The standard for an officer’s pre-search knowledge that a suspect is subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver search is probable cause. 

• Parole search and seizure conditions; an officer’s prior knowledge 
• Parole searches; standard of proof 
• Prohibition on arbitrary, capricious or harassing parole searches 
• The “collective knowledge doctrine” 

A law enforcement officer needs only to have “probable cause” to believe that a person is on active parole before that person may be searched pursuant to a parole search condition. However, arbitrary, capricious or harassing parole searches are prohibited by California statutory and case law.

Pursuant to the “collective knowledge doctrine,” information possessed by one officer may be imputed to another when the officers are either working together or one is acting at the direction or request of another. 

Defendant Christian Alejandro Estrella is a documented gang member belonging to the Angelino Heights Sureños, a criminal gang based in Santa Rosa, California. Having served prison time for an unspecified offense, he was paroled to Lakeport, California. On July 2, 2018, he visited the Lakeport Police Department to register as a convicted gang member, as required by Penal Code §186.30. When Officer Tyler Trouette, Lakeport P.D.’s gang specialist and a member of the Lake County Gang Task Force, was notified that there was a new gang member in their city, he “familiarized himself” with Estrella’s criminal history. 

On July 3, the day after Estrella registered, Officer Trouette visited Estrella at his home, where they discussed the conditions of his parole, such as not associating with a gang and not wearing gang attire. It was specifically mentioned that Estrella was not to wear an Oakland Athletics baseball cap. This is because, as both Estrella and Officer Trouette knew, the A’s baseball cap is commonly worn by members of the Angelino Heights Sureños because, to members of the gang, the “A” on the hat signifies “Angelino,” as opposed to “Athletics.”  

Officer Trouette subsequently made periodic contact with Estrella’s parole officer, discussing the terms and conditions of Estrella’s parole as well as his progress or lack thereof. In April 2019, 10 months after Estrella’s parole began, Estrella’s parole officer told Officer Trouette that Estrella had committed a battery, but that he remained out of custody. Four months later, Officer Trouette was in the field with a rookie, Officer Ryan Cooley, as Cooley’s field training officer (“FTO”), when he observed Estrella standing outside his residence next to a white Honda and wearing an Oakland Athletics baseball cap. Officer Trouette decided “to check up on him and verify that he was abiding by the terms of his parole.” He apparently also wanted to discuss with him the wearing of the cap. He did not, however, inform Officer Cooley of defendant’s parole status nor of his parole search and seizure conditions because he wanted his trainee to “find the relevant information through his own investigation.”  

So, with both officers in uniform and their guns exposed, after alighting from their marked patrol vehicle, they contacted Estrella. (Estrella said in court documents that he was told to stop, while the officers testified that they merely walked up to him, raising the issue of whether Estrella had been “detained” or merely “consensually encountered.”) Officer Cooley asked Estrella what he was up to. As Officer Cooley was soon distracted radioing in their location to dispatch Officer Trouette asked Estrella about the hat, reminding him that wearing it was a violation of his parole and that he “shouldn’t be wearing [it].” Estrella claimed that it was his “work hat” and he only wore it while working on his car. Officer Cooley returned 90 seconds later, and asked Estrella for identification and whether he was on probation or parole. Volunteering his driver’s license, Estrella admitted to being on parole.  

Officer Cooley contacted dispatch again and it was confirmed that Estrella was on California state parole until 2020, and that he had registered as a convicted felon and a member of the Angelino Heights Sureños gang. Based upon his parole status, the officers searched him and his vehicle. As they began searching, Estrella informed Officer Trouette that he had a gun in the car. A loaded Ruger 9mm handgun and nine rounds of ammunition were found in the car’s center console.  

Indicted in federal court for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), the trial court denied Estrella’s motion to suppress. He thereafter pled guilty and was sentenced to time served, three years of supervised release and a referral to an “alternative to incarceration” program run by the federal district court. (Oh, and he was required to forfeit the gun. Nice to know.) Estrella appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. 

On appeal, Estrella first argued that the warrantless parole search was unlawful as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, because at the time he was detained and searched, the officers did not know for sure that he was still on parole. 

Issues 

(1) Standard of Proof: A temporary detention and warrantless search of a parolee’s person and possessions are in fact exceptions to the general rule that the Fourth Amendment requires a reasonable suspicion (for the detention) and probable cause and a warrant (for the search).  

