Interrogating Juveniles; Custody, Beheler, & Common Sense
By Robert C. Phillips
DDA: Retired
April, 2018
It is becoming increasingly recognized that juveniles present a unique problem in attempting to obtain incriminatory statements in the custodial interrogation setting. It is estimated, for instance, that of the false confessions obtained by law enforcement, more than one third (35%) of such confessions are obtained from individuals under the age of 18.[1]
If you have difficulty accepting this premise, you should know that yet another appellate court decision has recently come down graphically illustrating this fact. In In re I.F.,[2] California’s Third District Court of Appeal describes in encyclopedic detail the plight of a 12-year-old murder suspect as he is confronted by a series of interrogations that, although never completely successful, do eventually squeeze out of him enough in the way of contradictory statements to earn him a juvenile court magistrate’s true finding.
The Facts:
I.F.’s nightmare (not to mention the agony to which his entire family was about to be subjected) began on the morning of April 27, 2013. B.F. (husband) and C.W. (wife), living in California’s Calaveras County with their blended family of six children, ages one to 15, all headed out to attend a Little League game, leaving only I.F. and his 8-year-old sister, L.F., home alone. Just after noon, C.W. received a panicked call on her cellphone from I.F., telling her that an intruder had come into their home and “hit” L.F., and then ran out. B.F and C.W. immediately hurried home, calling 911 on the way.[3]
The 911 operator called the “distraught” I.F. who told her that while he was in the bathroom, he heard a door slam. He then heard someone yelling and banging on the bathroom door. He emerged from the bathroom and saw a “Mexican” man running out the sliding glass back door, I.F. providing a detailed description of the man. I.F. further told the 911 operator that the man “stabbed (L.F.) a bunch of times,” adding, “she’s like dead.”[4]
When B.F. and C.W. arrived, they found L.F. dead on the floor in her bedroom, not realizing that she’d been stabbed until lifting her shirt revealed the stab wounds. When paramedics arrived, they found L.F. already cold to the touch with no pulse and not breathing. An autopsy later revealed that L.F. had 22 stab wounds, mainly in the chest area.[5]
Interviewed immediately by the first officer on the scene, I.F. said that he came out of the bathroom in time to see a man running towards the sliding glass back door. I.F. claimed that he chased the man to the back door, and then, upon hearing L.F. call out, turned around and went to check on her. As they talked, the deputy noticed that there was blood smeared across I.F.’s right forearm.[6]
A subsequent investigation, including a neighborhood check, failed to reveal any evidence that the suspect I.F. had described actually existed. The investigation also resulted in the discovery of some of L.F.’s blood on a tee shirt found in I.F.’s room, on a knife found in the kitchen, and on some sneakers I.F. would wear while doing yardwork around the house.[7]
In the ensuing two weeks, I.F. was interviewed four more times while never receiving a Miranda[8] admonishment. The admissibility of his statements at those interviews later became an issue at a Juvenile Court jurisdictional hearing as well as on appeal. The substance of these interviews and legal issues they generated are discussed below. On May 14, 2013 (two days after the final interview), a W&I Code 602 petition was filed in Juvenile Court, alleging that I.F. committed murder[9] and that he personally used a knife in the commission of the offense.[10] At a contested jurisdictional hearing, the magistrate admitted I.F.’s statements from all four interviews into evidence, finding that despite the lack of a Miranda admonishment and waiver, I.F. was not in custody for any of the interviews. The section 602 petition was sustained with a true finding on the knife-use allegation. Made a ward of the court and committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice, for a maximum of 16 years to life, I.F. appealed.[11]
California’s Third District Court of Appeal reversed. At issue on appeal was the admissibility of I.F.’s statements made at each of the four interviews, all of which were important to the prosecution in that they provided a number of contradictory, and thus incriminating, statements. I.F. argued on appeal that because he had never been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, nothing he said during any of the four interviews was admissible; i.e., that the Juvenile Court magistrate erred by using his statements against him.[12]
The Law:
The law is well settled that Miranda is inapplicable when the person being questioned is not in custody.[13] It was the People’s argument that I.F. was not in custody during any of the four interviews at issue.
