More on Prolonged Detentions and Miranda Questions Over Statements Made to an Undercover Officer 

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CASE LAW
  • Questions asked during a lawful traffic stop during the normal time it takes to issue a citation do not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop. Placing an undercover police officer in a suspect’s jail cell to record the suspect’s incriminating statements is lawful. 
  • Prolonged detentions during a traffic stop 
  • Undercover police officer placed in a jail cell with a defendant 
  • Statements made to an undercover police officer and the lack of coerciveness 
RULES

A traffic stop is not unlawfully prolonged as long as the officer diligently pursues the purpose of the stop. An officer asking questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop while also pursuing information relevant to the stop is not illegal. An undercover law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give?Miranda?warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking questions, even if that suspect had earlier invoked his right to the assistance of counsel. This is because when a jail inmate is talking to an undercover officer, there is no coerciveness involved. (But see note below.)

FACTS

Defendant Jason Felix was suspected of having murdered two individuals, in Montebello (Ricardo Mota, March 27, 2017) and in San Fernando (Jorge Gonzalez-Ortega, June 15, 2017), who were suspected of dealing drugs. Felix subsequently fled the state and was stopped in Utah on June 17 by Sgt. Charles Taylor, 23-year veteran with the Utah Highway Patrol, for failing to slow down as he passed the officer’s patrol car on eastbound I-70, a violation of Utah’s “slow down” law. The dashcam video from Sgt. Taylor’s patrol vehicle recorded the encounter beginning with Felix driving by his parked patrol vehicle and including the contact eventually leading to Felix’s arrest.  

As later testified to by Sgt. Taylor in a Los Angeles courtroom, while writing him a warning for the violation, Felix consented in writing to a search of his vehicle. The search resulted in the discovery of 10 taped packages of methamphetamine (5.4 kgs), a .22-caliber handgun, magazine and ammunition and two cellphones.  

Felix was arrested and held in custody until interviewed by detectives Michael Valento and Amber Montenegro of the San Fernando Police Department. After being advised of his Miranda rights, Felix admitted to picking up drugs from Gonzalez-Ortega at his home and shooting him in the head, but claimed it was in self-defense. Felix was soon extradited to California, where he was questioned by Detective Richard Ruiz and Sgt. Robert Gray of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. After being read his Miranda rights, Felix cooperated when initially asked questions, mostly concerning general background information. He also confirmed his cellphone number and said he had borrowed the car from a friend. However, when shown photographs of the other homicide victim (Mota), and of a 15-year-old suspected accomplice in the murder, Felix denied knowing either one. He invoked his right to counsel, the interview was concluded and Felix was returned to his jail cell.  

Apparently feeling that they needed more evidence tying Felix to the Mota murder, the detectives decided to place an undercover detective, wired for sound, into his cell with him. Initiating the conversation with his new cellmate, Felix asked him if he spoke Spanish. After the undercover detective said he did, they began to talk about what led to Felix being in custody. Felix told the undercover detective he had been in custody in Utah on drug charges but that the case had been “dropped.” He said he had been transporting drugs (“10 pounds of crystal”) and was on his way from Los Angeles to New York when he was stopped for a traffic violation.  

Needing to get Felix to start talking about Mota’s murder, Sgt. Gray and Detective Ruiz removed Felix from his cell, telling him that they had just received evidence pointing to his involvement in the Mota murder. Without asking him anything, they returned him to his cell and told him to think about what they had just said. After the detectives left, Felix resumed his conversation with the undercover detective, telling him that the detectives wanted him to “snitch” on some kid who had killed a man.  

Felix eventually made incriminating statements about his involvement in Mota’s murder, claiming that “the kid” who did the shooting was 15 years old and had already killed six people. Felix also indicated that he had given the kid a 9mm Beretta handgun and drove him to the murder scene outside of a church. Felix told the officer he never touched Mota and his fingerprints were not on the gun because he cleaned it well before giving it to the kid. As for the shooting of Gonzalez-Ortega, Felix told the undercover officer there were no witnesses so he could falsely say it was self-defense without being contradicted.  

Charged with two counts of first-degree murder, Felix filed a motion challenging the legality of his arrest in Utah. He also alleged that the use of the undercover detective to illicit incriminating statements after he had invoked his right to the assistance of counsel was illegal as a violation of his Miranda rights. The trial court denied his motions. Convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder plus enhancements, Felix was sentenced to 75 years to life plus one year. He appealed. 

