• Impounding vehicles due solely to outstanding unpaid parking citations is unconstitutional. 
• The Community Caretaking Doctrine and impounding lawfully parked vehicles Vehicle Code § 22651(i) and the warrantless impound of vehicles 
• A graduated forfeiture process and the impoundment of vehicles

The warrantless impoundment of a vehicle for unpaid parking citations violates the Fourth Amendment. The Community Caretaking Doctrine does not provide an exception to this rule absent evidence that the vehicle in question is parked illegally, blocking traffic or passage or stands at risk of theft or vandalism. 

The deterrent effect of towing vehicles with unpaid parking citations is insufficient to bring it within the scope of the community caretaking exception. Also, the towing of cars with outstanding unpaid parking citations is not justified as a graduated forfeiture process. 

Vehicle Code § 22651(i)(1) provides statutory authority for the towing and impoundment of any vehicle “found upon a highway or public land” whenever “it is known that the vehicle has been issued five or more notices of parking violations to which the owner or person in control of the vehicle has not responded within 21 calendar days” of issuance. 

Subdivision (i)(3) provides for a written “warning that repeated violations may result in the impounding of the vehicle” that is to accompany a notice of a parking violation, i.e., when the car is cited.   

Once a vehicle has been towed, local authorities may keep it in storage until the fines for the outstanding tickets are paid (V.C. § 22651(i)(1)(C)) or a “hearing examiner” rules that the person is not required to pay for the parking violations. (V.C. § 22651(i)(3)). During such a hearing, “the storing agency shall have the burden of establishing the authority for, and the validity of, the removal.” (V.C. § 22650(c))  

Absent a ruling from the hearing examiner in favor of the vehicle’s owner, “the vehicle may be sold...to satisfy” liens for towing and storage, and for the outstanding parking violations. (V.C. § 22851.1(a))  

The plaintiff/appellant in this lawsuit, the Coalition on Homelessness, sued to prevent the City and County of San Francisco (the defendant/respondent) from towing vehicles under the authority of the above statutes, absent San Francisco’s compliance with the rules as provided for under the Community Caretaking Doctrine. The trial court denied the plaintiff/appellant’s motion for a writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief. In other words, the lawsuit as filed by the Coalition on Homelessness was dismissed. The Coalition appealed. 

The First District Court of Appeal (Div. 5) reversed the trial court’s decision. 

The Community Caretaking Doctrine: The principal issue on appeal was whether the challenged warrantless tows, as authorized by V.C. § 22651(i), are permissible under the so-called “vehicular community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 

The respondent (the City and County of San Francisco) argued that their interest in deterring parking violations and nonpayment of parking fines justifies warrantless tows under the vehicular community caretaking exception. The appellant (the Coalition on Homelessness) countered with the argument that the towing of legally and safely parked motor vehicles — no matter how many outstanding unpaid parking citations existed — fails to satisfy the community caretaking requirements for towing and impounding the vehicles in issue, at least without first obtaining a warrant.   

The appellant alleged the warrantless tows — by failing to meet the community caretaking requirements — violated article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, and, by extension, the Fourth Amendment.   

The First District Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant. In the argument on appeal, the respondents conceded that city/county officials don’t seek a warrant prior to towing a vehicle under authority of V.C. § 22651(i)(1), and that such vehicles are towed without regard to whether they are legally or safely parked at the time of the tow and without regard to whether the vehicle was involved in any crime.   

The basic law on this issue is well settled. The Fourth Amendment (as well as Section 13 of Article I of the California Constitution) protects against unlawful seizures as well as searches.  “A property seizure (the type of action challenged in the present case) ‘occurs when “there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in [his or her] property.”’” (Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois?(1992) 506 U.S. 56, at p. 61.)  “The impoundment of an automobile is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”  (Miranda v. City of Cornelius?(9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3rd 858, 862.)  

It was therefore undisputed that the respondent’s practice of towing vehicles constitutes a “seizure.” As such, the general rule is that pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a warrant is required.  

An exception to the general rule, however, has been established under what has become known as the Community Caretaking Doctrine. First described by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski?(1973) 413 U.S. 433, the High Court allowed for the warrantless towing of vehicles under limited circumstances. This relaxed constitutional rule, when compared with one’s residence or office, is justified by the lessened expectation of privacy in a vehicle, resulting from the “pervasive governmental regulation” of vehicles capable of traveling on public highways.  

Also from Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, at pg. 441: “Local police officers,?unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community?caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” As a result, it is recognized that there is a diminished right to privacy in vehicles as compared to one’s home or business. (South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364.)  

As noted by the Supreme Court: “To permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some circumstances to preserve evidence, disabled or damaged vehicles will often be removed from the highways or streets at the behest of police engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control activities. Police will also frequently remove and impound automobiles which violate parking ordinances, and which thereby jeopardize both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.” (Id.?at pp. 368-369.) 

As a result of all this, the community caretaking theory allows for the towing of a vehicle only under limited specific circumstances; i.e., when a vehicle is parked illegally, is blocking traffic or passage, or stands at risk of theft or vandalism.  (People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853; People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775; People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756.)  