The test for determining whether an interrogated criminal custody can be simply summarized as follows: “Would a reasonable person interpret the restraints used by the police as tantamount to a formal arrest?”[14] In evaluating this rule, the “totality of the circumstances” must be considered. Among the circumstances to be considered, as noted by the court in the I.F. decision, are whether contact with law enforcement was initiated by the police or the person interrogated; whether the person voluntarily agreed to an interview; the express purpose of the interview; where the interview took place; whether police informed the person that he or she was under arrest or in custody; whether they informed the person that he or she was free to terminate the interview and leave at any time and/or whether the person’s conduct indicated an awareness of such freedom; whether there were restrictions on the person’s freedom of movement during the interview; how long the interrogation lasted; how many police officers participated; whether they dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation; whether they manifested a belief that the person was culpable and they had evidence to prove it; whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory; whether the police used interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect; and whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation.[15] In the case of a juvenile suspect, the child’s age is also to be considered, at least where his age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.[16]
A Parent’s Conflict of Interest:
I.F also submitted a unique argument that B.F., as the suspect’s father who had also lost a daughter in this case, had a conflict of interest which itself was a circumstance that should be factored in. Such a conflict, per I.F.’s argument, might cause the parent to unwittingly interfere with the thoughtful exercise of the child’s constitutional rights, or even contribute to a false confession.[17] This argument, although maybe unique, is not without some precedence.[18]
In this case, I.F. argued that his father’s conflict of interest, when coupled with his participation in I.F.’s various interviews, must be considered in determining whether a reasonable child in I.F.’s position would have felt free to leave the interviews; i.e., whether he was legally “in custody” for purposes of Miranda. The Court agreed, at least where the conflict is shown to have had some bearing on how a reasonable child would perceive the interrogation. Should a parent’s participation in an interrogation—such as B.F. did here in the fourth interview (see below)—become so pronounced that he or she might be considered, depending upon the circumstances, to be a “de facto police agent,” this fact must be considered. I.F. also argued that B.F.’s conflict of interest rendered him incapable of providing “conflict-free advice and protection” during any of the interviews, resulting in a violation of I.F.’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.[19]
The Court declined, however, to rule that B.F.’s conflict of interest required the Juvenile Court to suppress all of the interviews as a matter of constitutional law. In the end, the Court found that although a parent’s conflict of interest may be a factor among others to consider in evaluating the issue of custody for Miranda purposes, there is no authority for an exclusionary rule based upon this factor alone. In this case, the Court found that B.F.’s conflict of interest was not uniformly coercive, but rather, assumed a coercive character as the investigative focused on I.F., and intensified in the fourth interview.[20]
Having resolved the conflict of interest issue, the Court moved on to each of the four interviews, considering them separately. (Note: The admissibility of I.F.’s statements to the 911 operator, and his later statements to the first officer on the scene, were not in issue.)
