LEGALUPDATES.COM

• Consensual encounters 
• Detentions 
• Show of authority 

A “show of authority” by law enforcement officers may convert an intended consensual encounter into a detention. If such a detention is not accompanied by evidence that the detainee is engaged in criminal conduct, then the detention is illegal, requiring the suppression of any resulting evidence. The discovery during an unlawful detention that a detainee is on parole makes such a discovery, and the results of a parole search, subject to suppression. 

Defendant Jeremiah Paul was observed by two Los Angeles Police Department officers sitting in his Toyota Prius around 9 p.m. on March 7, 2020, in a residential area. The officers first noticed Paul because he was sitting there with his vehicle’s lights on. As the officers drove up next to Paul’s car, one of the officers “illuminated the Prius with his flashlight.” In response, Paul sunk lower in his seat as if “conceal[ing] himself from [the officers’] view,” an action Paul later denied, and the significance of, the court never discussed. One of the officers patrolled this area regularly and knew that a parolee lived across the street from where the Prius was parked. The driving officer then backed up the patrol car and stopped in the middle of the street with his headlights pointing straight down the road, putting the patrol car a vehicle length behind Paul’s car, thus allowing room for him to drive away should he choose to do so.  

That officer then got out of the patrol vehicle and walked to the driver’s side of the Prius while illuminating that side of the car with his flashlight. The second officer did the same on the passenger’s side. The driver’s side window was rolled up, but the door was partially open. The officer, who was standing two to three feet from the door, opened it further and spoke to Paul, asking him innocuous questions such as, “How ya doin’, man?” During a short back-and-forth between the two establishing that they were both doing “all right” and “good,” the officer asked Paul if he lived at that location, to which defendant said that he did. A few more seconds into this unenlightening, yet low-key, conversation, it culminated with the officer asking: “Any probation or parole?” Paul responded that he was on parole.  The officers therefore conducted a parole search of the car, recovering an illegal firearm. Paul was arrested and charged in state court with possessing a firearm with a prior violent conviction (Pen. Code § 29900(a)(1)). After his motion to suppress the firearm was denied, he pleaded “no contest” and appealed. 

The Second District Court of Appeal, Division 5, reversed.  

The issue on appeal was whether Paul was “detained,” or only “consensually encountered.” It was not contested by the People that if Paul was detained, then the discovery of his parole status, occurring during an unlawful detention, was illegal, and any resulting evidence (the firearm) should have been suppressed. If only consensually encountered, Paul’s admission to being on parole would have occurred during that lawful conversation, making the discovery of his parole status and the recovery of the firearm lawful. The applicable legal standards here are clear: “An illegal detention that uncovers evidence is generally subject to the exclusionary rule, which dictates the unlawfully obtained evidence be suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” (People v. Kasrawi?(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 751, 761.)  

A suspect who is subjected to a “show of authority” by the police will generally be held to have been detained. “The test for the existence of a show of authority is an objective one and does not take into account the perceptions of the particular person involved. [Citation.] The test is ‘not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person.’” (People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, at p. 1106.) “This includes an examination of both an officer’s verbal?and?nonverbal actions to ‘assess the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole, rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation.’” (Id.?at p. 1110.) The “totality of the circumstances” is to be considered when evaluating these circumstances.  

Clearly, the officers here intended for their contact with defendant to be nothing more than a consensual encounter. As noted by the court, they parked their patrol car behind and to the side of the Prius, purposely leaving room for him to drive away should he choose to do so. They used their flashlights only, choosing not to “spotlight” Paul. In addressing him, the officer’s questions to him “appear to have been non-confrontational in tone and language up to the point when (defendant) stated that he was a parolee.”  

Despite officers’ apparent efforts to keep everything low key, however, the court found the contact to be a detention. Specifically, the court ruled that despite the location where the officers parked the patrol car, “the officers’ subsequent positioning of their bodies (as they walked up to defendant’s car) blocked (defendant) from either driving away or departing on foot.” “(Defendant) could not have exited the vehicle with (the one officer) standing there (by the driver’s side door), nor could (defendant) have pulled the Prius out and driven away without either engaging or endangering (that officer).” “Moreover, the presence of (the other officer) on the passenger side of the vehicle prevented (defendant) from sliding across the seat and exiting on foot without engaging (that officer.)”  

Further, the court was critical of the officers approaching Paul from both sides of his vehicle while shining “their flashlights into the Prius from close range, right at the car door windows.” The court found this action alone to be “a display of authority that would lead an objective person to believe that he or she was suspected of wrongdoing, both because more than one officer approached and because the officers shined their flashlights on (defendant) from opposite angles, effectively illuminating him on all sides.”  

