• Community Caretaking Doctrine
• Impounding and Inventory Searches of Vehicles

The constitutionality of an impoundment and inventory search of an arrestee’s motor vehicle depends upon the applicability the Community Caretaking Doctrine.  Generally, the Community Caretaking rule applies in those situations when the driver has been arrested and his vehicle is parked illegally, poses a safety hazard, or is vulnerable to vandalism or theft.  This includes when the vehicle is in a third party’s driveway. An inventory search of an impounded vehicle is lawful so long as not used as a subterfuge for a criminal investigation and his/her unfettered discretion is limited by a law enforcement agency’s searching procedures. 

San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Deputy Daniel Peterson attempted to stop defendant Jonathan Anderson at about 2:00 a.m. one morning, for a partially obscured license plate in violation of Veh. Code § 5201.  Defendant initially failed to stop, turning abruptly into a dead-end street instead and accelerating to the end of the road.  As the deputy called for backup, defendant turned into an apartment complex, and then into the driveway of a private residence where (having run out of places to go) he stopped and got out of his truck. The total elapsed time between when Deputy Peterson first lit up his emergency lights to when defendant finally stopped was about 30 to 45 seconds. Believing that defendant had attempted to flee—an assumption that defendant denied—Deputy Peterson took him into custody at gun point and, upon arrival of a second deputy, handcuffed him.  Defendant claimed he didn’t see the deputy’s emergency lights.  He also claimed to be parked in the driveway of a friend.  Defendant did admit, however, that his license was expired; a fact verified via radio.  It was also learned that defendant was a “career criminal” (whatever that means).  Upon contacting the resident who told the deputies he did not know defendant, and that he wanted defendant’s vehicle removed from his driveway, the deputies decided to impound defendant’s truck pursuant to Veh. Code § 14607.6 (dealing with the impoundment of the vehicle of an unlicensed driver).  In preparation to towing the vehicle, an inventory search was initiated (over defendant’s express objection), resulting in the recovery a loaded handgun from under the driver’s seat.  Defendant was therefore arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm.  As Deputy Peterson took defendant to jail, Deputy Kyle Shuler filled out the necessary paperwork related to the impoundment pursuant to the standard administrative procedure requirements as described in the San Bernardino County Sherriff’s Department Manual.  This included inventorying the contents of the vehicle.  In so doing, Deputy Shuler checked off boxes reflecting the presence of two radios and a firearm in the car.  The deputy failed, however, to document other property found in the car although pictures were taken of everything.  Defendant was charged in federal court with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, per 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  After his motion to suppress the gun was denied (defendant arguing primarily that the deputies initiated the search of his truck before verifying with the homeowner that he did not know defendant; a witness credibility issue decided by the trial court in the deputies’ favor), defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to six years and 5 months in prison.  Defendant appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in a split, 2-to-1, decision.  As a general rule, the government must obtain a search warrant based upon probable cause in order to conduct a search.  However, there are exceptions, such exceptions typically being based upon what is “reasonable” under the circumstances.  “Reasonableness” is determined “by balancing its intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”  (Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 654.) With these basic rules in mind, and in applying them to the impoundment and inventory searches of motor vehicles, the “Community Caretaking Doctrine” was born: 

“One ‘well-defined exception to the warrant requirement’ is the inventory search. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 . . . (1983); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 . . . (1987). This exception arises under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement for seizure of property. See United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2012). ‘Under the community caretaking exception, “police officers may impound vehicles that jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.”’ Id. at 1141 (quoting Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir.2005). . . . ‘[T]he reasonableness of the impoundment depend[s] on whether the impoundment fits within the authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience.’ Id. . . . ‘[I]mpoundment serves some “community caretaking:”’” purpose if a vehicle is ‘parked illegally, pose[s] a safety hazard, or [i]s vulnerable to vandalism or theft.’ Id. . . .  For example, a community caretaking purpose exists where a vehicle is blocking parking lot spaces ‘in a manner that could impede emergency services’ to a building and neither the driver nor any passenger is legally able to move it. See United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2016). Impoundment is also justified where a vehicle is parked in ‘the middle of the street,’ United States v. Johnson, 889 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2018), left in a public parking lot without anyone to retrieve it, see Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1025 (9th Cir. 2009); Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1477 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993), or totaled and lying in a ditch, see United States v. Garay, 938 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2019).”