First Interview; April 27, 2013:
The first interview took place at the hospital where L.F.’s body had been taken, in the airlock vestibule between the emergency room and the ambulance bay. Detective Wade Whitney of the Calaveras County Sheriff’s Department, upon receiving permission from B.F. to talk with his son, sought additional information about the intruder I.F. had described and who was already the subject of an intensive manhunt.[21]
While a combination lock prevented people from entering the vestibule from the ambulance bay, a person could leave the vestibule, either to the ambulance bay or into the emergency room, by just opening the door. In fact, as Detective Whitney (who wore plain clothes and had a visible gun and badge) talked to I.F., emergency personnel came and went through the vestibule.[22]
I.F. was not handcuffed. Although his movements were not directed, there was no discussion concerning whether he was under arrest or not free to leave. He also was not Mirandized.[23]
In a 16-minute interview with I.F.’s father, B.F., present, I.F. was asked to reiterate what had happened when L.F. was stabbed. I.F. claimed that after he and L.F. had breakfast and watched a movie, he went to the bathroom and L.F. went to her room. While in the bathroom, I.F. claimed to have heard someone yelling in heavily accented English; “Hey, I know you’re in here, come out.” He then heard L.F. scream. Although I.F. had told the 911 operator that the intruder banged on the bathroom door, he did not mention this detail during his conversation with Whitney. I.F. said that he opened the door to the bathroom in time to see a man running toward the sliding glass back door. He told Whitney he followed the man to the door but that he then realized that L.F. might need help. So he stopped, turned around, and ran towards his sister’s bedroom, grabbing a knife from the kitchen counter, “just in case there’s anyone else.” This was the first mention by I.F. that he had used a knife. When he reached the bedroom, I.F. said he saw L.F. lying on the floor with her shirt covered in blood. Dropping the knife and then picking it up, he then went back to the kitchen, returned the knife to the counter, and called C.W., his step-mother. I.F. was shown photos of possible suspects, but said that none of them resembled the alleged intruder. [24]
At this point, Detective Whitney told I.F. that he was not under arrest or in any trouble, and that he did not have to answer the following question: “Did you do anything to harm your sister.” I.F. answered; “No.”[25]
With evidence of this encounter introduced into evidence against him (i.e., in the form of the later contradictory statements), I.F. argued that absent a Miranda admonishment and waiver, the Juvenile Court magistrate erred. The Appellate Court disagreed, finding that under these circumstances, I.F. was not in custody. Even though never told he was free to leave, all the other circumstances dictate that a reasonable person—even a 12-year-old juvenile—would have understood that he was free to just away from this encounter.[26]
Of primary importance was the location; the hospital’s airlock vestibule, a transitional space that necessarily connotes ingress and egress, and where others were in fact coming and going. If B.F.’s conduct is to be considered at all (see the “conflict of interest” discussion, above), he did not appear to have pressured I.F. to participate in this interview or otherwise conduct himself in a manner that contributed to the creation of a coercive atmosphere. In all, this first interview was only 16 minutes long, and the overall tone of the questioning was low key and conversational. Considering these factors, I.F. was not in custody for this interview, so no Miranda admonishment was required.[27]
Second Interview; April 27, 2013:
While still at the hospital, Detective Whitney asked B.F. for permission to interview I.F. a second time. B.F. agreed. I.F., himself, was never asked.[28]
I.F. was driven to the nearby District Attorney’s office by his father where Detective Whitney and DA Investigator Gary Sims took him to a portable trailer near the office. In the trailer was an interview room with an adjoining observation room. The interview room had two doors, both of which were open during this second interview. B.F. watched the questioning from the observation room via closed circuit television. Both detectives were in plain clothes with a visible badge and gun. I.F. was not handcuffed nor placed under arrest.[29]
To the contrary, he was specifically told that he was there as a witness only; that the doors were open; that he was not under arrest or being detained; that he could take a break whenever he wished; and that he could “get up, walk out anytime you need to, if you don’t want to talk to us.” He was also told that his father was watching from the next room and that he could take a break to speak with him if he wished.[30]
