Turning Movements While Failing to Signal 

CAC00066
CASE LAW
  • Traffic Stops and an Objectively Reasonable Mistake of Law
  • Veh. Code § 22107 and the “Other Affected Vehicle” Requirement
  • Veh. Code § 22108 and the Failure to Signal a Turning Movement
RULES

When an police officer’s justification for an illegal traffic stop is based on a reasonably objective mistake of law or fact, the resulting stop may be upheld despite the Fourth Amendment violation.  In order for V.C. § 22108’s signaling requirement to be effective, it must also be shown that there was another vehicle that might have been affected, as required by V.C. § 22107.  It is not reasonable for a law enforcement officer to believe that V.C. § 22107’s “other affected vehicle” requirement is met merely because one vehicle is behind a turning vehicle, at least in the absence of a possibility that the rear vehicle could move into the path of the turning vehicle. 

FACTS

Rookie Vallejo Police Officer Laura Bellamy (with a whole one month on the police force), riding with her field training officer (“FTO”), observed defendant Andrew Holiman in his vehicle stopped at a stop sign.  Officer Bellamy was stopped at the same four-way stop sign intersection, on a cross street, and to defendant’s left.  Defendant made a left hand turn in front of Officer Bellamy, looking at her as he passed her patrol car, and then “quickly looked away as if to want to hide his face.”  Officer Bellamy found this “furtive glance” to be “curious.”  So she made a U-turn and followed defendant’s vehicle for the next couple of blocks until they came to a three-way stop sign intersection.  With Officer Bellamy directly behind him, defendant made a full stop at the stop sign with his vehicle in a position where the roadside curb was immediately to his right, leaving no room for another car to pass him on his right-hand side.  He then turned on his right-hand blinker “just prior” to making a right turn.  Officer Bellamy followed defendant for another mile (about “four more minutes”) before executing a traffic stop.  Her stated reason for the stop was because defendant failed to signal his right-hand turn for a full 100 feet before making the turn, pursuant to Veh. Code § 22108.  Upon contacting defendant, it was quickly determined that he was on parole (for armed robbery) and therefore subject to search and seizure conditions.  A Fourth waiver search of his car resulted in the recovery of a loaded semiautomatic handgun, methamphetamine, and marijuana.  Charged in state court with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, plus other charges, and with a prior strike conviction, defendant’s motion to suppress everything recovered as a result of the search of his car was denied.  Defendant was sentenced to seven years and four months in prison after pleading no contest in a negotiated plea.  He subsequently appealed.