The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of California’s statutory warrantless, suspicionless search conditions for parolees under Penal Code section 3067(b)(3). (See Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. 843.) The Supreme Court held in Samson that section 3067(b)(3) “satisfies the mandates of the Fourth Amendment, as the state’s interests in public safety and reintegration (of the parolee back into society) outweigh the privacy interests of its parolees.” (pg. 857.) “As parole is ‘an established variation on imprisonment’ subject to strict monitoring and behavioral conditions, id. at 850 (quoting Morrissey ), parolees’ expectations of privacy are ‘severely diminished . . . by virtue of their status alone,’ id. at 852. Those limited privacy interests are comprehensively outmatched by the state’s ‘“overwhelming interest” in supervising parolees’ to reduce recidivism and ‘promot[e] reintegration and positive citizenship.’ Id. at 853 (quoting Penn. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott (1998) 524 U.S. 357, 365. . . .)”  However, it is also a rule that for a parole search to be lawful, the officer must know at the time that the person being detained is in fact on parole.  Discovering a detainee’s parole status after a warrantless-suspicionless detention and search have been completed is insufficient to justify the detention and search.  As noted by the defendant: “(A)n officer must possess ‘actual knowledge’ of the suspect's parole status before conducting a suspicionless search or seizure pursuant to a parole condition.”  (See also People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318.)  In the instant case, upon initially contacting defendant, Officer Trouette knew at the very least that defendant had been on parole at least as of four months earlier.  Absent from the record is any evidence (at least initially) that Officer Trouette knew that defendant was still on parole.  Assuming this was an issue at all, the Court here established the rule for the first time that all Officer Trouette needed was “probable cause” to believe defendant was still on parole.  Knowing that defendant was initially released from prison on parole only 14 months earlier, that he was still on parole four months prior to this particular contact, and that state parole (at least it this time in history) was for at least two to three years, the Court held that this was sufficieint to give Officer Trouette the necessary “probable cause” to believe that he was still on parole, even if he didn’t know for sure how long that was to last.  Thus, defendant’s detention and subsequent parole search were lawful.  ), parolees’ expectations of privacy are ‘severely diminished...by virtue of their status alone,’ id. at 852.  

Those limited privacy interests are comprehensively outmatched by the state’s “‘overwhelming interest’ in supervising parolees to reduce recidivism and ‘promot[e] reintegration and positive citizenship.’ Id. at 853 (quoting Penn. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott (1998) 524 U.S. 357, 365.)”  

However, it is also a rule that for a parole search to be lawful, the officer must know at the time that the person being detained is in fact on parole. Discovering a detainee’s parole status after a warrantless, suspicionless detention and search have been completed is insufficient to justify the detention and search. As noted by Estrella’s argument: “(A)n officer must possess ‘actual knowledge’ of the suspect’s parole status before conducting a suspicionless search or seizure pursuant to a parole condition.” (See also People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318.)  

In the instant case, upon initially contacting Estrella, Officer Trouette knew at the very least that Estrella had been on parole, at least as of four months earlier. Absent from the record is any evidence (at least initially) that Officer Trouette knew Estrella was still on parole. Assuming this was an issue, the court here established the rule for the first time that all Officer Trouette needed was “probable cause” to believe Estrella was still on parole. Knowing that Estrella was initially released from prison on parole only 14 months earlier, that he was still on parole four months prior to this particular contact, and that state parole, at least it this time, was for at least two to three years, the court held that this was sufficient to give Officer Trouette the necessary “probable cause” to believe that he was still on parole, even if he didn’t know for sure how long that was to last. Thus, Estrella’s detention and subsequent parole search were ruled lawful.  

(2) Harassment: Estrella also argued that the officers violated California law in that by contacting and detaining him, they were “harassing him.” Indeed, California statutory law prohibits officers from conducting parole searches “for the sole purpose of harassment.” (P.C. § 3067(d).) Case law expands upon this protection a bit, prohibiting parole searches that are “wholly arbitrary...based merely on a whim or caprice or when there is no reasonable claim of a legitimate law enforcement purpose.” (People v. Cervantes (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1404, 1408.)  

Under California law, a Fourth Amendment waiver search constitutes harassment if it is “unrelated to rehabilitative, reformative or legitimate law enforcement purposes, or when the search is motivated by personal animosity toward the parolee.” People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 743.)  

