P.C. § 148(a)(1) and Refusing to Identify Oneself

Refusing to Identify Oneself Upon Being Cited for an Infraction

Refusing to identify oneself to an officer who intends to write a citation to that person for an infraction offense violates P.C. § 148(a)(1): Resisting, obstructing, or delaying an officer in the performance of his or her duties.

On a warm and beautiful August 19, 2018, defendant Brent Knoedler was enjoying a cool one (can of beer) while standing on the sidewalk near Beach and Main Streets in the City of Santa Cruz, and minding his own business.  The only problem is that Santa Cruz has a city ordinance (Santa Cruz Municipal Code, §§ 9.12.030, 9.12.060.) prohibiting the possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage in a public place; an infraction offense.  Upon observing defendant with his open container, Ranger Sarai Jimenez approached him and informed him of his violation.  A repentant defendant offered to toss his beer into the garbage.  But Ranger Jimenez declined his offer and asked him for his identification.  No longer repentant, an increasingly defiant defendant refused to provide any identification, or even give his name. despite repeated requests.  Officer Denise Cockrum, responding to Ranger Jimenez’s call for backup, was equally unsuccessful in getting defendant to identify himself despite her polite explanation as to why they needed his identification.  Defendant contested that unless he intended to drive a vehicle—which he did not—he had no reason to cooperate.  Intending to physically arrest him, Officer Cockrum grabbed defendant’s arm.  Defendant broke free, hitting the officer with sufficient force to cause her body camera to be knocked off her person. A chase and struggle ensued ending in defendant being physically arrested with the help of other responding officers.  A jury convicted defendant of a misdemeanor violation of resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer (P.C. § 148(a)(1)), acquitting him of battery on a peace officer (P.C. § 243(b)).  He was sentenced to 60 days in county jail and a $573 fine (pretty expensive beer).  Defendant appealed.

The Appellate Division of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court affirmed.  The issue on appeal was whether a person’s refusal to identify himself when he is about to be cited for an infraction constitutes a violation of P.C. § 148(a)(1).  Defendant argued that instructing the jury that it may in fact be, is an incorrect statement of the law, violating his right to due process and a fair trial under the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, respectively.  The Court disagreed, differentiating the facts of this case from the authority cited by defendant.  Specifically, defendant cited a federal district court opinion; Belay v. City of Gardena (C.D. Cal., 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66017.  In Belay, it was held that a person cannot be arrested for a violation of P.C. § 148(a)(1) when he is merely detained.  In contrast, the officers in the instant case had not only a “reasonable suspicion” justifying the initial detention, but also the “probable cause” necessary to cite defendant for a violation of the Municipal Code, having observed him in possession of an open container of alcohol in a public area.  Defendant also cited People v. Quiroga (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961, noting that the Court there had specifically held that “a refusal to disclose personal identification following arrest for a misdemeanor or infraction cannot constitute a violation of Penal Code section 148.” (p. 970.)  The Court differentiated Quiroga by the fact that the officers in the instant case had not “arrested” defendant at the specific time he refused to identify himself, but rather were attempting to write him a citation for a municipal code infraction.  Also, in Quiroga, it was held that the defendant’s refusal to identify himself upon being arrested did not violate P.C. § 148(a)(1) in that the officers were not impeded in the performance of their duties by the defendant’s lack of cooperation.  However, defendant Quiroga did violate section 148(a)(1) later, when being booked, because his lack of cooperation at that point in time did in fact slow the officers down (i.e., “impede”) in the performance of their duties.  (pp. 971-972.)  In the instant case, the same “public interest” in being able to identify defendant during his booking (as noted in Quiroga) applies to when an officer is attempting to cite him in the field.  They have to know who he is in order to effectively accomplish these tasks.  Lastly, the Court differentiated the case of In re Gregory S. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3rd 764, where it was held that P.C. § 148(a)(1) did not apply when based on a minor’s failure to provide his first name during a detention.  In that case, the court made it clear that its holding was fact-specific.  (p. 779.) More importantly, the Court explained that because the officer already knew the minor’s address and his surname, the minor’s failure to provide further identifying information could not have “delayed the officer (in the performance of his duties) to a degree justifying an arrest.” (p. 780.)  In the instant case, defendant’s refusal to identify himself to officers who were attempting to write him a citation did in fact impede them in the performance of their duties.  He therefore was properly held to answer to a charge of P.C. § 148(a)(1).

I’ve read a lot of cases trying to find some consistency on the issue of whether a person who refuses to identify himself in a “detention” situation is in violation of P.C. § 148(a)(1).  There’s a lot of case law on the issue (more than I have room to cite here), but not a lot of consistency in the holdings.  We do know that a person who is only “consensually encountered” cannot be forced to identify himself.  (Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352.)  And we know that a statute that specifically requires a detained person to identify himself is constitutional.  (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada (2004) 542 U.S. 177.)  But California has no such statute.  So as I see it, the best way to analyze the applicability of P.C. § 148(a)(1) is to look at the specific circumstances of each case and determine whether a detained (or arrested) person’s refusal to identify himself has in some significant way, “delayed or obstructed” (i.e., “impeded”) the officer in the performance of his or her duties.  This may be hard to prove in a “detention” situation.  But until we get a Supreme Court (California or U.S.) decision telling us whether a detained person is impeding an officer by refusing to identify himself, all we can do is throw some cases up there and see if anything sticks.  Win or lose, this important element (i.e., “impeding”) must be clearly documented in your arrest report if you expect P.C. § 148(a)(1) to get charged.