The court also was critical of the officers for “approaching (defendant) while he was talking on his phone inside a legally parked vehicle with the windows rolled up,” noting that Paul “could not reasonably decline to interact with the officers without suspending or ending his phone conversation and at least engaging in a brief conversation with them.”  

The court concluded that this set of “circumstances would lead an objectively reasonable person to believe that the officers required their attention and that they could not simply depart.” Based upon this version of the circumstances, the court ruled that such a “show of authority” converted the intended consensual encounter into a detention that was not supported by any reason to believe defendant might have been engaging in criminal conduct. As such, the detention was illegal, requiring the suppression of the firearm as a product of that illegal detention. 

Simply amazing! The three appellate court justices who wrote and/or signed off on this decision need to go on a ride-along and get a first-hand taste of the realities and dangers of police work in the field, particularly at night. Until they do so, they’ll never understand the dangers inherent in their suggestions to the officers here regarding how they should be handling themselves in the field during a nighttime police-citizen contact. 

The court went so far to hint that one officer should have stayed in the patrol car, or at the very least, that “the officers could have approached the Prius from the same side of the vehicle and engaged (defendant) in casual conversation.” Continuing, the justices criticize the officers for having “flanked the Prius and approached from both sides while shining their flashlights into the vehicle,” apparently suggesting they leave their flashlights in the patrol car.  

The court also criticized the officers for having approached Paul at all while he was on his cellphone, suggesting that they politely wait in the patrol car until he finish his phone call. Any officer who even thinks about complying with this advice would be subject to disciplinary actions by his supervisors for unnecessarily endangering himself and his partner.  

In my opinion, the trial court judge who denied Paul’s motion to suppress had a much firmer grasp on realities of the real world, noting in his ruling that “(1) the patrol car was not blocking the Prius and nothing prevented (defendant) from backing up and departing, (2) the officers’ flashlights provided the only illumination of the Prius; the police did not use spotlights or headlights, (3) the officers did not approach the Prius at a brisk pace, (4) the officers did not touch (defendant) before he stated?that he was on parole. (5) (only) two officers were present, and (6) (the one officer’s) tone when addressing (defendant) was casual and conversational before (defendant) stated he was on parole.”  

If this wasn’t enough to set up a classic consensual encounter situation, then we’re never going to have one in any nighttime contact of a vehicle’s occupants. I didn’t name the officers in this case due to a LEGALUPDATES.COM policy of avoiding unnecessary embarrassment to officers when evidence is suppressed. But I could have. They did nothing wrong here. To the contrary, they did everything by the book. I am hopeful that this decision gets appealed. 

Georgia v. Randolph and the “present at the scene” requirement for a co-tenant’s objection to a warrantless search to be valid. 

• Consent searches of a residence 
• Use of a laser pointer on aircraft, per 18 U.S.C. § 39A 
• An objecting co-tenant’s physical presence requirement 
• Non-custodial questioning vs. an interrogation 
• Suppression of the products of an illegal search 

When two co-tenants are present at a residence, one of whom consents and the other objects to police officers entering and searching their residence, the objecting co-tenant’s objection takes precedence.  

To be “present,” the objecting co-tenant must be at least within the “immediate vicinity” of the residence. Being within visual (“line-of-sight”) and auditory reach of the residence counts as being within the immediate vicinity. A suspect’s oral admissions will not be suppressed as the product of an illegal search if the suspect was unaware of any evidence that was seized during that search. 

Brett Wayne Parkins (aka: the “laser pointer guy,” to his neighbors), living in a Huntington Beach apartment complex, liked to amuse himself by pointing a laser light at helicopters and other aircraft flying overhead. Over the six months leading up to June 25, 2021, a number police helicopter and commercial aircraft pilots from nearby airports had complained of laser strikes on their aircraft. On the night of June 25, Huntington Beach Police Department Officers Garwood and Vella, flying a HBPD helicopter, were struck by a bright green laser. Turning their highly sophisticated thermal imaging camera toward an apartment complex below — they recalled having been struck by green lasers from this area on previous flights — the officers attempted to locate the source. When a second laser shined upon their helicopter, the thermal camera captured the image of a man with a stocky build and a large stomach, wearing shorts and a hat, walking from the area of the laser source into a nearby apartment breezeway where he disappeared. When hit by a third laser strike, the same form appeared. The officers were able to follow his movements for several minutes, ending on a second-floor balcony attached to a specific apartment. Believing this man to be responsible for the laser attacks, Officer Garwood obtained the assistance of patrol officers on the ground.  

