Miranda and the Equivocal Invocation

            Robert C. Phillips

Deputy District Attorney (Ret.)
August, 2014

            In a gruesome series of murders as graphically described in the California Supreme Court decision of People v. Suff,[1] and reminiscent of the television series “Criminal Minds,” twelve prostitutes disappeared off the streets of the Cities of Lake Elsinore and Riverside between June, 1989, and December, 1991.  Their bodies were eventually found, one by one, abandoned in fields and other rural areas.  Commonalities indicating that they had all been murdered by the same serial killer included, in addition to being prostitutes, that each victim met her end by asphyxiation due to strangulation, four of the victims had also suffered stab wounds to the chest, and the right breast of three of the victims having been excised and left near the bodies.  Fibers, hair samples, DNA, unique mismatched tire tracks, and shoeprints were recovered from most of the victims and the areas where they were dumped.  A special law enforcement task force was created to catch the killer.

            In January, 1989, one of the killer’s intended victims, a prostitute named Rhonda Jetmore, escaped.  After being picked up off Main Street in the City of Lake Elsinore by an individual later identified as William Lester Suff, and while negotiating the cost of her services, Suff suddenly attacked her, cutting off her airway with his bare hands.  While face to face with her assailant as he choked her, Jettmore was able to get a good look at his face.  She also noted at one point that he wore a belt buckle with the name “Bill” on it.

            Fortunately, Jetmore was able to break free from Suff by hitting him in the head with a flashlight she had with her, knocking off his wire-rimmed glasses.  She then made good her escape as Suff sought to retrieve his glasses.  Her description of his physical appearance, including the glasses he wore and the van he drove along with some of the van’s contents, later became instrumental in Suff’s later capture and prosecution.

            Finally, on the evening of January 9, 1992, Riverside Motor Officer Frank Orta was on patrol in an area of Riverside known for its prostitution activity when a van attracted his attention.  As Officer Orta watched, an apparent prostitute approached and conversed with the driver of the van, only to walk away.  But being aware of information from a police bulletin concerning an individual and a vehicle suspected to be involved in the serial killings of prostitutes in Riverside County, and noting that the van matched the general description of the killer’s van, Officer Orta decided to follow it. 

            Upon observing the van make an illegal turn without signaling, Officer Orta effected a traffic stop and contacted its driver; William Lee Suff.  It was quickly determined that Suff’s license was suspended and his vehicle registration expired.  Also, Suff resembled a composite sketch of the murder suspect obtained from Jetmore’s description of the man who attacked her.  Officers assigned to the special prostitute murder task force, and eventually a homicide detective—Christine Keers—were notified.  After some investigation at the scene, noting the similarities between Suff’s van and the suspect vehicle, including its unique mismatched tires and some of the contents of the van as described by Rhonda Jetmore, Suff was arrested for a parole violation, having served prison time in Texas for murdering his daughter some years back, and transported to the police station for questioning.

            At the police station, Detective Keers advised Suff of his Miranda[2] rights and obtained a waiver in writing. But then Suff asked; “Do I need a lawyer?”  To this, Detective Keers responded; “Well, I don’t know.  Do you need a lawyer?”  Suff then said; “I don't know. For what I’ve done, I don’t see why I need a lawyer.” Keers then said, “And all I’m doing is asking you to talk to me.  Do you want to do that?” He said, “Okay.”  From this point, Keers began questioning Suff about the prostitute murders.  Suff, not surprisingly, denied any involvement. 

            Not too far into the interrogation, Detective Keers asked Suff for consent to search his apartment.  Perhaps growing wary of the possibility that he was actually suspected of having murdered a number of prostitutes, Suff responded to the consent-to-search request with; “I need to know, am I being charged with this, because if I’m being charged with this I think I need a lawyer.” Keers responded; “Well at this point, no you’re not being charged with this.” Immediately following this exchange, Suff consented to a search of his apartment. 