In the instant case, defendant’s vehicle was left in a third party’s driveway with that third party asking for its removal.  The Court found that such a situation fits within the Community Caretaking Doctrine, allowing for the vehicle’s removal. The fact that defendant indicated that he had a friend who could be present and move his truck more quickly than a tow truck could was irrelevant.  On this issue, the Court held that “an officer ‘is not required to consider the existence of alternative less intrusive means when [a] vehicle must in fact be moved to avoid the creation of a hazard or the continued unlawful operation of the vehicle.’” (Miranda v. City of Cornelius, supra, at p. 865, fn. 6.)  Then, “(o)nce a vehicle has been legally impounded, the police may conduct an inventory search, as long as it conforms to the standard procedures of the local police department.”  (United States v. Cervantes, supra, at p. 1141.)  This is constitutionally allowed for a variety of reasons.  First, the “expectation of privacy” in a vehicle is significantly less than in one’s home or office.  Secondly, the government has a legitimate interest in the protection of the vehicle owner’s property while it remains in police custody.  A part of this factor is to protect the police themselves (as well as the tow company) from belated claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, as well as to protect the police (and again, the tow company) from potential danger from what could conceivably be in the impounded vehicle (e.g., explosives or hazardous materials).  Probable cause is not a necessary prerequisite of an inventory search.  For this reason, an inventory search cannot be used as a subterfuge for a criminal investigation.  Also, inventory searches do not allow for the “unfettered discretion” of an individual officer.  As such, it is required that inventory searches be conducted in accordance with an individual police agency’s policies (written or unwritten).  The San Bernardino Sheriff’s impound search policies are contained in their “Department Manual.”  The Court here found that Deputy Shuler’s inventory search of defendant’s truck was conducted in a manner consistent with the instructions contained his agency’s Department Manual despite having failed to list all the property found in the truck.  Such an oversight, however, was determined by the Court not to be fatal to a finding that the inventory search was lawful.  Per the U.S. Supreme Court:  “‘[R]easonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment,’ even if the police implementation of standardized inventorying procedure is ‘somewhat slipshod.’”  (Colorado v. Bertine, supra, at pp. 369, 374.)  Defendant also argued that the deputies conducted the search of his truck for a criminal purpose which, if true, would be illegal absent a finding of probable cause justifying the search.  Also if true, the search of defendant’s truck cannot be classified as an “inventory search.”  The Court held, however, that the fact that the deputies may have also hoped to find evidence of a criminal violation does not necessarily invalid an inventory search.  “When an inventory search would have occurred in the absence of a motive to search for evidence of a crime, ‘the mere presence of a criminal investigatory motive or dual motive—one valid, and one impermissible—does not render an [inventory] search invalid.’”  (United States v. Magdirila (9th Cir. 2020) 962 F.3rd 1152, 1157.)  California law authorizes impoundment of a vehicle where the driver does not have a valid driver’s license. (See Veh. Code § 14607.6.)  With this statutory authorization to impound defendant’s truck, and upon a finding that the community caretaking requirements were met, the Court ruled that the deputies followed all the rules for the impoundment of defendant’s truck and a valid inventory search no matter what the deputy’s subjective motivations might have been. As such, the search at issue here was held to be lawful.

There’s really nothing new in this case. But I briefed it anyway to highlight the rule that in order for officers to impound an arrestee’s vehicle, not only must there be a statute authorizing such an impoundment, but the elements of the Community Caretaking Doctrine must also be met.  I consistently get questions from officers in the field asking about this, wondering why a statute alone isn’t enough. The simple answer is that between a statute and a constitutional principle, the Constitution always takes precedence.  For instance, V.C. § 14607.6, used here as the deputies’ statutory authorization to impound defendant’s truck, is useless unless the requirements of the constitutionally based Community Caretaking Doctrine are also satisfied. Parking one’s vehicle in a third party’s driveway, per this decision (for the first time), constitutes a Community Caretaking authorization to remove that vehicle and then (so long as guided by the agency’s search procedures) conduct an inventory search of its contents.  The dissenting opinion, by the way, only asked that the case be remanded for a more thorough examination of the factual issue concerning whether the deputies searched defendant’s truck before or after the homeowner told them that he did not know defendant and that he wanted the truck removed.  If the deputies started an inventory search before knowing that defendant had no right to park in that driveway, then the search (with no probable cause to believe it contained something illegal and without the Community Caretaking theory to rely on) would have been illegal.  While the trial judge determined that he believed the deputies on this issue, this conclusion appeared to be based upon the absence of any factual evidence to the contrary. With some argument that the deputies simply did not have enough time to talk to the homeowner before initiating the search of defendant’s truck (there being only seven minutes from when Deputy Peterson first noticed defendant’s obscured license plate to when he called in the gun to dispatch), the dissenting justice wanted some more testimonial evidence on this potential issue.

Also see additional information in Professor Ray Hill's Bulletin on Community Caretaking Guidelines When Conducting Vehicle Inventory Searches March 3, 2023 LUPC Ref # CAB00200