Contrary to the arguments made by the city/county, the fact that a vehicle has outstanding, unpaid traffic tickets does not fall into any of these categories. The community caretaking theory, therefore, cannot be constitutionally used to impound vehicles merely because its owner has failed to pay for his or her parking tickets despite the Legislature’s attempt to allow for such an impoundment by statute.   

And there is no other authority for the argument that outstanding parking tickets allows a warrantless tow?of a legally parked car. In so ruling, the High Court rejected the respondent’s arguments to the effect that towing cars that accrue numerous unpaid tickets will deter violations of parking laws and that tows to achieve such deterrence are within the scope of the caretaking exception.   

Not doubting that the threat of impoundment may encourage compliance with parking laws, the court could find no authority to the effect that such deterrence is a sufficient basis for a warrantless tow?of a legally parked car?under the vehicular community caretaker exception. The Court held instead that “the deterrence rationale is incompatible with the principles of the community caretaking doctrine.”  

On the other side of this coin, the Court noted that “vehicle tows are a significant intrusion on property rights that may seriously impact the lives of the owners.” “The private interest in the uninterrupted use of an automobile is substantial. A person's ability to make a living and his access to both the necessities and amenities of life may depend upon the availability of an automobile when needed.”  (Stypmann v. City & County. of San Francisco?(9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2nd 1338, 1342-1343.) Per the Court: “The Fourth Amendment warrant requirement protects those property interests.” Attempting to bypass this constitutional principle under the guise of some unpaid parking citations cannot be justified.”   

A Graduated Forfeiture Process 

Also, the Court rejected the respondent’s argument that the towing of vehicles for unpaid parking citations is lawful under “a sort of graduated forfeiture process...which both deters drivers from committing traffic and parking infractions in the first instances and induces delinquents to pay penalties once incurred.”   

The respondent’s argument on this theory was based upon a single case out of the federal Washington D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal, Tate v. D.C.?(D.C. Cir. 2010) 627 F.3rd 904.  Under Tate; “[t]he District’s practice of auctioning a vehicle when tickets go unpaid is the culmination of a sort of graduated forfeiture process...which both deters drivers from committing traffic and parking infractions in the first instance and induces delinquents to pay penalties once incurred.”  (Id., at p. 909) The Tate court concluded: “Like other?forfeiture statutes, the District’s booting and towing provisions can be effected by the warrantless seizure of a vehicle subject to impoundment thereunder.” (Id., at p. 911.) The court here rejected Tate’s reasoning, finding that the Tate court based its decision upon a misinterpretation and unjustified extension of a U.S. Supreme Court decision involving the warrantless impoundment of a vehicle that was determined by the High Court, under the circumstances, to be contraband itself.  (See Florida v. White?(1999) 526 U.S. 559, “The police had probable cause to believe the vehicle was contraband subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act because they had observed it being used to deliver cocaine on three occasions.” (Pg. 561.) 

Conclusion 

Finding no other authority for forfeiting a vehicle merely due to unpaid parking citations, the court here held that there was no legal justification for impounding the appellants’ vehicles.  The trial court’s judgment was therefore reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 

I briefed this case because it provides an opportunity to emphasize three important legal concepts upon which I occasionally get challenged.   

(1) The Community Caretaking Doctrine allows for the impoundment of vehicles only under limited circumstances, despite much broader statutory authority for such an impoundment. I still get officers arguing with me that because a California statute provides for the towing of a vehicle (such as Vehicle Code § 22651(i), as discussed in this case), such an impounded is lawful.  However, as noted so graphically above, it is a hard-and-fast rule that a state statute does not take precedence over a constitutional principle. The community caretaking theory provides a judicially recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment seizure rules. Absent the applicability of an exception in your case, the constitutional principles (such as the Fourth Amendment) take precedence over a state statute. Period. No exceptions. 

(2) As discussed above, community caretaking only applies when the impoundment of a vehicle is parked illegally, blocking traffic or passage, or stands at risk of theft or vandalism.  Impounding a vehicle merely because the driver and/or other occupants were arrested is illegal absent one or more of the above limited circumstances, or where some other legal theory applies (e.g., where the vehicle itself is evidence of a crime.)   

(3)  Lastly, note that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Community Caretaking Doctrine applies to vehicles only, and not to residences or businesses. (Caniglia v. Strom (May 17, 2021) __ U.S. __ [141 S.Ct. 1596; 209 L.Ed.2nd 604].) The California Supreme Court ruled similarly even before Caniglia. (See People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034.)  

As noted by the Court here, “there is no recognized exception to the warrant requirement?for community caretaking?outside the vehicular context.”  “Based on those recent and authoritative pronouncements, it would be inaccurate?to state there is a recognized ‘community caretaking’ exception to the (Fourth Amendment) warrant requirement. Instead, there is only a recognized?vehicular?community caretaking exception.”  

Conclusion 

Despite all this, I still get arguments from various law enforcement officers that they routinely impound vehicles any time the driver is arrested, no matter what the circumstances, and that their department allows (or even encourages) them to do so.  (E.g., see Veh. Code § 22651(h)(1))   

All I can say is that in the circumstances often described to me by such officers, they likely were not criticized only because no one up the chain was even thinking about the community caretaking rules, it never became an issue in a court proceeding (e.g., no evidence was found that was subject to suppression or no case was ever filed), or no one has yet sued them. But violate these rules long enough and your day will come.