant, and the defendant made no omissions.  The prosecution, lacking sufficient evidence to charge the robbery and kidnapping, charged the defendant only with a misdemeanor violation of section 10851.  He plead guilty and was convicted and sentenced.  Over a year later, he was arrested for a separate murder.  During the course of that murder investigation, the defendant made admissions about the original kidnapping and robbery.  Along with the unrelated murder, he was charged with and convicted of the kidnapping and robbing the victim of the same car he had been caught driving in the 10851 case.  The defendant argued that the later conviction should be barred under Kellett.  The California Supreme Court denied the claim, relying in part on the lower court’s ruling that at the time the initial 10851 charges were brought, the authorities had insufficient evidence to identify the actual robber, and therefore could not have brought both charges together. 

Due diligence is an important consideration in deciding whether a prosecutor should have known about a related offense. 

In Barriga v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 739, three men assaulted the victim in a park, robbed him of his car keys, $4, and his cellphone, and drove off in the victim’s car.  Four hours later the police stopped the victim’s car.  Defendant was a passenger in the car, and disobeyed the officer’s order that he remain in the car.  The defendant was placed in the patrol car.  There were two other men in the car, including the driver, and two women.  At a field show-up, the victim identified the driver and the second male passenger as two of the attackers at the park, but he told police that the defendant that he was certain that defendant was not involved.  The D.A. charged the other two men with carjacking, and charged the defendant with resisting a police officer, unlawful driving of a stolen vehicle and some other charges related to his being stopped in the stolen car.  The D.A. did not charge him with carjacking.  (Because he was a juvenile, the charges were filed in juvenile court.)  About two weeks after his arrest, the defendant admitted the resisting a peace officer charge, and the remaining charges were dismissed. 

The arresting agency continued to investigate the carjacking charge.  About a month after the defendant’s arrest police executed a search warrant for the defendant’s cell phone and discovered evidence linking him to the original carjacking.  Approximately six weeks after the defendant’s arrest, and 2-1/2weeks after his guilty plea, the D.A. charged defendant with the carjacking in a new complaint.  The defendant argued that the carjacking prosecution had to be dismissed under Kellett.  Citing the victim’s statement that defendant was not one of the carjackers, the trial court denied the motion.  On appeal, the Court of Appeal disagreed.  The Court of Appeal recognized the exception to Kellett articulated in the Davis: whether the prosecutor could have known of necessary facts using due diligence.  The Barriga court therefore concluded that the question before it was whether, at the time of charging, the prosecutor should have been aware of the evidence linking Barriga to the carjacking.  The Court of Appeal concluded that the prosecution should have been aware of the evidence and would have been aware of the evidence if the police had acted with due diligence.  “[T]he People do not draw our attention to any evidence … that explains why they could not have, with reasonable efforts, and in the exercise of due diligence, obtained a search warrant for Barriga’s cell phone … before they charged him” with the lesser crimes in the first prosecution.  (Barriga, 206 Cal.App.4th at 748.)  The court therefore found that Kellett did apply, and the carjacking prosecution was barred.

The question sometimes arises as to whether the prosecution is actually aware of other charges being filed.  There is an exception to the Kellett rule if the prosecution is not actually aware of parallel prosecutions, where the prosecution should not have been expected to know of the parallel prosecution. 

In People v. Ochoa (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 15, discussed in more detail above, the authorities were conducting two separate investigations of the same defendant for conspiracy to sell methamphetamine during roughly the same time period.  One investigation focused on methamphetamine distribution, and was conducted by the state Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, the federal Drug Enforcement Agency, and the San Jose Police.  As a result of the investigation, the Santa Clara District Attorney’s Office charged the defendant for conspiracy to distribute narcotics with several other drug sellers and buyers. The defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced for this offense. The second investigation focused on the defendant’s involvement with the Nuestra Familia Gang, and was conducted by the Santa Clara County specialized enforcement team, the Campbell Police Department, and the San Jose Police Department.  The Santa Clara District Attorney’s Office charged this investigation in a separate prosecution charging the defendant with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine for the benefit of the gang.  The second prosecution was filed after the defendant had already been sentenced for the first.  The trial court dismissed this second prosecution on Kellett grounds.  The prosecution argued that the two prosecutions were separate investigations by different agencies brought by different prosecutors.  The prosecution did not explicitly state whether the different prosecutors were aware of both investigations, but the court took time to address the issue.  The court noted that the San Jose police participated in both investigations, and the Santa Clara District Attorney’s Office filed both prosecutions.  There was even circumstantial evidence that the prosecutor in the first case was aware of the second investigation.  The defendant’s lawyer heard about the second investigation, and asked the first prosecutor whether the defendant would be charged again.  The prosecutor responded that the defendant “should plead now.”  The court concluded from all the evidence that the prosecutor was aware of both prosecutions. 

In deciding whether to dismiss for Kellett violations the courts look at questions relating to jurisdiction, but the fact that crimes are charged by two different jurisdictions is not determinative.    The Kellett/654 bar does not apply if joinder is prohibited or severance permitted for good cause.  (People v. Britt (2004) 32 Cal.4th 944, 954.) Where separate offenses also involve separate jurisdictions, a defendant’s Kellett claim is predicated on the assumption that both counties have jurisdictional venue to hear the charges.  (People v. Ward, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at 135.)  It follows that if one county has jurisdiction over one offense, and a second county has jurisdiction over the second, the two offenses are immune from a Kellett claim.  “It would be absurd to hold that crimes must be tried together if they may not be tried together.”  (People v. Britt, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 954.)  If, however, both counties have jurisdiction over both crimes, the offenses are subject to Kellett attack.  (Id. at 954-55.) 

