• Illegally prolonging a traffic stop before the discovery of a person’s Fourth Amendment waiver conditions makes a subsequent fourth waiver search illegal. 
• Prolonged detentions 
• Mission of the traffic stop 
• Criminal investigations unrelated to the mission of the traffic stop 

Reasonable suspicion to believe a vehicle is not properly licensed is sufficient cause to stop the vehicle and investigate. The ensuing determination that the vehicle is, in fact, properly registered requires that once the mission of the traffic stop is completed, the driver must be allowed to leave. An intervening inquiry into other possible criminal conduct that prolongs the detention necessitates the suppression of any information or evidence discovered afterward. 

In May, 2021, defendant Anterion Dantelamar Suggs was driving with an acquaintance through Sacramento when a Sacramento Police Department officer observed that his car displayed a paper plate only, with no visible evidence that the car was properly registered or had permanent plates, in an apparent violation of Vehicle Code § 5200. The officer made a traffic stop, but upon walking up to the car, the officer immediately noticed the necessary documentation was attached to the rear window, although it was obscured by the window tinting.  

Despite this new information, the officer contacted Suggs anyway and asked him about the purchase of his vehicle. Suggs provided the officer with out-of-state purchase paperwork. After asking where they were headed (it’s unknown if there was a response), the officer then asked for identification from Suggs and his companion. Suggs asked in response whether “this (is) necessary?” After explaining that he was not able to see the car’s documentation through the tinted windows, the officer launched into a series of more probing questions such as whether there was anything “crazy in the car that [he] needed to know about,” whether they were on parole or probation, and whether they had been arrested previously.  

Suggs was cooperative in his responses. When the officer asked if he could search Suggs’ car. Suggs declined, saying he was “just trying to get on [his] way.” At this point, the officer took the subjects’ earlier obtained identifications to his patrol car and ran a radio check, resulting in the discovery that both subjects had suspended licenses and that the passenger was on searchable probation due to a firearms-related conviction. So, he returned to Suggs’ vehicle and conducted a probation “fourth waiver” search, finding a concealed firearm, ammunition and methamphetamine.  

Charged in state court with possession of a concealed firearm, possession of meth with the intent to sell and other related charges, Suggs’ motion to suppress was denied. He pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor gun charge and appealed his sentence of 90 days’ jail and one year of informal probation. 

The Third District Court of Appeals reversed. The issue on appeal was the legality of the search of Suggs’ car. Specifically, Suggs argued that once the officer noticed the proper documentation attached to his vehicle’s rear window and thus learned that the reason he had stopped defendant was invalid, any further detention was unlawful.  

While not totally agreeing with this argument, the court held that the contact should have been terminated and Suggs allowed to leave before the officer conducted the radio check resulting in the discovery of the passenger’s fourth waiver.  

The basic law is well settled: “A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation. The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop.” (Arizona v. Johnson?(2009) 555 U.S. 323, 333.) How long that “temporary seizure” is allowed to continue depends upon the circumstances. Determining how long that may be, the courts are to “examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” (United States v. Sharpe?(1985) 470 U.S. 675, 686.)   

The “tolerable duration [of the traffic stop] is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’ — to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop.” (Rodriguez v. United States?(2015) 575 U.S. 348, 354.) That “mission” is allowed to include “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” This typically involves checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” (Id.?at p. 355.) The Supreme Court has allowed this because it “serve(s) the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” (Ibid.) During this detention, it is okay to ask about other possible criminal wrongdoing, as was done in this case, but “not...in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” (Italics added; Ibid.)  

In other words, the initial detention during a lawful traffic stop must be limited to issues related to ensuring that the driver and the vehicle are properly licensed and registered, or anything else related to the “safe and responsible” operation of the motor vehicles. And while an officer may also ask about other possible “ordinary criminal wrongdoing” during a traffic stop, the duration of the traffic stop may not be prolonged for that purpose absent the officer having developed at the very least independent reasonable suspicion of such a criminal violation.  

As for the traffic stop itself, how long the officer may detain the driver depends upon the circumstances. In this case, the traffic stop itself was lawful. And even after the officer determined that he was mistaken as to whether there was a violation of the Vehicle Code, he was not required to simply walk away. Rather, he was permitted to approach the car and explain to defendant why he stopped him. It was also lawful for the officer to ask to see Suggs’ driver’s license and vehicle registration, and check their validity.  

Once the officer determined that there were no Vehicle Code violations, however, and the license to drive was produced along with the vehicle’s documentation, the contact should have been terminated and driver allowed to leave. While checking the status of the license is also allowed, the officer did not attempt to do that until after he prolonged the detention by making separate inquiries as to what other possible criminal violations. The court held that prolonging the detention for the purpose of making these inquiries was illegal. Because the officer held off conducting the radio check until this point, the discovery of the passenger’s fourth waiver status was also illegal, being the product of an unlawfully prolonged detention. The results of the car search, therefore, should have been suppressed. 

This case goes hand-in-hand with People v. Gyorgy (July 14, 2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, out of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which sets the same rules under different circumstances. Inquiries made during a traffic stop must be limited to what is commonly referred to as “the mission of the traffic stop,” as described in detail in Gyorgy. And while the law is clear that an officer is allowed to make inquiries into other possible criminal conduct (typically referred to by the courts as “ordinary criminal wrongdoing”), one can only make such inquiries so long as doing so does not prolong the time it would have taken to write the ticket and attend to other matters related to that traffic stop.  

But then if — and only if — such inquiries lead to at least a reasonable suspicion that other criminal conduct is taking place, can an officer justify prolonging the detention for the purpose of investigating that newly developed reasonable suspicion. In this case, had the officer merely asked for the identification of the driver and his passenger and gone straight back to his radio to check the status of Suggs’ driving privilege and warrants for either subject, discovery of the fourth waiver would have been lawful, as would the subsequent fourth waiver search of the car. (It is a separate issue, by the way, whether a mere passenger in a stopped motor vehicle is required to produce ID [see United States v. Landeros (9th Cir. 2019) 913 F.3rd 862)]; a whole ’nother issue, as they say.) 

But prolonging the detention by asking about other possible criminal activity first poisoned everything that happened after that. Live and learn. 

PUBLISHER NOTE:   Also see a related case by Robert Phillips published April 28, 2024:

More on Prolonged Detentions: Careful Not to Stray from the ‘Mission of the Traffic Stop’

This issue is related to another just-published article exploring Fourth Amendment Waiver searches. Diverting from the “mission of the traffic stop” to investigate other, unrelated potential criminal violations may convert an otherwise lawful traffic stop into an illegally prolonged detention.