• Searches of a vehicle on less than probable cause are illegal. 
• Once the reasonable suspicion of a group engaging in criminal activity dissipates via the arrest of one member of the group, all the other members must be released. 
• Probable Cause Searches of a Vehicle
• Vehicle Searches Conducted during an Unlawfully Prolonged Detention
• Prolonged Detentions and De Facto Arrests

The warrantless search of a person’s vehicle under the Automobile Exception requires that there be probable cause.  The recovery of a firearm from another person at the scene, with all those present being gang members, does not provide the necessary probable cause.  A continued detention of everyone at the scene of one subject’s arrest for possession of a firearm, where only one firearm is observed by witnesses prior to the contact, is illegal; any reasonable suspicion having dissipated upon the recovery of the one firearm. 

On July 5, 2023, a citizen reported to the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office that a group of men were in the apparent process of creating a music video in the parking lot of an apartment in Rancho Cordova.  One of the men was observed to be holding a handgun.  The caller described the man holding the gun as thin, approximately 16 to 17 years old, and wearing “all black clothing.” 

Deputies and detectives from the Sheriff’s gang suppression unit responded to the call, arriving at 8:12 p.m. That particular location was known by the gang detectives to be within territory claimed by the East Side Pirus criminal street gang.  One of the six men found to be at that location was defendant, who was a heavyset 300-pound man of approximately 30 years of age. Another subject, referred to as “D.M,” and who was a juvenile, was also there.  Defendant was wearing all black. D.M. was wearing a black jacket and blue jeans. Upon the officers’ arrival, the group of six individuals was instructed to put their hands in the air.  Everyone complied except for D.M. who immediately took off running. He was caught within two minutes and, upon being taken into custody, was found to be in possession of a pistol.  Another gun was later found in D.M.’s car. 

After arresting D.M., the other five men, including defendant, were all detained at the scene. By 8:22 p.m., an active investigation, involving “a lot of tasks and duties,” was underway. This included records checks for all members of the group, including checks of the “known persons file database,” which revealed that all were members of the East Side Pirus. Employees of the apartment complex from where the original call came were also interviewed.

During all this, defendant was patted down for weapons (none was found), handcuffed, and detained in the front seat of a patrol car.  When interviewed, it was learned that he had driven to the scene in a car that was parked about 20 feet away.  He twice declined the detectives’ request for permission to search the car.  This discussion with defendant ate up about 5 to 10 minutes.  Finally, believing that they had probable cause to search his car, it was searched, resulting in the recovery of a loaded magazine.  As a result, defendant’s person was "pats searched" more thoroughly.  This time a Glock handgun was found and he was arrested.  At this point, defendant had been detained for some 41 minutes. 

The Sacramento County District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging defendant with numerous gun- and gang-related offenses, along with a prior strike.  Upon the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, he filed for a pre-trial writ of mandate. 

The Third District Court of Appeal reversed.  Two issues were discussed in this appeal, both of which resulted in rulings in the defendant’s favor.   

(1)  Probable Cause to Search Defendant’s Car:  At defendant’s motion to suppress, one of the gang detectives testified that he believed he had probable cause to search defendant’s car because as a member of the gang suppression unit for several months, he had been involved in numerous investigations related to gang activity, the “vast majority” of which involved a gangster’s possession of firearms. Secondly, the detective noted defendant’s status as a validated member of the East Side Pirus, and that the location of the apartment complex where his detention took place was within gang territory. Third, the detective testified that he had personally watched over 100 gangster-produced music videos, such as these gangsters were reported to have been making in this case, and that in his experience, such videos—made for the purpose of posing “as a threat to rival gangs or to show the power and dominance of that gang”—commonly involve firearms or firearm-related accessories such as holsters, magazines, or ammunition.  Fourth, the detective was of the opinion that said gang members frequently hide firearms in their cars. Finally, the detective testified that he was familiar with defendant's criminal history.

Based upon all this, the People argued that the detectives had probable cause to search defendant’s car, and that as such, the so-called “automobile exception” allowed for such a search without a warrant.  The automobile exception does in fact allow for warrantless searches of a car, but only upon a finding that the searching officers had probable cause; an issue on which it is the People’s burden to prove.  The relevant law is well settled:  The automobile exception, when it does apply, applies as well to unoccupied parked cars, as was the situation in this case.  However, probable cause exists only when, under the totality of the circumstances, “there is a fair probability that contraband or?evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Illinois v. Gates?(1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238.)  In this case, the People failed to meet its burden to prove there was probable cause to believe defendant’s car contained any sizable evidence.  Noting that the evidence necessary to prove probable cause to arrest is sometimes different than what is needed to prove probable cause to search (See United States v. Rodgers?(9th Cir. 2011) 656 F.3rd 1023, 1028–1029. and?United States v. Rojas?(5th Cir. 1982) 671 F.2nd 159, 165.), the Court held here that just because there might have been probable cause to believe defendant possessed a firearm does not mean that there was also probable cause to believe he had one in his vehicle. 