In response to the detectives’ questions in an interview that lasted 77 minutes, I.F. reiterated his story of hearing a door open, the man with an accent yelling at I.F. to come out of the bathroom, hearing his sister scream, and then opening the door in time to see the man running towards the sliding glass back door. Consistent with what he’d said before, I.F. said he chased the man to the sliding glass back door, then turned and ran towards L.F.’s room, grabbing a recently washed knife from the kitchen counter as he passed. This time, I.F. emphasized that he did not enter L.F.’s bedroom, but merely observed her prone body from the doorway. He then went back to the kitchen, returned the knife to the counter, and called C.W.[31]
I.F.’s description of the intruder was consistent with the description he offered during the first interview. Also as before, I.F. omitted what he had told the 911 operator about the intruder banging on the bathroom door. Sixty-eight minutes into the interview, B.F. interrupted and asked the detectives to “wrap it up.” The interview was concluded some nine to ten minutes later with I.F. and B.F. leaving shortly thereafter.[32]
I.F. similarly argued that this interview required a Miranda admonishment and waiver, which didn’t happen, in order for it to be admitted into evidence. The Court was sympathetic to the argument that a child, delivered to detectives for the purpose of being interviewed, would not feel like he had a choice. However, in this case, I.F. was immediately informed that he was free to leave. Specifically, before questioning even began, he was told that “both of these doors are open, you are not under arrest, you’re not being detained, you're here on your [own] free will.” He was then told that he could “get up” and “walk out anytime.” I.F., despite his young age, appears to have heard and understood these admonitions.[33]
Such an admonition (sometimes referred to as a “Beheler admonishment”[34]) would have alerted any reasonable 12 year old that he was free to terminate the interview and leave if he so chose. Being temporarily separated from his father did not alter this conclusion, particularly in light of the fact that I.F. was told that B.F. was watching from the next room and that he could take a break to speak with him if he wished.[35]
The Court further rejected I.F.’s argument that the nature of the questioning was relevant, finding that although pressing for some details, the detectives’ tone was professional and appropriate.[36] Lastly, the Court held that taking another nine to ten minutes to end the questioning after B.F.’s request to “wrap it up” was reasonable, and did not convert the interview into a custodial interrogation.[37]
The Court, therefore, found this interview to be non-custodial. I.F.’s responses to the questions were properly admitted into evidence against him.[38]
Third Interview; April 29, 2013:
Reporting to the DA’s Office ostensibly to fill out some victim/witness paper work two days later, Sheriff’s Deputy Gary Kuntz appeared and asked B.F. for permission to take his son to the family home for a walk-through of the crime scene. Asked if he would like to do this, I.F. declined to go. While waiting for the victim/witness coordinator to show up, the whole family provided cheek DNA swabs.[39]
Detective Whitney then told B.F. that they wanted to do some more interviews, including another with I.F. B.F. consented. This third interview, conducted by Sergeant Tim Sturm and Detective Josh Crabtree, took place in the same interview room as before, but with the doors shut although apparently unlocked. B.F. was not invited to watch this interview. Both detectives were in plain clothes and neither was armed. I.F. was not handcuffed nor placed under arrest. However, he was also not told that he was free to leave as he had been in the previous interview, nor was he Mirandized.[40]
Over the next 84 minutes, I.F. largely repeated the sequence of events as described above with two significant variations. First, he reintroduced the idea that the alleged intruder had been banging on the bathroom door, a detail, although told to the 911 operator, was omitted from the first and second interviews. Second, he made no mention of the knife he previously claimed to have grabbed from the kitchen counter.[41]
While the first half of this interview was non-confrontational, the second half consisted of the detectives confronting I.F. with the inconsistencies in his story and how the forensic evidence didn’t support what he was telling them. Parts of the interview had the detectives sympathizing with I.F., telling him that they all made mistakes and that it was “therapeutic” to “unburden (his) conscience.”[42]
While never told that the was not in custody, the detectives eventually did tell him that no matter what he said, he would be going home with his parents that day. Getting more confrontational, however, I.F. was specifically told; “There is no man that ran out of that house is there?” I.F. insisted that the man was there. Detective Sturm also asked I.F. how he knew L.F. had been stabbed, as he told the 911 operator, when he later claimed to have not known that she had been stabbed until he later examined her closely. I.F. could only answer; “I don't know I . . . I could have seen it I guess.”[43]