HELD

The Second District Court of Appeal (Div. 8), in a 2-1 decision, affirmed (except to modify the presentence custody credits by one day.) At issue on appeal was the legality of Felix’s arrest in Utah, as well as the use of an undercover police agent in his jail cell after he had invoked his Miranda right to the assistance of counsel.  

The Utah Arrest: Felix argued on appeal, as he did in trial, that the search of his vehicle and his arrest in Utah was the product of an unlawfully “prolonged detention,” and thus a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court disagreed. To the contrary, Sgt. Taylor did everything by the book, to the point where the court never mentioned how much time was expended between when he was stopped until his car was searched and he was arrested.  

As recorded by the patrol car’s dashcam, Sgt. Taylor initiated his contact with Felix by first explaining to him why he had been pulled over and asking for the requisite paperwork. Felix responded by giving the officer a Mexican identification or license card along with the vehicle’s registration, telling the officer that he was visiting the U.S. on vacation and driving a friend’s borrowed car. Felix also volunteered that he was going to Salt Lake City to visit another friend. 

This admission made Sgt. Taylor suspicious in that Salt Lake City was north of their location while Felix was driving east, having “passed four different highways that he could have taken (him toward Salt Lake City,) and the last one he passed [was] about 20 miles behind him.” 

A records search included attempting to verify Felix’s identity, the registration on his car, and whether he had any warrants. Sgt. Taylor also requested that a Spanish-speaking officer come to the scene so that there was no miscommunication between them. While waiting for a response on the records check and the arrival of a Spanish-speaking officer, Sgt. Taylor continued to collect information relevant to writing a citation while at the same time trying to verify the purpose of Felix’s trip.  

Sgt. Taylor’s suspicions were further aroused in that Felix’s story kept changing. Also, the increasingly nervous Felix could not provide an address or phone number for the friend he was supposed to be visiting. While awaiting the results of the warrant check, Sgt. Taylor continued to question Felix, seeking clarification of some of the contradictory answers he’d already provided. The officer also asked Felix if he was transporting anything illegal, and Felix said he was not. Per the court; “(t)hese questions, including the ones not directly related to the traffic violation, were permissible and did not unlawfully extend the duration of defendant’s detention as they occurred while Sgt. Taylor was awaiting a response on the records check.”  

The law on this point is clear: “Questioning during the routine traffic stop on a subject unrelated to the purpose of the stop is not itself a?Fourth Amendment violation. Mere questioning is neither a search nor a seizure. While the traffic detainee is under no obligation to answer unrelated questions, the Constitution does not prohibit?law enforcement officers from asking.” (People v. Gallardo?(2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 239. See also Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, at page 333: “An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop...do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful?seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”  

After the records check came back negative, the officer told Felix he was going to write him a warning in lieu of a citation. At the same time, Sgt. Taylor asked defendant for permission to search his car. Felix provided the permission and even signed a written consent form. The search resulted in the discovery of the drugs and firearm as described above.  

Felix argued on appeal that once the records check came back negative, the officer was legally bound to write him the citation or warning and let him go. The court found, however, that any further questioning was relevant to the writing of a citation, verifying certain biographical data, and did not prolong the duration of the lawful traffic stop.  

Under the circumstances of this case, it was also reasonable to seek clarification of “defendant’s confusing answers for why he was in Utah and where he was headed, including asking whether defendant was transporting anything illegal.” It was during this legally permissible time frame that Felix freely and voluntarily consented, in writing, to a search of his car. The trial court, therefore, properly denied Felix’s motion to suppress the evidence that resulted from his arrest. 

Use of an Undercover Police Officer in Felix’s Jail Cell: Felix argued on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting the incriminating statements he made to the undercover detective who had been surreptitiously placed into his jail cell. Felix’s reasoning was that once he had invoked his?Fifth Amendment right to counsel, done during his earlier interrogation by Detectives Ruiz and Gray, he was off limits to any further questioning until an attorney was provided.  

The appellate court agreed with the trial court, however, holding that “(w)hen a suspect considers himself in the company of cellmates and not officers, the coercive atmosphere is lacking.” (U.S. Supreme Court, Illinois v. Perkins?(1990) 496 U.S. 292, at page 296.) “Perkins?made clear that ‘Miranda?forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a fellow prisoner.’” (Perkins, supra, at page 297.)  