HELD

The First District Court of Appeal (Div. 2) reversed.  The issue on appeal was the legality of the traffic stop.  All parties agreed that if the traffic stop was illegal, then the search of defendant’s car, as the product of that stop, was also illegal.  With a traffic stop being classified as the equivalent of a “detention,” it is the People’s burden to show that a reasonable officer, under the same or similar circumstances, would have had a “reasonable suspicion” to believe that the defendant committed a traffic offense.  Should the People fail to meet this burden, then the traffic stop will generally be held to be illegal.  Any fruits of the stop will be subject to suppression as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.  However, there is an exception to this rule. (Isn’t there alwaysIf the detaining officer’s justification for a traffic stop is based on a reasonable mistake, “either factual or legal” (often referred to as “a mistake of fact or a mistake of law”), then the resulting search or seizure will be upheld despite the Fourth Amendment violation, at least if it can be said that the officer’s mistake was “objectively reasonable.”  (Heien v. North Carolina (2014) 574 U.S. 54, 57, 60–61, 67.) “To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’” (Id. at pp. 60–61.) However, this exception can be stretched only so far.  As noted by the Supreme Court in Heien: “(A)n officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.” (Id. at p. 67.)  Officer Bellamy’s stated justification for stopping defendant in this case was her belief that Veh. Code § 22108 was violated when he failed to signal his intention to turn some 100 feet in advance.  However, it is a rule of law that section 22107 must also be considered along with Vehicle Code § 22108. The two sections must be read in conjunction with each other. As noted by the Court, section 22107 provides: “No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway until such movement can be made with reasonable safety and then only after the giving of an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this chapter in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.” Section 22108 provides: “Any signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.”  (Italics in both added by the Court.)   These two sections together have been interpreted to mean that a driver when turning his vehicle must signal his or her intention to turn for the last 100 feet before turning (as required by section 22018), but only if there is another vehicle that may be affected in some way by the proposed turn (as required by section 22107).  (See People v. Carmona (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1394.)  Defendant conceded that if both sections 22107 and 22108 apply (i.e., he failed to signal for 100 feet before making his turn and another vehicle was thus affected), then a reasonable officer could have believed that he should have begun his signaling at some point at least 100 feet before he reached the stop sign.  However, defendant argued that section 22108 does not apply because there were no vehicles that could have been affected by his right turn at that intersection.  The Court agreed.  The People argued in response that Officer Bellamy’s patrol vehicle, being right behind defendant at the stop sign, could have been affected.  The Court rejected this argument, noting that there was no physical way for the patrol car to have attempted to proceed around defendant’s car on the right, defendant being so close to the right-hand curb that Officer Bellamy’s patrol car could not have fit into the remaining space. If it had been a motorcycle behind defendant, being a vehicle narrow enough to move around defendant’s right-hand side at the stop sign (see People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1055-1056.), then the answer would have been different.  But it wasn’t.  The only vehicle behind defendant was Officer Bellamy’s full-sized patrol car.  Simply being behind defendant’s car was not sufficieint to show that it could have been affected by defendant’s failure to signal earlier. The Court therefore rejected the People’s argument that it was objectively reasonable for an officer in Officer Bellamy’s situation to believe that her car could have been affected under these circumstances.  This being so, section 22107 did not apply.  And because section 22107 didn’t apply, the signaling requirement of section 22108 didn’t apply.  Defendant’s right turn, with or without a signal, was therefore lawful.  For these reasons, the Court held that defendant’s vehicle was unlawfully stopped.  The resulting evidence recovered from his vehicle must therefore be suppressed.

AUTOR NOTES

Having held that V.C. § 22107 doesn’t apply merely because one vehicle is behind another, at least under the circumstances of this case (i.e., no vehicle being interfered with), the Court never reaches the issue of whether not signaling until a car stops at an intersection and then turns violates V.C. § 22108’s “100 feet before turning” requirement.  Resolution of that issue must await another day.  When you look at section 22108, however, and its requirement that; “Any signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning,” it seems pretty unambiguous.  That having been said, it’s also somewhat ridiculous if it’s to be interpreted to mean that you can’t make a right or left hand turn at all unless you’re quick enough to remember to flip on your turn signal at least 100 feet ahead of time.  How many times have we all violated that rule, if that’s how section 22108 is to be interpreted   And lastly, congratulations to Officer Bellamy for getting her name mentioned in a published case so early in her career, her FTO (who is never identified) apparently being more than happy to give her all the credit.  Hopefully, however, the next time this happens for her, it will be in a win.

Author Notes

Having held that V.C. § 22107 doesn’t apply merely because one vehicle is behind another, at least under the circumstances of this case (i.e., no vehicle being interfered with), the Court never reaches the issue of whether not signaling until a car stops at an intersection and then turns violates V.C. § 22108’s “100 feet before turning” requirement.  Resolution of that issue must await another day.  When you look at section 22108, however, and its requirement that; “Any signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning,” it seems pretty unambiguous.  That having been said, it’s also somewhat ridiculous if it’s to be interpreted to mean that you can’t make a right or left hand turn at all unless you’re quick enough to remember to flip on your turn signal at least 100 feet ahead of time.  How many times have we all violated that rule, if that’s how section 22108 is to be interpreted?  And lastly, congratulations to Officer Bellamy for getting her name mentioned in a published case so early in her career, her FTO (who is never identified) apparently being more than happy to give her all the credit.  Hopefully, however, the next time this happens for her, it will be in a win.