Continuing to press, the detectives intimated that they already had DNA evidence establishing I.F. as the killer, and then asked for an “explanation” or “reason” for the crime. The record did not reflect a response. Telling him again that the evidence didn’t support his story, the detectives urged I.F. to admit his “mistake” so that he could “move on” and “feel better.” He was also confronted with the fact that L.F.’s blood was seen on his forearm. Returning to a more sympathetic tone, the detectives assured I.F. that his parents would continue to love him “no matter what.” I.F.’s responses—to the extent he responded at all—were short and frequently inaudible.[44]
Meanwhile, outside, an agitated B.F. banged on the locked door of the observation room, asking what was going on. After being put off several times, B.F. eventually demanded that he be allowed to take his son home. The interview was ended with the detectives, by then, convinced that I.F. had killed his sister.[45]
Again, I.F. argued that under these circumstances, the interview was custodial and there being no Miranda admonition and waiver, should not have been admitted into evidence. This time the Court agreed.[46]
For this interview, I.F. was in fact separated from his father. Having been offered a choice as to whether he wanted to participate in a walk-through of the crime scene (a request he rejected), he was not offered any choice about whether he would submit to another interrogation. Also different this time was the fact that I.F. was not told at the beginning of the interview that he was free to leave; an important oversight if the detectives wanted to keep the questioning non-custodial. Further, the doors to the interview room this time were closed. Being told during the interview that he would be allowed to leave with his family when the interview was over would have led a reasonable 12 year old, in the Court’s opinion, to believe he had no right to leave before the interview was over, or decide for himself when the interview would end. [47]
Perhaps most importantly, the second half of the interview became very confrontational, the detectives hinting that they had forensic evidence that disproved I.F.’s story. Employing a variation of an interview tactic known as the “Reid Technique,”[48] the officers used a “minimization-maximization” tactic where the suspect is offered a face-saving out such as by suggesting that a homicide might have been accidental or perhaps justified, but then in the next breath telling the suspect that denying the crime is hopeless because the officers have conclusive proof to the contrary. In this way, the detectives here leaned heavily on I.F. to tell what they believed to be the truth.[49]
Overall, although Detectives Crabtree and Sturm were courteous and polite, even sympathetic at times, their questions clearly manifested a belief that I.F. was culpable and that they had the evidence to prove it. A reasonable 12 year old, confronted with the possibility that the police viewed him as a suspect, would not have felt free to terminate the interview and leave. I.F. should have been Mirandized under these circumstances as a prerequisite to having his contradictory statements used against him in evidence. He was not, so the Court found these statements to be inadmissible.[50]
The Fourth Interview; May 9, 2013:
About ten days later, Captain Jim Macedo telephoned C.W. and told her that they wanted to conduct separate interviews of each of the family’s surviving children. B.F. and C.W. agreed to the interviews on the condition that they be allowed to observe. Bringing the children (including I.F.) to the Sheriff’s station on May 9th, Captain Macedo and FBI Special Agent Chris Campion attempted to renege on their agreement that the parents could be present for the interviews. It was only when B.F. started to leave with his children that the officers again agreed that the parents could observe the interviews.[51]
C.W. was to observe I.F.’s interview in the same trailer as used before, although she was immediately made uncomfortable when the officers took him into the trailer through a separate door and began the interview before she could get to the observation room to observe.[52]
This interview, broken down into two parts, was conducted by Detective Crabtree and Special Agent Sam Dilland (a female) of the FBI. Both officers were dressed in civilian clothes with no visible badge or gun. The doors were unlocked, apparently open at some points and closed at others. The first half of the interview (lasting 97 minutes) began with Agent Dilland telling I.F. that if he did not want to answer any specific question, he didn’t have to. After some 27 minutes of “small talk,” I.F. was then told; “You know there's a door there and you know that door’s open so … [¶] … [¶] if you want bam, you just [¶] … [¶] leave you alone.” But no Miranda admonishment was given.[53]