As guided by Officer Garwood, two patrol officers arrived at the apartment complex and spotted Parkins standing on a second-floor apartment balcony. At the front door of that apartment, the officers contacted a woman — soon determined to be Parkins’ girlfriend — when she answered the door. She claimed that Parkins was not home, until  officers told her they had just seen him on the balcony. When told they needed to speak with him about shining a laser at the police helicopter, she disappeared into the apartment to get him. Parkins eventually came to the door and stepped outside with the officers. He then attempted to retreat back into his apartment when the officers tried to pat him down for weapons. Parkins asked if he was under arrest and the officers told him he was not, but that they were going to escort him downstairs for a “chat.”  

The officers took him to a nearby bench, and a third officer arrived. When questioned about the laser incident, Parkins denied owning or using a laser pointer, repeatedly asking to be allowed to return to his apartment, or to at least see his girlfriend. Eventually, at his request, the officers moved him to a set of mailboxes bordering a parking lot where he would be less exposed to gawking neighbors. At this point, he was one flight of stairs and one short walkway, about 20 feet, from the entrance to his unit. It was noted, however, that he was within hearing distance and “line of sight” of his apartment.  

Two officers remained with Parkins as the third returned to the apartment to ask the girlfriend for permission to come in and search for a laser pointer. She agreed. As the girlfriend was executing the form, Parkins yelled up at her: “Don’t let the cops in and don’t talk to them.” It was undisputed that she could hear him. A minute later, he yelled up at her again: “Don’t talk to them, talk to them outside,” followed by “Don't tell them anything.” Parkins was handcuffed, removed from the mailbox area and placed in a squad car because, as noted by one of the officers, he was “running [his] mouth” and “obstruct[ing] the investigation.”  

To this point, before being put into the patrol car, Parkins had been detained outside for roughly 20 minutes. The resulting search turned up a laser pointer with the name “Brett” conveniently etched on it. Without being told that they’d found his laser pointer, Parkins was transported to the police department, where the helicopter crew took over. After waiving his Miranda rights, Parkins continued to deny owning a laser pointer, still not knowing that his personally monogramed laser pointer had been found in his apartment. He eventually admitted to having one, but continued to deny pointing it at the officers’ helicopter.  

A federal grand jury indicted Parkins for one count of aiming a laser pointer at an aircraft, in violation of?; a five-year federal felony offense.  Defendant’s motions to suppress the laser pointer itself and his resulting admission that he owned a laser pointer were both denied.  He thereafter pled guilty and was sentenced to eight months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release.  Defendant appealed.18 U.S.C. § 39A, a five-year federal felony offense. Parkins’ motions to suppress the laser pointer and his admission that he owned one were both denied. He thereafter pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eight months in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release. He appealed. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part.  

The primary issue on appeal was the applicability, if any, of the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 U.S. 103, which reversed existing California state case law. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Randolph that when two co-tenants of a residence — when both are present at the scene — are asked by the police for consent to enter their residence and search, and one says “yes” but the other says “no,” the “no” takes precedence. The first, and most important, issue in this case was whether Parkins — while about 20 feet away — was “present,” as the term is used in Randolph, when he told his girlfriend not to let the police into their apartment. A secondary but related issue was whether Parkins had effectively refused the officers permission to enter and search.  

Defendant’s Presence at the Scene: The federal district (trial) court had held both that Parkins was not “present,” as the officers had lawfully removed him from the doorway, and that he did not “expressly” refuse to give consent, but rather merely instructed his girlfriend not to permit the officers to enter and search their apartment. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court was wrong on both points.  

As to whether he was “present” at his apartment, the rule is as follows: As between two co-tenants, ‘the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects?is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.’ (United States v. Matlock (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 170.) However, if either present co-tenant objects, then entering and searching the residence is illegal. (Georgia v. Randolph, supra.)  

First, it is only necessary that the police “reasonably believe” that the person giving consent has the authority to do so. (Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177, 188-189.) That Parkins’ girlfriend in this case had the apparent authority to consent to the officers’ entry and search of their apartment was not an issue. The primary issue was whether Parkins was “physically present” when the facts show he was some 20 feet from the doorway.  