Felix, however, cited a footnote in Perkins in which Justice William J. Brennan wrote that while he agreed with the majority, the relevant inquiry should be whether, prior to being questioned by an undercover law enforcement officer, the defendant had knowingly waived his right to counsel, citing?Edwards v. Arizona?(1981) 451 U.S. 477, at pages 484-485. In Edwards, the U.S. Supreme Court held in part that once an accused invokes right to counsel under Miranda, he “is not subject to further interrogation” until counsel is made available or the accused initiates further communication.  

However, Division 2 of the Second District Court of Appeal has already held in People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal. App.5th 802, that Justice Brennan’s comments on this issue were mere dicta, and therefore not controlling. Following the majority in Perkins, the court here held that Felix’s conversation with the undercover detective that followed his invocation was not a coercive interrogation of the type with which Miranda was concerned. Lacking coerciveness, the incriminating statements he freely made to someone he believed to be a fellow inmate were properly admitted into evidence against him despite his earlier invocation.  

The court also noted that the discussions Felix had with the undercover officer were not somehow rendered coercive simply because the detectives removed him at one point from his cell to tell him they had evidence connecting him with the Mota murder, and then putting him back into his cell with the undercover officer. As such, the majority of the court held that the trial court was correct when it ruled that Felix’s incriminating statements made to the undercover officer were admissible against him at trial. 

Author Notes

There is a dissenting opinion (pages 453-455 of the published decision) on the invocation issue, where Presiding Justice Maria E. Stratton argued that it is not legally “permissible for a?Perkins?(undercover) agent to interrogate appellant after he invoked his right to counsel, despite the lack of coerciveness.” Justice Stratton noted that: “Edwards applies even if the subsequent interrogation after invocation of the right to counsel is not coercive. Under?Edwards, no police-initiated interrogation whatsoever is to occur unless the accused has given a valid waiver of the right to counsel they previously invoked. (Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at page 484.)” 

I have to agree with Justice Stratton. When I used to teach this stuff, I’d tell my students that there are three components to the necessity of a Miranda advisal; (1) custody, (2) interrogation, (3) by a law enforcement officer (or an agent of law enforcement). While it’s true that the purpose of Miranda is to offset the inherent coerciveness of an in-custody interrogation (People v. Thomas?(2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 926), the absence of coercion does not by itself relieve an officer of the necessity of obtaining a Miranda waiver.  

The Miranda decision was premised on the presumption that any interrogation in a custodial situation (“incommunicado interrogation of an individual in a police-dominated atmosphere”) is “inherently coercive.” (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, at page 445. See also Doody v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2011) 649 F.3rd 986, 1018-1019, and In re: Joseph H. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 517, 530.)  

While any in-custody interrogation usually tends to be coercive to one degree or another, there is no credible authority for the argument that coerciveness itself is a necessary element triggering the Miranda advisal requirement. To the contrary, even low-key, non-coercive interrogations require a Miranda advisal and waiver if you expect the suspect’s statements to be admissible in a subsequent trial. 

The fact of a simple Miranda violation, or ignoring a suspect’s attempt to invoke his right to counsel, does not “inherently constitute coercion” without evidence of actual coercion or other circumstances bearing on the suspect’s free will. (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 599, citing People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1039-1040; See also People v. Mendez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 680, 698.)  

Bottom line is that the lack of coercion during an interrogation does not excuse an officer who chooses to ignore the dictates of Edwards v. Arizona. So, what should the undercover officer in this case have done to avoid a Miranda issue? He should have simply sat there and acted like a “listening post,” not asking questions or otherwise encouraging Felix to talk about his crimes, but rather just letting him ramble on about his criminal exploits.  

Interestingly enough, neither the majority in this case nor Justice Stratton in her dissent cites Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, a case that is right on point with this fact scenario. In Shatzer, the U.S. Supreme Court held that once an in-custody suspect invokes his right to counsel, as Felix did in this case, he is off limits to all further questioning while he remains in custody, at least up to an arbitrarily set two weeks. Nowhere does the Supreme Court in Shatzer say that the Edwards rule is limited to coercive circumstances. The undercover officer in the Felix case violated Shatzer by questioning the defendant in his jail cell.  

Note also, by the way, that Shatzer (as well as this new case) is limited to circumstances where the defendant has invoked his right to counsel. Had he only invoked his right to remain silent, none of this would have been an issue. (See People v. Warner (1988) 203 Cal.App.3rd 1122.) 

But because this case involves a clear Shatzer violation, Felix’s conviction should have been overturned (assuming, as Justice Stratton argues in her dissenting opinion, that the error was prejudicial). If taken to the California Supreme Court, I believe this case will be reversed.