Miranda and the Non-Custodial Interrogation
Robert C. Phillips
DDA (Retired)
June, 2015
Kim Raymond Kopatz was deeply in debt. With thirteen maxed-out credit cards totaling some $117,883 of debt, and a family monthly income that covered only half the bills, including the minimum credit card payments, Kopatz’s was living upside down, financially speaking. His wife, Mary, worked as the manager of a Jenny Craig weight loss center in Riverside. But Kopatz himself was unable to help with the family income due to injuries he’d suffered in a workplace accident. And as a stay-at-home father to his two daughters, Kopatz’s efforts to make money in the stock market through day-trading was just not working out.
However, Kopatz did have life insurance policies on his wife and his 3-year-old daughter, Carley, totaling more than $800,000 in value, as well as $13,628 in policies on his wife’s wedding and anniversary rings. But of course, that money just wasn’t available, . . . unless, . . .
On April 22, 1999, Mary, who was always punctual, failed to show up at work. Also, the couple’s eight-year-old daughter, Ashley, who Kopatz had taken to school that morning, was experiencing a diabetes-related problem requiring the school officials to get permission to administer an insulin shot. Efforts by both the school officials and Mary’s co-workers to get ahold of either Mary or Kopatz during the morning hours were unsuccessful, with neither person answering their cell phones nor home phone.
A drive-by of the Kopatzs’ home revealed that Mary’s Chrysler, which she always drove to work, was parked in the driveway, and the family van, which normally occupied that spot, was nowhere in sight. And Ray Kopatz was similarly nowhere to be seen. More calls to both the Kopatzs’ cells and their home phone continued to go unanswered.
Finally, at about 1:00 p.m., Kopatz was observed by neighbors working on his sprinklers in the front yard. At 1:15, he called Mary’s work and “calmly” asked if Mary had brought Carley to work with her. He explained that Mary was going to run some errands that morning before going to work and that she was going to take Carley to work with her for “take your daughter to work day;” an assertion that seemed odd in that Mary had instructed office personnel weeks earlier that no one was to bring their kids to work due to liability concerns. Kopatz also claimed to have been in the backyard working all morning and didn’t hear either the house phone or his cell phone.
Mary’s co-workers and Kopatz’s relatives then descended upon the residence intent upon finding out what had happened to Mary and Carley. Kopatz’s claims of working in the backyard all morning, digging and installing sprinkler pipe, didn’t ring true in that he was dressed in all white and was neither sweaty nor dirty. He did, however, have blue pipe glue on the tops of his hands and forearms. Also, two rings similar to Mary’s wedding and anniversary rings were seen by one witness on a bathroom sink.
While attempting to retrace Mary’s steps that morning, Kopatz’s brother finally found the missing van, parked and locked, on a residential street about a mile away. Mary and Carley’s lifeless bodies were found inside the van by responding paramedics. It was later determined that both Mary and Carley died from asphyxia due to ligature compression of the neck. The ligature marks indicated that they had been strangled from behind with a smooth cord, such as a nylon rope or electrical cord. Mary also had two broken ribs and blunt force trauma to her face and the back of her head, along with contusions from her shoulders to her hands, as well as on her knees. It was also apparent that she’d been lying face down at some point, contrary to the face up position in which she was found in the van, indicating that she’d been moved postmortem. And although Mary’s pants were found to be unbuttoned, unzipped, and spread open, exposing her underwear, with her bra “protruding” from under her shirt, the autopsy revealed no indications of a sexual assault. Mary’s wedding and anniversary rings were missing. Carley’s body had some superficial slash wounds that appeared to have been made postmortem.
Riverside police, with an evidence technician, responded to the Kopatzs’ residence. In checking Kopatz, the evidence tech noted red marks on his eyelid and wrist, scratches on his forehead and hands, cuts on his hands, bruises around his elbows, and “blue glue” on his hands covering some of his wounds. Kopatz became uncooperative when efforts were made to take photographs of, and swabs from, his hands, refusing to answer any questions put to him by the evidence tech.
Throughout the evening, Kopatz repeatedly complained of severe back and head pain, but never asked about the progress of the investigation relating to his wife or daughter. Although paramedics could not find anything wrong with him, they eventually took him to the hospital, followed by Riverside P.D. Officers. Later, at the request of detectives, and after Kopatz was examined and cleared by the medical staff, the officer told Kopatz that they were taking him to the detective bureau for an interview. Kopatz didn’t object, but instead responded with a non-committal “fine.”
Although Kopatz continued to complain about head and neck pain, he still failed to inquire about the investigation or his wife or daughter. At the police station, detectives took his statement in an interview lasting less than an hour. He was not advised of his Miranda[1] rights. He was then driven to his brother’s house and released. Four days later, Kopatz filed an insurance claim for his wife’s missing wedding and anniversary rings.
In a consensual search of the Kopatz residence, blood was found on a doorframe that was later determined through DNA testing to likely be Mary’s (one in 4.2 million Caucasians, one in 7.6 million Hispanics, and one in 95 million African-Americans). Blood found on a carpet in the house had been compromised by an “inhibitor,” such as a cleaning solution. However, fibers found on Mary’s body were consistent with fibers from the carpet. And lastly, a witness who lived near where the van had been abandoned testified that he’d seen Kopatz walking away from the area the morning of the murders.