This time, in reiterating the events of the morning of April 27th (the day of the murder), I.F. specifically denied that the man in their house had banged on the bathroom door. He also failed to say anything about having retrieved a knife from the kitchen. With the interview turning confrontational, I.F. was told that there was no evidence supporting his claim that there was a man in his house. He was also confronted with the fact that a t-shirt with L.F.’s blood on it had been retrieved from the clothes hamper in his room, a fact for which I.F. could not offer a logical explanation (saying, for instance; “I could have changed I guess, I don’t remember.”).[54]
At this point in the interrogation, I.F. was told that he was free to leave if he so chose. Although I.F. did not respond to this invitation, C.W., taking her cue, interrupted the interview by entering the interview room and commanding I.F. to leave with her. C.W. later testified that she’d become “very alarmed” at what was going on, and that I.F. seemed “very stressed” and “nervous,” as though “he was going to crawl out of his chair.” Finally realizing that I.F. was considered to be a suspect as opposed to just a witness, and, perhaps spotting the real issue here before anyone else did, C.W. noted that despite being told he could leave whenever he wanted, that in reality; “[H]e’s not free to go, he’s a 12-year-old child in a room with closed doors and officers, he doesn't understand that point.” C.W. therefore decided to stop the interview.[55]
C.W. told officers that because she was only I.F.’s step-mother, and not even his legal guardian, she wanted B.F. involved. Taken to another location where B.F. and the other children were, the officers pointblank finally admitted to B.F. that I.F. was in fact a suspect in L.F.’s murder and requested his permission to allow the interview to continue. B.F. agreed on the condition that he himself be allowed to confront I.F., noting that he also wanted answers and that he could tell when I.F. was lying.[56]
Reconvening at the interview trailer, B.F. asked I.F. if he wanted to go back in and talk about the murder. I.F. clearly and unequivocally said “no.” But B.F. insisted, telling I.F.; “We need to get to the bottom of this, we need to find out what happened.” B.F., C.W., and I.F. then all joined Agent Dilland and Detective Crabtree in the interview room, commencing the second half (consisting of 43 minutes) of the fourth interview.[57]
Detective Crabtree began by reiterating, twice, that, “no matter what happens . . . (y)ou guys are gonna leave this building” and that they were all “free to go at any point.” B.F. indicated that he understood. I.F., however, did not respond. After Detective Crabtree outlined the evidence against him, B.F. told I.F. that if he had in fact hurt his sister, he needed to admit it. Failing for the first time to deny his guilt, I.F. told them that he could not remember anything. Not buying that, a tearful B.F. attempted to impress upon his son the need to tell the truth; that if he had in fact killed L.F., he would still love him no matter what, but only if he told the truth. “If it’s something you did, you have to talk to um. If you lie to me, and hide s--t, you know that’s when I don’t support you, right? I.F. responded that he did not do it.[58]
After Detective Crabtree and Agent Dilland, urging I.F. to “be honest about what happened,” reiterated to I.F. that B.F. would love him no matter what, the sobbing 12-year-old I.F. finally responded: “I can't remember . . .”, and then; “I don't remember doing it. But I guess I did, I don't know.”[59]
Confronting him again with the evidence pointing to his guilt for the next fifteen minutes with everyone, including B.F., attempting to get I.F. to talk about the murder, and with I.F. repeatedly either denying the accusations or saying that he did not remember, the interview was finally ended. All parties were thereafter allowed to leave as promised.[60]
As with the third interview, The Court found this interview also to be a custodial interrogation, requiring a Miranda admonition and wavier as a precondition to the admissibility of I.F.’s statements. Per the Court, “(a) reasonable 12 year old in I.F.’s position would have experienced both parts of the fourth interview as a restraint on his liberty, albeit for different reasons.”[61]
As for the first part, although B.F. clearly understood that they were free to leave, nothing in the record indicates that I.F. also knew this. No one even asked him whether he was willing to submit to another round of questions. Then, with his father taken off to be with his other children, and I.F. abruptly separated from his mother as he was led alone by the officers to the interrogation trailer, it is safe to assume that any reasonable12 year old in I.F.’s position would have experienced this unexpected separation from an adult ally as a restraint on his freedom.[62]
