In the previous California Legal Update (Vol. 24, #11, Oct. 28, 2019), my brief of a Fourth District Court of Appeal (San Diego) decision, People v. Lee (Oct. 3, 2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, brought forth a number of (sometimes) irate (“don’t kill the messenger”) responses concerning the impounding of vehicles. As I noted in my brief, Lee specifically held that despite the existence of authorizing statutes (e.g., V.C. § 14602.6(a)(1)), it is a Fourth Amendment violation to impound a vehicle and conduct a subsequent warrantless inventory search unless such an impoundment is also allowable under the so-called “Community Caretaking Doctrine.” In Lee, the defendant was caught driving while his license was suspended. Among the arguments the People made in Lee in attempting to justify the warrantless impoundment and inventory search of defendant’s vehicle was that § 14602.6(a)(1) authorizes such a procedure. The Appellate Court ruled to the contrary. Per People v. Lee, to be lawful, the impoundment of a vehicle must be both authorized by statute (such as V.C. § 14602.6(a)(1)) and in compliance with the Community Caretaking Doctrine. (pp. 867-869.) (Lee also stands for the proposition that an inventory search of an impounded motor vehicle, when done for the purpose of finding evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing as opposed to merely protecting the owner’s personal possessions, is illegal. See also United States v. Johnson (9th Cir. 2018) 889 F.3rd 1120, 1125. But that is not the issue here.) Generally, the Community Caretaking Doctrine has been held to apply (allowing for the impoundment of a vehicle) only when the vehicle, if left at the scene, is parked illegally, blocks traffic or passage, or stands at risk of theft or vandalism. A number of you told me that you use V.C. § 14602.6(a)(1) (or other impound statutes; e.g., V.C. § 22651; see below) to justify the impoundment and inventory of vehicles on a regular basis without concern about the applicability of the Community Caretaking theory, and that no one ever complains. Well, that may be. But if so, it’s likely that in those instances Community Caretaking never became an in-court issue because (1) The D.A. rejected the case and never told you, (2) no illegal contraband was found during the inventory search so no criminal case was filed as a result, (3) defense counsel was unaware of these rules and failed to litigate them, and/or (4) you were just lucky that no one wanted to expend the time and effort (not to mention the money) to sue you. But, in response to your “cards and letters,” I researched the issue further and here’s what I found: Lee’s ruling—i.e., that the Community Caretaking requirement, being based upon Fourth Amendment principles, takes precedence over V.C. § 14602.6(a)(1)’s statutory authorization for impounding a vehicle—is consistent with prior case law, both state (see People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 786- 792.) and federal (see Miranda v. City of Cornelius (9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3rd 858, 862- 866; and United States v. Cervantes (9th Cir. 2012) 703 F.3rd 1135, 1140-1143.). I could not find any authority authorizing an exception to the rule as announced in Lee for someone driving on a suspended or revoked license, or who never had a license. Similarly, prior case law (again, state and federal) requires compliance with the Community Caretaking Doctrine when the impoundment of a vehicle is statutorily authorized pursuant to V.C. § 22651(h)(i); i.e., where the driver is subjected to a custodial arrest. (People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761–763; and United 3 States v. Caseres (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3rd 1064, 1074-1075.) It is noted also that there are a whole host of other statutory grounds for impounding vehicles, such as (but not limited to) those listed in V.C. § 22651(a) through (w), interwoven into some of which are various Community Caretaking factors. Most of section 22651’s authorizations for impounding vehicles, however, do not yet have any case law telling us whether or not the Community Caretaking Doctrine even applies. Absent such case law, we have to assume it to be the general rule that the Community Caretaking Doctrine does in fact apply to any statutorily authorized impoundment absent a specific appellate court decision to the contrary. (However, see Clement v. City of Glendale (9th Cir. 2008) 518 F.3rd 1090, where the Ninth Circuit criticized the impoundment of a vehicle per subdivision (o)(1)(A) of section 22651—when it was found in an off-street parking facility with expired registration—but as a Fourteenth Amendment “due process” violation for failing to provide the car’s owner with a pre-impoundment court hearing. The Clement case never even mentions the Community Caretaking Doctrine.) It is also a reoccurring issue whether the Community Caretaking Doctrine applies when the officer’s reason for impounding a vehicle is to prevent an unlicensed driver from continuing his unlicensed driving. (See People v. Torres, supra, at p. 792; United States v. Caseres, supra, at p. 1075; and Miranda v. City of Cornelius, supra, at pp. 865-866.) None of these cases, however, definitively decide the issue, although they do tend to lean toward not allowing the impounding of a vehicle in such a circumstance. Don’t forget, however, that whether or not there is probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless vehicle search (i.e., under the so-called “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement) is a whole separate issue (see People v. Lee, supra, at pp. 861-867) and not reliant upon either the Community Caretaking Doctrine or the inventory search rules. But as for the impoundment of a vehicle under authority of V.C. §§ 14602.6(a)(1) (unlicensed drivers) and/or 22651(h)(i) (arrested drivers), and a subsequent inventory search of that vehicle, my research tells me it is a hard-and-fast rule that these violations do not give a police officer the right to impound the driver’s vehicle and conduct an inventory search absent compliance with the Community Caretaking Doctrine. Period. End of issue.