This prohibition has been determined, however, to be decidedly narrow: “It is only when the motivation for the search is wholly arbitrary, when it is based merely on a whim or caprice or when there is no reasonable claim of a legitimate law enforcement purpose...that a search based on a probation (or parole) search condition is unlawful.” (People v. Cervantes, supra.)  

Estrella argued here that the officers’ interaction with him was nothing but a “training tool” for the rookie officer, and that they really had no legitimate reason to detain or search him. Estrella argued that this was not a legitimate purpose for a parole search, and that his search and seizure were therefore, by definition, “arbitrary and capricious.”  

The Court determined that it need not decide whether using him as a training tool was “arbitrary and capricious,” in that the record does not support defendant’s claim that the officers searched and seized him exclusively as a training exercise. To the contrary, Officer Trouette’s decision to conduct a parole compliance check was based at least in part upon his observation of Estrella wearing an Oakland Athletics hat — a symbol of the Angelino Heights Sureños and a violation of Estrella’s parole conditions. While using Estrella as an opportunity to help train Officer Cooley may have been at least part of reason for contacting defendant, this fact alone did not convert the contact into harassment, the court ruled. 

The primary point of this case is to establish the rule that you only need probable cause to believe a person is on parole to justify a warrantless parole search. Once that probable cause exists, you, as a law enforcement officer, may search him, his vehicle, his residence, etc., without any further justification, so long as not done for purposes of harassment, etc.  

What I wish the court had covered a little better is what might be considered an extension to this rule:  That is, if you have the necessary probable cause to believe a person is on parole, you don’t need any further justification to initiate a detention for the purpose of conducting a parole search. In other words, it is not necessary that a detaining officer have any reason at all to believe a parolee (or a probationer on search and seizure conditions) is then and there in violation of the terms of his parole (or probationary) Fourth waiver.  

I’ve heard from various sources that some very experienced officers (who perhaps should know better) are telling their subordinates that you need at least a reasonable suspicion to believe a parolee is in violation of the law in some way (e.g., armed, in possession of drugs, etc.) before you can stop and detain him for the purposes of conducting a parole search.  

That is simply wrong! If you had to get over a “reasonable suspicion” hump just to conduct a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee, what good is the warrantless, suspicionless search condition for parolees (and for probations with search and seizure conditions)   

In defense of the officers who are putting out this erroneous information, there is very little published case law giving us the rules. But if you check People v. Viers (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 990, at pages 992-993, you will note the court’s conclusion that an existing search and seizure condition justifies a corresponding detention without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, including while in a vehicle, and a suspicionless search of the car under the terms of the defendant’s Fourth waiver. (Viers, by the way, was eventually overruled on other grounds.)  

See also People v. Douglas (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, at pg. 863, where the court notes: “If a police officer knows an individual is on PRCS, he may lawfully detain that person for the purpose of searching him or her, so long as the detention and search are not arbitrary, capricious or harassing.” (“PRCS” stands for Post-Release Community Supervision Act of 2011 [Pen. Code §§ 3450 et seq.] and is comprised of statutes that provide for the housing of certain low level non-violent felony state prisoners in local county jails.) 

Later (at pg. 865), the Douglas court further notes: “(W)e conclude that an individual who has been released from custody under PRCS is subject to search (and detention incident thereto) so long as the officer knows the individual is on PRCS.” Although sparse, the law (and common sense) dictates that you do not need an independent reasonable suspicion to stop and detain an individual who is subject to a Fourth waiver search as a prelude to a suspicionless search of that Fourth waiver suspect.  

The court mentions one other interesting tidbit (see Fn. 6) that I hadn’t heard discussed in a long time: the “collective knowledge doctrine.” Officer Trouette led his rookie, Officer Cooley, into this contact without telling him what he (Trouette) already knew about Estrella’s history. Despite holding this information back, what Officer Cooley himself knew subjectively was never really an issue. But had it been, the issue would likely have been overcome via the collective knowledge doctrine. Pursuant to this doctrine, it has been held that knowledge may be imputed between different officers (1) “where law enforcement agents are working together in an investigation but have not explicitly communicated the facts each has independently learned,” or (2) “where an officer...with direct personal knowledge of all the facts necessary to give rise to reasonable suspicion...directs or requests that another officer...conduct a stop, search, or arrest.” (See United States v. Villasenor (9th Cir. 2010) 608 F.3rd 467, 475; quoting United States v. Ramirez (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3rd 1026, 1032-1033.)  

Despite not having anything new on this theory for some time, it’s a good concept to remember and use when appropriate.