The interrogation continued over the next three and a half hours.  During this time, Suff made a number of incriminating admissions connecting him directly with at least one of the murders in a vain attempt to explain away his possession of a bloody knife found in his van which was used to stab several of the victims. 

            Charged with twelve murders and a premeditated attempted murder, with special circumstances, Suff contended in pretrial motions that he invoked his right to counsel during the early interrogation stage when he stated; “I need to know, am I being charged with this, because if I’m being charged with this I think I need a lawyer.”  If found to be an invocation, Suff’s post-invocation admissions should be suppressed.  The trial court, however, found such an attempt at an invocation of his Miranda rights to be equivocal and legally ineffective.  The California Supreme Court agreed.[3]

            The rule is simple, even if not always so easily applied:  “In order to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege after it has been waived, and in order to halt police questioning after it has begun, the suspect ‘must unambiguously’ assert his right to silence or counsel.”[4]  Suff’s argument centered on the theory that because Detective Keers had to have known in her own mind that he was about to be formally charged with the murders, then his invocation was clear and unequivocal.  Further, if not sure herself, with the prosecutor sitting nearby monitoring the interrogation, she had an obligation to ask.[5]

            The High Court responded, however, that this issue has been decided before,[6] and that the detective had no obligation to inform Suff of the likelihood that he would be formally charged.  “There is no requirement that, before a person may validly waive his privilege against self-incrimination, he must be apprised of the evidence against him, the ‘severity of his predicament,’ or the chances he will be charged.”[7]

            The majority of the Court (with Justice Liu vehemently disagreeing[8]) rejected Suff’s argument that Detective Keers’ alleged “deceit and trickery,” where “it is obvious that she was deliberately buying time in an effort to keep him talking,” should not be allowed to thwart his attempt to invoke his right to the assistance of counsel under Miranda.[9]  Per the Court; “The focus of the test . . . is the clarity of the defendant’s request, not the particular officer’s belief, and there is no requirement that an officer ask clarifying questions.”[10]  Whether or not Detective Keers was in fact attempting to be “tricky,” therefore, is irrelevant in the face of a suspect’s equivocal attempt to invoke. 

            Lastly, Suff attempted to characterize his initial waiver of his rights as “conditional,” contending that it was “limited” because he “placed a condition on his waiver” when he stated that he thought he needed a lawyer if he was being charged.  The Court, however, noted that Suff never stated that he would speak to the detectives without the assistance of counsel only if not charged with the crimes.  And there is no legal obligation for the detective to seek out such a clarification.  While selective waivers are in fact recognized by the courts,[11] the Supreme Court declined to let Suff “avoid (the requirement that an invocation be clear and unequivocal) by characterizing an ambiguous reference to counsel as a limitation on his waiver of his Miranda rights.”[12]

            William Lester Suff sits on death row today.  As noted by Justice Liu in his criticism of Detective Keers’ “trickery,” the evidence of his guilt was over-whelming with or without his admissions.  But that doesn’t make it any less important for prosecutors, as well as investigators, to be aware of the rules on ambiguous attempts to invoke one’s Miranda rights in the mid-interrogation circumstance.  And it is also important to note that when an equivocal attempt at an invocation is made at the initiation of an interrogation (i.e., without a prior waiver), it may very well be held to be legally effective, requiring clarification if we are to make the argument that the suspect didn’t really intend to invoke.[13]

[1]             (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013

[2]             Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436

[3]             People v. Suff, supra, at pp. 1068-1070

[4]             Id, at p. 1068; quoting People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 535

See also Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452 

[5]             People v. Suff, supra, at p. 1070

[6]             See People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111

[7]             People v. Suff, supra, at p. 1070

[8]             Id., at pp. 1079-1080

[9]             Id., at p. 1069

[10]            Id., at p. 1070

[11]            E.g., Arnold v. Runnels (9th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 859, 864

[12]            People v. Suff, supra, at p. 1070

[13]            People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 553

Sessoms v. Runnels (9th Cir. 2012) 691 F.3rd1054