Jurisdictional concerns are heightened where there are different prosecuting agencies.  (Id. at 955.)  Where there are different public law offices involved in prosecution, there are certain risks.  In People v. Ward, discussed more fully above, the defendant was charged with rape of a mother in Los Angeles County, and with a rape of the victim’s daughter in San Bernardino.  Each county opted to file only the crimes that occurred within its borders dude to jurisdictional concerns.   “Under these fast-moving events, it is doubtful that either county had the opportunity to give full consideration to the jurisdictional problems involved ... .  Even though it might be said that they were chargeable with knowledge thereof, it is not reasonable to assume that the ... authorities [in the second county] should have anticipated that defendant would plead guilty at such an early date.”  (Id. at 137.)   

On the other hand, the mere fact that different jurisdictions were involved does not by itself trump the Kellett rule.  In the Britt case, discussed more fully above, both Sacramento and El Dorado county had jurisdiction over a 290 registrant who moved from one county to the other without informing either of the new address.  The court noted that where both counties have jurisdiction over both crimes, the offenses may be subject to Kellett attack.  (Britt 32 Cal.4th at954-55.)  The court found that Kellett did apply to the two prosecutions and ultimately dismissed the second of them. 

There may be policy and substantial justice concerns at play in deciding whether to dismiss a prosecution under Kellett.  This is especially true if we have a felony that is dismissed in favor of a misdemeanor. In such cases, there is a risk that “a misdemeanor prosecutor may proceed without adequately assessing the seriousness of a defendant’s conduct ... .”  (People v. Ward, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at 136.) 

            The Kellett/654 bar against multiple prosecution “is primarily a procedural safeguard against harassment.”  (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 557 (citations and quotations omitted).)  The policies underlying the bar are to prevent that harassment of the defendant and to prevent the waste of public resources through relitigation of the issues.  (Id. at 558.)  As we discussed, one of the issues in Davis was whether or not the prosecution could have known all the facts it needed to support the filing of the greater of several crimes involved with the defendant’s arrest.  But the court also discussed policy considerations:

[T]he policies underlying section 654-preventing harassment of the defendant and the waste of public resources through relitigation of issues ...-would not be served here by holding that the kidnapping and robbery charges were barred.  Here, defendant's interest in being free from the harassment of a second trial in relation to the [10851] incident was minimal given that he was already on trial for the much more serious charges arising from [unrelated] 1985 murders.  Further, the public's interest in avoiding the waste of resources through relitigation was minimal given that defendant pled guilty to unlawfully taking [the victim’s] car, thus dispensing with a need for a trial.  Balanced against these minimal interests was the public's weighty interest in prosecuting and punishing defendant for the serious crimes of robbing and kidnapping the victim.

            (People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 558-59 (citations omitted).)

            A concern that a defendant will escape proper justice is not limited to situations where the initial prosecution is for a misdemeanor and the subsequent prosecution is a felony.  The Ward opinion said, “We recognize that Kellett limited its comments to situations where the initial prosecution is for a misdemeanor and the subsequent prosecution is for a felony.  We see no reason why this exception should not be extended to case involving successive felony prosecutions in different jurisdictions under circumstances comparable to those anticipated by Kellett.”  (Ward, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at 137.)

            Some takeaways:

• Know Kellett and educate police officers about its dangers.  Start with the excellent summary of Kellett law attached.  This summary was originally written by then Alameda County (now Santa Clara County) Deputy District Attorney Jeff Rubin and reflects his thorough and enlightened approach to complex legal issues.

• Look out for Kellett red flag situations:
  • Continuous crimes, such as conspiracy, kidnapping, human trafficking
  • Vehicle related cases, such as 10851s, 2800.3s, 23152s
  • Firearm or stolen property crimes:  are these items connected to more serious crimes?
  • Cases involving multiple counties or agencies

• Don’t be in a hurry to charge if you spot a Kellett issue.  Consider a PV, if possible, while you wait for the evidence to solidify.

• If you must charge and you know there’s a potential Kellett problem, document what you do and don’t know about the greater crime, and make sure to expedite any follow-up investigation.

• Ask questions:  reach out to other agencies or D.A.s office that might be connected to the case

• If you become aware that there are two separate prosecutions that may violate Kellett, take immediate action:  consolidate or even dismiss charges if necessary.

Additional Case Law:

People v. Hendrix (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 457:  P.C. § 654 did not bar prosecution of defendant’s DUI offenses where the same act or course of conduct did not play a significant part in both his failure to stop at a red light infraction and the DUI offenses because although the red light infraction and the DUI offenses were recorded in the same police report, all that was needed to prove the red light infraction was proof defendant rolled through that light, while the evidence needed to prove the DUI offenses was supplied by the observations the officers made after defendant was stopped, his failure to successfully perform various field sobriety tests, and this subsequent BAC testing, and that evidence depended in no way on the circumstances that led him to being pulled over. 

[1]   This P&A was originally shown in June 2017.  It is authored by Assistant District Attorney Micheal O’Connor.