The Court held here that the words as used in Randolph (i.e.; “at the door”) should not be taken too literally. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “physical presence is not limited to the doorway, but merely ‘requires presence on the premises to be searched.’” (Fernandez v. California (2014) 571 U.S. 292, 306.) To be present, the objecting party needs to be in the “immediate vicinity” of the front door. (Bailey v. United States (2013) 568 U.S. 186, 192-202.) See also Matlock, supra, where it was noted that the defendant was not present when he “was...‘restrained in a squad car a distance from the home.’” (pg. 179.)  

The defendant in the instant case was but 20 feet away, within visual and oral contact with those at his front door. For purposes of the Randolph rule, the court held here that this was close enough, and that he was therefore “physically present.”  

Legal Sufficiency of the Defendant’s Objection to Officers Searching his Apartment: The secondary issue here was whether Parkins did in fact object to the officers searching his apartment. The district court held that he did not. Again, the Ninth Circuit disagreed. In Randolph, the High Court ruled that “a warrantless search of a shared dwelling cannot be justified ‘over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident.’” In this case, Parkins never specifically told the officers that he was objecting to the search. What he did do was yell to his girlfriend orders not to give the officers consent and to only speak to them while outside. As noted by the court, “‘[I]mplicit refusals’ are insufficient...But both words and actions can constitute an express refusal to grant the police entry.”?(Citing Bonivert v. City of Clarkston (9th Cir. 2018) 883 F.3rd 865, 875.)  

Although Parkins never specifically told the officers they could not search his apartment, the court held that his statement to his girlfriend not to let the police in sufficiently conveyed his objection. The “express objection” requirement was therefore sufficiently satisfied. 

Miranda Issues: A Miranda admonishment and waiver are only necessary when all three of the following elements are present: (1) in custody, (2) in an interrogation, (3) conducted by law enforcement. Parkins objected to the trial use of any admissions he might have made both before and after his arrest.  

Pre-Arrest Interrogation: Pre-arrest (i.e., during the first 20 minutes of his detention, outside his apartment), Parkins was asked questions concerning his alleged use of a laser pointer and whether he owned one, which resulted in denials. Therefore, there was nothing said that the prosecution was likely going to try to use at trial as an “admission” unless his lie about not owning one became relevant. (Note that Parkins was also held in a patrol car for an additional 30 minutes, but was not asked any questions during that time.)  

During this initial 20 minutes of detention, it was noted that “the officers conducted themselves in a manner that was professional and unabusive — even friendly at times.” After Parkins initially denied using, or even possessing, a laser pointer, there were no more questions asked of him. Any further conversation between the officers and the defendant was typically initiated by Parkins.  

The issue became, therefore, whether Parkins was even interrogated, as one of the three elements as a prerequisite to a Miranda admonishment. By legal definition, an “(i)nterrogation ‘refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from?the suspect.’” (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301,) “‘[I]nterrogation ‘must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.’” (Bradford v. Davis (9th Cir. 2019) 923 F.3rd 599, 618.)”  

Under the circumstances of this case, the Ninth Circuit held that no interrogation — as that term is legally defined — took place after Parkins’ initial denials. As such, no Miranda admonishment was legally required. Also note that defendant made no admissions during this initial questioning, thus making this a moot issue. The court also does not discuss whether he was in “Miranda custody” during this initial 20 minutes. Legally speaking, custody does not occur until: “(h)e has been formally arrested, or there exists a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125.) Put in simpler terms, “Miranda custody” is when a suspect would reasonably believe, under objective circumstances, that he is either under arrest, or he is about to be arrested. With Parkins specifically being told that he was not under arrest, and that he was only being detained, it is extremely questionable that until finally handcuffed — 20 minutes after this initial questioning — that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda.) 

Post-Arrest Interrogation and the Fourth Amendment: After being arrested and transported to the police station, Parkins was Mirandized and questioned. After waiving his rights, he admitted to owning a laser pointer (an “admission” that is admissible against him at trial), even though he continued to deny using it on the officers’ helicopter. This admission, as the product of an interrogation following a Miranda admonishment and waiver, was admissible absent a finding that it was the product of an unlawful search or arrest. Parkins therefore argued that this admission should have been suppressed as the product of (1) an unlawful search of his apartment and/or (2) his unlawful arrest.  

The court rejected both arguments, noting that he was never told a laser pointer had been found in his apartment. Secondly, he was lawfully arrested, as the officers had “ample probable cause to arrest” him. As for not being told a laser pointer had been recovered from his apartment, he could not have been motivated to say that he did in fact own a laser pointer by the illegal search of his apartment and the recovery of the laser pointer. Even if we ignore the fact that the officers found a laser pointer during an illegal search, the court ruled that based upon the observations of the helicopter pilots as memorialized by the helicopter’s thermal camera, plus other admissible evidence connecting defendant to the being “the laser pointer guy,” probable cause existed to arrest him. As for the probable cause to arrest him, Parkins’ admission to owning a laser pointer cannot be said to have been the product of an unlawful arrest.  