Once inside the trailer, although told that he didn’t have to answer any specific question put to him, he was not told that he could terminate the questioning altogether and leave. After some 27 minutes of “small talk,” I.F. was in fact told; “You know there's a door there and you know that door's open so … [¶] … [¶] if you want bam, you just [¶] . . . [¶] leave you alone.” The Court found this statement, however, to be somewhat ambiguous, certainly leaving a 12 year old confused as to what his alternatives were at that point.[63]
The questioning then began in earnest, challenging I.F.’s story while pointing out that they had “a lot of evidence pointing to another story,” and listing some of it (e.g., I.F.’s shirt with blood on it). In fact, it became so accusatory that C.W., apparently realizing for the first time that I.F., her step-son, might be responsible for L.F.’s murder, and knowing instinctively that I.F. did not understand that he was free to leave despite being told he was, took the initiative and stopped the questioning. Based upon this, the Court agreed with C.W.’s on-the-spot assessment of the situation and concluded that no reasonable 12 year old in I.F.’s position would have felt free to terminate the first part of the fourth interview and leave.[64]
The second part of this fourth interview began with B.F. participating in the questioning, thus triggering the “conflict of interest” issue as described above. When I.F. was asked if he wanted to resume the questioning, but with his father involved, I.F. very clearly and unambiguosly responded that he did not. (“No.”) He was ignored and returned to the interrogation room anyway, albeit in the company of both his parents, along two of the many officers who had been questioning him off and on for the last two weeks.[65]
Once back into the now-familiar interrogation room, I.F. was again told by the detectives that he would be going home with his parents at the end of the interview no matter what was said. Although interlaced with a comment that he could leave “at any point,” the Court wasn’t convinced that I.F. understood that this meant he did not have to submit to questioning.[66]
Before B.F. began questioning his son, the detectives listed a “thumbnail sketch of the evidence” against him. B.F. then told his son that they needed to get to the truth of the matter, but that he loved him no matter what had happened, and that the only thing that might make him mad was if I.F. lied about it. With this pressure being applied, I.F. eventually waivered a bit saying: “I can't remember, . . .” and then; “I don't remember doing it. But I guess I did, I don’t know;” a statement which if not incriminating, was at least inconsistent with his prior outright denials.[67]
The Court ruled that given these circumstances, I.F. was in fact in custody at the time of this questioning and that due the lack of a Miranda admonishment and wavier, his responses should not have been admitted into evidence. As for B.F.’s participation, the Court—falling short of classifying him as a “de facto police agent” due to the overall control of the questioning by law enforcement officers, and also rejecting the People’s argument that his questioning of his son was nothing more than a “private conversation” without the participation of law enforcement—noted that pressure from B.F. did in fact add to the coerciveness of the interrogation, thus being a factor to consider in determining that I.F. should have been Mirandized.[68]
Conclusion:
Because I.F.’s responses to his interrogators made during the third and fourth interviews should have been suppressed and not considered in the People’s case-in-chief, and with a finding that the magistrate’s admission into evidence of these statements was prejudicial, the Juvenile Court magistrate’s sustaining of the petition was reversed, and the matter returned to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings.[69]
Perhaps the biggest problem this case helps to illustrate is the wholesale use of, or attempt to use, the so-called Beheler admonishment; i.e., attempting to take the custody out of an interrogation by telling the suspect that he or she is not under arrest and can terminate the questioning at will, thus side-stepping the need for a Miranda admonishment.
The use of the Beheler admonishment has its uses, and is not an improper interrogation tactic even when employed against a juvenile suspect.[70] However, it can perhaps be argued that too many officers are making this their go-to practice, seldom if ever Mirandizing a suspect as the Supreme Court has unequivocally said, in the Miranda decision itself, they must. While Beheler admonishments have their place, such as when you have an uncooperative suspect or one who historically always invokes, “Behelering” anyone and everyone is a dangerous practice, and one, as in this case, that may backfire.