Based upon the above (and other post-murder consciousness-of-guilt activity), Kopatz was eventually arrested and charged in state Court with two counts of murder[2] with the special circumstances of murder for financial gain[3] and multiple murder.[4] At trial, and over his objection, the videotaped one hour interview by detectives was played for the jury. Upon his conviction and death sentence, appeal to the California Supreme Court was automatic.
The California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed at People v. Kopatz (Apr. 30, 2015) 61 Cal.4th 62. Among the issues on appeal was the admissibility of Kopatz’s one-hour videotaped interview with detectives. Although he never admitted to killing his wife and daughter, the interview was important in that it contained a number of inconsistent and improbable statements relevant to his consciousness of guilt.
Kopatz’s argument on appeal was that he was in custody at the time of the interview, having been unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that failing to advise him of his rights violated the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona.[5] The People argued in response that no such Miranda warnings were legally necessary under the circumstances in that he was neither arrested (“seized”) nor in Miranda-custody.[6]
The Supreme Court, agreed with the People. Unless a person is in custody at the time of his interrogation, no Miranda admonishment and waiver is necessary. An interrogation is custodial only when “a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”[7] The test for Miranda-custody is whether a reasonable person would have felt, under the circumstances, that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. The objective circumstances of the interrogation are examined, not the “subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”[8]
Per the Court, “the test for determining whether a person was seized under the Fourth Amendment or was under Miranda custody is essentially the same: whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was at liberty to leave or to decline the officers’ requests to go to the detective bureau and be interviewed there.”[9]
Looking at the objective circumstances of this case, Kopatz was never treated as anything other than a mere witness. He was never restrained, being free to move around his house during the initial investigation. Going to the hospital was his idea. Although he was apparently told, as opposed to asked, that he would be taken to the detective bureau from the hospital (the officer couldn’t remember the details), he did not object. He was neither handcuffed nor frisked. No weapons were displayed by the officers. He walked to the officer’s patrol car of his own accord. The drive to the station was only 10 minutes during which Kopatz’s only complaint was about still being in some physical discomfort.[10]
At the station, Kopatz was told that he’d be free to go after the interview, and was in fact given a ride to this brother’s house afterwards. He was given a bathroom break when he asked. The interview itself took place in an unlocked interview room, lasted less than an hour, and was never “hostile, menacing, or accusatory,”[11]
Based upon these circumstances, Kopatz was never “seized,” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, nor was he subjected to a custodial interrogation. “(U)nder the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Kopatz’s position would not have believed he was in custody, and thus, Miranda warnings were unnecessary.”[12]
While the lack of custody in this case might seem obvious, there were at least two issues here where the Supreme Court was actually pushing the envelope. First, and the most obvious, was the unconsented to transporting of Kopatz from the hospital to the police station.
The general rule has always been that any non-consensual transportation of a suspect constitutes an arrest.[13] Here, the transporting officer testified that he couldn’t remember whether he’d asked Kopatz to come with him, or just told him, which is cop-speak for admitting that Kopatz wasn’t given a choice. We only got a favorable ruling on this issue because Kopatz didn’t object (telling the officer; “fine”) and there were no other indications that he was under arrest; i.e., no frisks, handcuffs, nor other indicia of an arrest. This issue could have gone either way on us.
Secondly, the Court held that the “the test for determining whether a person was seized under the Fourth Amendment or was under Miranda custody is essentially the same: whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was at liberty to leave or to decline the officers’ requests to go to the detective bureau and be interviewed there.”[14] This is contrary to what lower courts have been saying for years.
Per the Fourth District Court of Appeal (Div. 3) in People v. Pilster,[15] “custody” for purposes of Miranda, under the Fifth Amendment, involves a different analysis than “custody” for purposes of a detention or arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Per Pilster, the Fourth Amendment requires an analysis of the reasonableness of the officer’s actions. “In contrast, Fifth Amendment Miranda custody claims do not examine the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct, but instead examine whether a reasonable person (in the defendant’s position) would conclude the restraints used by police were tantamount to a formal arrest.”[16]
Either way, however, although the Supreme Court here did not discuss harmless error, even without Kopatz’s interview he would still have been convicted. Kopatz’s plan to resolve his financial woes through insurance money from the murder of a loved one was hardly unique. And he certainly wasn’t the most brilliant wife-killer we’ve ever seen. This was a pretty strong circumstantial-evidence case.
[1] Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436
[2] P.C. § 187
[3] P.C. § 190.2(a)(1)
[4] P.C. § 190.2(a)(3)
[5] Miranda v. Arizona, supra.
[6] People v. Kopatz, supra., at p. 79
[7] Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at p. 444
[8] Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) 541 U.S. 652, 663
[9] People v. Kopatz, supra., at p. 80
[10] Id., at pp. 80-81
[11] Id., at pp. 81-82
[12] Id., at pp. 79-82
[13] See Kaupp v. Texas (2003) 538 U.S. 626;
and People v. Harris (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 384.
[14] People v. Kopatz, supra., at p. 80
[15] (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395
[16] Id., at p. 1406
See also People v. Bejasa (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 26;
United States v. Sullivan (4th Cir. 1998) 138 F.3rd 126, 131; and
United States v. Smith (7th Cir. 1993) 3 F.3rd 1088, 1097