Conclusion 

The court therefore returned the matter to the trial court for a determination of whether the U.S. attorney wished to take the case to trial without the laser pointer itself, since it had been ruled as inadmissible. 

The only thing that was suppressed is the laser pointer itself, as the product of a slight expansion of the Rudolph Rule as we always understood it. I would imagine that this case is still triable, however, even without the laser pointer. With the pilot/officers’ testimony tracking Parkins to his apartment, his admission to owning a laser pointer, and other evidence (not described) from neighbors who knew him as “the laser pointer guy,” I’m guessing there still remains plenty of evidence with which to obtain a conviction.  

The importance of this case, however, is in its discussions about how far away from this front door a suspect can be for his objection to a warrantless search of his residence to still prevail over a co-tenant’s consent under Georgia v. Randolph. Per the Ninth Circuit as the Court ruled in this case, within view (“line of sight”) and hearing distance of the subject’s front door is close enough, although this is still a pretty vague test.  

If you wonder whether the officers should have moved defendant further away, note that there’s case law holding that if you move him away from the scene without some valid legal reason for doing so, but rather for the purpose of avoiding the rule of Georgia v. Randolph, then it doesn’t count.  

The only advice I can provide is that when in doubt as to whether a co-tenant’s objection to search a residence takes precedence over another co-tenant’s consent, get a warrant. This eliminates the issue and will save you a lot of time sitting in a courtroom hallway waiting to testify, and the appellate attorneys (on both sides) untold hours and money in litigating the issue. If you still wish to push the envelope, however, that’s fine with me. It gives me neat cases like this one to talk about how you screwed it up. 

• Constitutionality of a city’s fixed camera monitoring program 
• San Diego’s “City I.Q.” camera streetlight program 
• The intrusiveness of a fixed camera monitoring program and the Fourth Amendment 

A fixed camera monitoring program spread throughout parts of a city is constitutional. 

Defendant Kevin Eugene Cartwright and his accomplice, Lorena Espinoza, robbed a flooring store in downtown San Diego on October 10, 2018. Espinoza went into the store first and led its owner and operator, identified as G.R., to the back of the store. Cartwright entered the store shortly thereafter “wearing a granny mask and sunglasses” and “incapacitated” G.R. by first kicking him, then shooting him three times, killing him. Cartwright then pried open the cash register and took its contents. 

Unbeknownst to Cartwright, his actions before and after the robbery/murder – getting out of a GMC Yukon and entering the store, and walking to the rear of a nearby clothing store and removing his mask, then using two different sedans to leave the area as Espinosa drove the Yukon away – were all recorded by the city of San Diego’s City I.Q. camera streetlight program. The clothing store’s security camera also showed Cartwright’s movements. 

The cameras that comprise the City I.Q. program were described by the court as being attached to various streetlights. However, they were not “situated so (that) they could peer into businesses or residences,” capturing “only the ‘public right of way.” This camera system was further described as having a “fixed position and located throughout downtown San Diego and other parts of the city. The devices capture ‘environmental data, like temperature, humidity, pressure...traffic data, like car speeds, car counts, pedestrian data, bicycle data, and even video data.’ The video feature creates high-quality, wide-lens footage, but the devices do not record sound and do not act as gunshot detectors because the city did not ‘enable the microphones.’ Footage is stored on each camera’s hard drive for five days; if it is not retrieved within five days, the camera records over the footage.”  

Via this system, the license plate on Cartwright’s Yukon was recorded, leading officers to identify him as its registered owner through DMV records, and arrest him. In a subsequent search, evidence was found linking him to both the robbery/homicide at G.R.’s flooring store, as well as having committed another robbery of an adult-content store and theater the day before. 

Cartwright was charged in state court with capital murder and a host of related charges, with eight (yes, count ’em, eight) “strike” convictions alleged. His pretrial motion to suppress the products of the City I.Q. camera streetlight system was denied. Convicted on all counts and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of life without the possibility of parole plus 50 years to life, and a determinate prison term of 20 years and four months, defendant appealed. (The co-defendant, Espinoza, pled guilty to second-degree murder and admitted a firearm allegation, resulting in a prison sentence of 15 years to life, plus one year. She did not join in this appeal.) 