In this case, defendant’s car was some 20 feet away, with no evidence that any of his fellow gangsters (let alone defendant himself) had approached the car or placed anything in it.  The fact that defendant admitted driving to the apartment complex in the car, the detective’s knowledge that gang members frequently hide firearms in cars, and the opinion that defendant “could have had time to hide a firearm in his car before detectives?arrived on scene,” was insufficient, per the Court, to establish probable cause to believe that defendant’s car contained a firearm. Also, “(t)hat (defendant) was standing within 20 feet of a parked car in a parking lot does not, without more, raise an inference that evidence of crime or contraband might be found inside the car.”  The Court further noted that while the detectives’ training and experience “may be considered in determining probable cause, they are no substitute for objective facts supporting an inference that evidence of crime may be found in a particular place.”  In total, the Court held that “viewing the record independently, and considering the totality of the circumstances,” what was known to the detectives at the time was insufficient to establish sufficient probable cause to believe defendant’s car contained evidence of a crime.  As such, the automobile exception did not apply. The search of defendant’s car was therefore illegal.  The gun having been found on defendant’s person, being the product of the illegal search of his car, should have been suppressed.   

(2) Prolonged Detention:  Defendant argued that the detectives detained him for an unreasonable length of time, converting what started as a lawful detention into an unlawfully prolonged detention, and thus a “de facto arrest.” The People countered with the argument that considering the fact that the deputies and detectives were “faced with an active investigation involving numerous suspects and witnesses, and detained (defendant) no longer than necessary to perform their ‘many necessary tasks,’” that the 41 minutes it took to develop probable cause was not unreasonable. 

Once again, the Court sided with defendant. Again, the basic rules are clear even if not easily applied:  A police officer “can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity?‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” (United States v. Sokolow (1980) 490 U.S. 1, 7.) However: “An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate its purpose.” (Florida v. Royer?(1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500.)  An investigative detention “exceeds constitutional bounds when extended beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances that made its initiation permissible.” (People v. Russell?(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 101.) 

Recognizing that there are no “hard-and-fast rules” that help distinguish between an investigative detention and a “de facto arrest” (commonly referred to as an “unlawfully prolonged detention”), the Court noted that “the facts of each case, with a focus on ‘whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to dispel or confirm their suspicious quickly, using the least intrusive means reasonably available under the circumstances,’” must be considered.  (People v. Celis?(2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 675.)  The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the detention was reasonable in scope and duration.?(People v. Pearl (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1288.)  Defendant conceded that at least initially, he was legally detained.  However, once D.M., who generally matched the description of the person observed by the apartment complex witnesses (thin, 16 to 17 years old, and wearing black, even though he was also wearing blue jeans), was arrested and found with a gun, defendant argued that the detectives no longer had any reason to suspect that he—who, although wearing all black, was much older (around 30 years old), weighed around 300 pounds, and thus did not match the witnesses’ description—might also be in possession of a gun.  Any continued detention of defendant after D.M.’s arrest, therefore, violated the Fourth Amendment. 

The Court agreed.  By 8:22, ten minutes into the contact, D.M. had been arrested, found in possession of a firearm, with a second firearm found in his car.  At that point, per the Court, there was no longer any reasonable suspicion supporting the detectives’ belief that defendant also might have a firearm; a fact confirmed by the patdown search of defendant’s person with negative results (even though it was later determined that the patdown had missed a weapon defendant was in fact carrying).  The Court ruled that at this point in time, the detectives had “completed their mission and the original justification for the investigative detention ‘completely dissipated.’”  Any further detention was not supported by a reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant (or any of the other four individuals with him) were engaged in criminal activity.  As such, detaining him beyond this point constituted a “de facto arrest,” violating the Fourth Amendment.  As such, even if the search of defendant’s car had been supported by probable cause (which it was not, per the above), it was conducted during an unlawful detention.  The magazine found in the car, and the gun found during the subsequent search of his person, should have been suppressed.