Interrogating Juveniles
Robert C. Phillips, Deputy District Attorney (Ret).
October 31, 2022

Necessary admonishments when interrogating minors under the age of 18.

Agent Matt Ryan of the Campbell Police Department recently confronted me with his concerns about law enforcement’s legal right to question juvenile suspects and the necessary admonishments required before you, as a police officer, do so.  In answer to this question, two Welfare and Institutions Code sections come into play: 

Welf. & Inst. Code § 625, which has been around for some six decades, mandates that: “In any case where a minor is taken into temporary custody on the ground that there is reasonable cause for believing that such minor is a person described in Section 601 or 602, or that he has violated an order of the juvenile court or escaped from any commitment ordered by the juvenile court, the officer shall advise such minor that anything he says can be used against him and shall advise him of his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent, his right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and his right to have counsel appointed if he is unable to afford counsel.”  There are several important things to note here: 

• The term “temporary custody” as used in this section has been held to be the equivalent of having been arrested.  (See In re Ian C. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 856, 860; In re Thierry S. (1977) 19 Cal.3rd 727, 734, fn. 6.)
• “Reasonable cause” is the same thing as “probable cause.”  (Heien v. North Carolina (2014) 574 U.S. 54, 62.)
• Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 601 and 602 reference being uncontrollable, a truant, and/or when in violation of any law. 
• The described admonishment is roughly the equivalent of the standard Miranda (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.) admonishment given to any adult.  Note, however, that for a juvenile, there’s no requirement that the minor ever be questioned in order for this admonishment requirement to kick in. 
• There’s no indication in the section or any case law dictating when during the arrest process (except prior to any questioning, if the minor is in fact questioned) that the admonishment must be administered. 
• Except for under the rules of Miranda (again, if the juvenile is questioned), there is no sanction for failing to Mirandize the minor. I.e., we don’t suppress an arrest and if not questioned, there are no statements to suppress.

Welf. & Inst. § 625.6:  Thanks largely to some limited instances when police interrogators have perhaps pressured a juvenile suspect into what is later determined to be a “false confession” (e.g., see In re Elias V. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 568, 578, 587-600), and recognizing that minors often lack “the fortitude or confidence” to resist what might be considered a high pressure interrogation (Id., at p. 579.), the California Legislature took it a step further by enacting another statute which, on its face, appears to have pretty much ended any attempt to interrogate an in-custody juvenile.  Pursuant to Welf. & Inst. § 625.6, first effective as of January 1, 2018 (SB 395), and subsequently amended as of January 1, 2021 (SB 203; raising the age of the minor from 15 or less to 17 or less), the following requirements have been imposed upon an interrogating law enforcement officer:

• A law enforcement officer who intends to question an in-custody minor “shall” first, before given any admonishment and seeking a waiver, tell the minor, that he is to “consult with legal counsel in person, by telephone, or by video conference. The consultation may not be waived.” (Subd. (a)) 

However, the Legislature left some wiggle room:  If an interrogating officer ignores the dictates of subdivision (a), and the prosecution then attempts to use any statements obtained from a juvenile in violation of subdivision (a), a trial court may still admit into evidence the juvenile’s statements upon considering the following balancing test, as provided for in subdivision (b):

• The trial court “shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth 17 years of age or younger made during or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with subdivision (a) . . .”

The Legislature also (albeit inexplicably) threw in the following warnings for the interrogating officer:

• The court “shall consider any willful violation of subdivision (a) in determining the credibility of a law enforcement officer under Section 780 of the Evidence Code.”  (Evid. Code § 780 lists the factors a trier of fact (judge or jury) may consider “in determining the credibility of a witness (including) any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing, . . .”

Another exception to the subdivision (a) is provided in subdivision (c).

• This section does not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth 17 years of age or younger if both of the following criteria are met:

(1) The officer who questioned the youth reasonably believed the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from an imminent threat.

(2) The officer's questions were limited to those questions that were reasonably necessary to obtain that information.

And lastly, subdivision (d) of the statute provides an exception for probation officers:

• This section does not require a probation officer to comply with subdivision (a) in the normal performance of his or her duties under W&I §§ 625, 627.5, or 628.

Note that all the above deals with “in-custody” juveniles.  None of the above is relevant (allowing you to ignore the W&I §§ 625 and 625.6 admonishment requirements) when the juvenile who is questioned is not in custody.  Whether or not a juvenile is in custody when questioned, however, depends upon an evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances.  A non-exclusive list of those circumstances include:

• Whether contact with law enforcement was initiated by the police or the person interrogated;
• If initiated by the police, whether the person voluntarily agreed to an interview;
• Whether the express purpose of the interview was to question the person as a witness or a suspect;
• Where the interview took place;
• Whether police informed the person that he or she was under arrest or in custody;
• Whether they informed the person that he or she was free to terminate the interview and leave at any time and/or whether the person's conduct indicated an awareness of such freedom;
• Whether there were restrictions on the person's freedom of movement during the interview;
• How long the interrogation lasted;
• How many police officers participated;
• Whether the police dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation;
• Whether they manifested a belief that the person was culpable and they had evidence to prove it;
• Whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory;
• Whether the police used interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect; and
• Whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation.

(In re Matthew W. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 392, 405; noting that “(n)o one factor is dispositive,” citing In re I.F. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 735, 759; and People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162; People v. Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528, 539-540.)

The Court in In re Matthew W. discusses an addition factor in juvenile cases, noting that “a child’s age may be considered in the Miranda analysis, ‘so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.’”  (Id., at pp. 405-406, citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261, 277 [180 L. Ed. 2nd 310; 131 S. Ct. 2394].)

And then despite all this, note that the First District Court of Appeal (Div. 4) has also chimed in, ruling that a minor’s statements to police are not rendered inadmissible by the failure of police to arrange for him to consult with counsel, as required by Welf. & Inst. Code § 625.6.  In June of 1982, Proposition 8 (eventually becoming section 28(f)(2) of the California Constitution) was passed by California’s voters, dictating that unless also in violation of the U.S. Constitution or its amendments, evidence obtained in violation of a California statute will not be suppressed.  In In re Anthony L. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 438, 448-450, because the 15-year-old minor’s rights under the United States Constitution were not violated when the officers ignored W&I § 625.6, but where he validly waived his Miranda rights and willingly answered questions after acknowledging that he understood his rights as well as the consequences of waiving them, and there was nothing in the record to the contrary, it was held not to be error to use his incriminating statements against him. 

So what do you do?  Considering your professional and ethical obligation to comply with California law, my strong suggestion is to follow the Legislature’s dictates as described in W&I § 625.6, at least as a general rule.  When absolutely necessary, however, given the nature of the case in front of you, and where you can articulate the importance of obtaining a juvenile’s statements, an exception might be justified. This is a decision that by its nature is very case specific, and one that I have to leave up to you.