The Fourth District Court of Appeal (Div. 1) affirmed. 

Cartwright’s sole contention on appeal was the legality of the City I.Q. camera streetlight system, arguing that its use violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that his identity would never have been discovered without it. In advancing this argument, he cited the U.S. Supreme Court case of Carpenter v. United States?(2018) 138 S.Ct. 2206. Carpenter dealt with the constitutionality of a warrantless collection of cell-site location information and its subsequent use in reconstructing a suspect’s movement over the course of 127 days. The Supreme Court held in Carpenter that the government’s acquisition of the cell-site records constituted a “search,” and as such, when done without a warrant, invaded the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. (pp. 2219, 2223.)  

Here, Cartwright also cited the federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision of Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Dept.?(4th Cir. 2021) 2 F.4th 330. Following the reasoning in Carpenter, the Fourth Circuit in Beautiful Struggle held that an aerial surveillance program operated by the city of Baltimore, where it collected both traditional surveillance data and aerial photographs, violated the Fourth Amendment. That’s because — as ruled by the Fourth Circuit — the police could effectively track someone’s every movement throughout the city retroactively over a 45-day period.  

This integrated surveillance program, the Fourth Circuit concluded, was an incursion into personal privacy directly comparable to the cell-site location information accessed in?Carpenter. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that Cartwright’s situation was not comparable with the situations in either Carpenter or Beautiful Struggle.  

Per the court: “Neither?Carpenter?nor?Beautiful Struggle?can be read to indicate that the review of footage from the streetlight cameras in this case amounts to a search subject to a warrant requirement.”?The court concluded that “(r)ecordings from cameras, such as the ones that captured Cartwright’s movements in the downtown urban environment in the middle of a weekday, do not rise to the same ‘unique nature of cell phone location records,’” as occurred in Carpenter. To the contrary, a person traveling around on the “public thoroughfares” do not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”  

When Cartwright drove his gold Yukon downtown and parked it in front of G.R.’s flooring store, “the movements of the vehicle and its final destination had been ‘voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.’” As such, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when he chose to expose his presence to the City I.Q. camera streetlight program. The court differentiated San Diego’s program from the cell tower situation described in Carpenter and the aerial surveillance program as occurred in Beautiful Struggle by noting that the “streetlight cameras, only capture ‘short term’ movements rather than ‘everyone's movements across the city.’” They are “fixed in place,” “only capture individual trips,” and do not create “a retrospective database of?everyone's movements across the city.” Due to these inherent limitations, stationary cameras merely “augment...ordinary police capabilities.” They “modestly supplement and enhance, to a permissible degree, warrantless capabilities the police had even before the technology.”  

As such, it was noted that the City I.Q. streetlight camera program was no different that the private security cameras employed outside many businesses. In fact, when Cartwright moved to the rear of a clothing store and removed his mask, his movements were recorded on that business’ security camera as well. Given this reality, the court held that “Cartwright could not maintain an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the downtown, urban public spaces when any number of private businesses may have maintained similar cameras that capture similar images.”  

Comparing this limited use of San Diego’s City I.Q. streetlight camera program with the cell tower and aerial surveillance programs described in Carpenter and Beautiful Struggle, where massive amounts of information was collected on anyone and everyone in the area, the court noted the comparative limited use of the former. Thus, the court concluded that “Cartwright had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when he used the public streets and sidewalks downtown in a manner readily observable to passersby.” The court held that “the police did not conduct a ‘search’ when they accessed footage from city’s streetlight cameras and, accordingly, there was no violation of the?Fourth Amendment.” 

If the above reasoning is bit confusing, think of it as merely comparing the overall intrusiveness of the various programs on a sliding scale, nothing more than a matter of degree. 

Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically indicated in its Carpenter decision that its holding was a “narrow one” and not intended to extend to “conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.” (138 S.Ct. at 2220.) Undoubtedly, San Diego’s City I.Q. streetlight camera program is less extensive than the vast amounts of information collected by the vast network of cell towers that now exists throughout the nation.  

I understand that the “Big Brother” aspects of such monitoring — via cell towers or fixed cameras throughout the city — might be a little troubling for some of us. But note that as pointed out by the court, San Diego’s streetlight cameras aren’t much more intrusive than all the security cameras that many private businesses use to monitor the goings-on inside and outside those businesses. Either way, what a great tool for law enforcement. We shouldn’t be hesitant to use this information in our investigations to bring a little justice to our streets.