Beheler admonishments, being but one factor to consider among any number of other relevant factors when determining whether a questioned suspect is in custody for purposes of Miranda, do not always work.[71] “The mere recitation of the statement that the suspect is free to leave or terminate the interview . . . does not render an interrogation non-custodial per se.”[72]
This case also highlights the potential issues raised when a relatively naïve juvenile suspect is interrogated. Use of the so-called Reid Interrogation Technique, mentioned above, has been held not to be a wise practice when dealing with juveniles in that it is not uncommon for such a technique to produce false, or at the very least, unreliable confessions.[73]
As a legislative fix to the problems caused by officers using the Reid Technique, including the practice of “minimization-maximization” (also described above), or otherwise pressuring relatively unsophisticated and inexperienced juvenile suspects into questionable confessions, we now have to contend with California’s new Welf. & Inst. Code § 625.6. Effective January 1, 2018, law enforcement is no longer allowed to attempt custodial interrogations of minors 15 years (expect this to be raised to 17 someday) of age and younger, nor even seek a waiver of the minor’s Miranda rights, until the minor has consulted with legal counsel either in person, by telephone, or by video conference. This is a right, by the way, that cannot be waived.[74] Bad facts make for bad case law, and in California, bad legislation as well.
[1] In re Elias V. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 568, 578, 587-600; citing Drizin & Leo; The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World (2004) 82 N.C. L.Rev. 891, 902, 944–945, fn. 5.
[2] (Feb. 22, 2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 735
[3] In re. I.F., supra, at p. 741
[4] Ibid.
[5] Id., at pp. 741-742
[6] Ibid.
[7] Id., at pp. 756-757
[8] Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436
[9] Pen. Code § 187(a)
[10] Pen. Code § 12022(b)(1)
[11] In re I.F., supra, at pp. 755-758
[12] Id., at p. 758
[13] People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395;
Dyer v. Hornbeck (9th Cir. 2013) 706 F.3rd 1134, 1137-1145;
People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 56-57
[14] In re I.F., supra, at p. 759
[15] Ibid.
[16] Id., at p. 760
[17] Ibid.
[18] See dissent in denial of certiorari in Little v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 957, 959-961
[19] Id., at pp. 760-766
[20] Ibid.
[21] Id., at p. 767
[22] Ibid.
[23] Id., at pp. 767-768
[24] Id., at pp. 742-743
[25] Id., at p. 743
[26] Id., at pp. 767-768
[27] Ibid.
[28] Id., at p. 743
[29] Ibid.
[30] Id., at p. 744
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Id., at pp. 768-769
[34] California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121
[35] In re I.F., supra, at pp. 769-770
[36] Id., at p. 770
[37] Ibid.
[38] Id., at p. 771
[39] Id., at pp. 744-745
[40] Id., at p. 745
[41] Ibid.
[42] Id., at pp. 745-746
[43] Id., at p. 746-747
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Id., at p. 771
[47] Id., at pp. 771-772
[48] Id., at p. 768;
See In re Elias V. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 568, 579-580; and
Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations (2010) 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 3, 7 (Police-Induced Confessions).
[49] In re I.F., supra, at pp. 772-773
[50] Id., at p. 773
[51] Id., at pp. 747-748
[52] Id., at p. 748
[53] Id., at pp. 748-749
[54] Id., at pp. 749-751
[55] Id., at pp. 751-752
[56] Id., at pp. 752-753
[57] Id., at p. 753
[58] Id., at pp. 753-754
[59] Id., at p. 754
[60] Id., at p. 755
[61] Id., at p. 733
[62] Id., at pp. 773-774
[63] Id., at pp. 774-775
[64] Id., at pp. 775-776
[65] Id., at p. 776
[66] Id., at pp. 776-777
[67] Id., at pp. 777-778
[68] Id., at pp. 778-781
[69] Id., at pp. 781-783
[70] See In re Kenneth S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 54, 63-66
[71] E.g., see United States v. Lee (9th Cir. 1982) 699 F.2nd 466, 467-468;
Moore v Czerniak (9th Cir. 2009) 574 F.3rd 1092, 1103, fn. 11;
People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151;
People v. Saldana (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 432, 456-458
[72] United States v. Craighead (9th Cir. 2008) 539 F.3rd 1073, 1088
[73] See In re Elias V. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 568
[74] Subd. (a), Welf. & Inst. Code § 625.6
