Booking Questions

Miranda, Juveniles, and Questions Re: Age and Birthdate

A minor’s responses to booking questions relative to the minor’s age and date of birth are admissible in evidence despite the lack of a preceding Miranda admonishment and waiver, and even when relevant to the elements of a pending criminal charge.

On November 15, 2019, sixteen-year-old defendant J.W. was observed by Los Angeles Police Department officers walking down the street, carrying a backpack.  Defendant made eye contact with the officers and, as if to say; “Hey, look at me; I’m doing something illegal,” panicked and took off running.  The officers gave chase.  Not knowing that case law says that “fight alone is insufficient to justify a detention” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224.), but that items discarded while in flight are admissible in evidence as “abandoned property” (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1540.), defendant tossed his backpack as he ran.  After catching defendant attempting to hide in a laundromat, the officers retrieved the backpack. The backpack was found to contain a loaded semi-automatic handgun with one round in the chamber. As defendant was being handcuffed, he spontaneously told the officers that he was carrying the gun for protection.  Taken to the police station, and while being booked (but before being Mirandized), defendant was asked for his age and date of birth, which he willingly provided. With a petition being filed in the Juvenile Court alleging a violation of Pen. Code § 29610 (minor in possession of a firearm), the officer was allowed (over defendant’s objection) to testify to defendant’s age and date-of-birth responses obtained during booking.  The petition was sustained and defendant was placed at home on probation.  Defendant appealed.

The Second District Court of Appeal (Div. 2) affirmed.  Defendant’s argument on appeal was that his booking responses relative to his age and birthdate should have been suppressed, having been made in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, and that without this evidence, the Juvenile Court magistrate’s true finding cannot stand.  The Court of Appeal recognized that defendant’s status as a minor is certainly an element of the offense of being a minor in possession of a firearm, per Pen. Code § 29610.  The validity of the Juvenile Court’s order sustaining the allegations against defendant, therefore, does in fact turn on whether Miranda bars admission of the statements he made during booking about his age and birthdate.  The basic rules are well established.  Miranda precludes the use in evidence of any incriminating statements made while the suspect is in custody and subjected to an interrogation by a law enforcement officer.  Miranda’s protections apply to juveniles as well as adults.  Defendant here—a minor—was certainly in custody, and his statements relative to his age and birthdate were in fact made in response to a law enforcement officer’s questions.  However, not all questioning is to be classified as an interrogation.  When such questioning by law enforcement is, and when it is not, to be classified as an “interrogation,” as this term is legally defined, depends upon the circumstances.  To be subjected to an interrogation necessarily involves either (1) “express questioning,” or (2) “any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”  (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301.)  A recognized exception to the above involves what is sometimes referred to as “booking questions.”  Per the U.S. Supreme Court, a suspect's answers to express questions during the booking process regarding his or her “name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age” (italics in original) are not barred by Miranda, even though not preceded by the standard Miranda warnings.  (Pennsylvania. v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582, 586, 601.)  In this particular case (i.e. involving J.W), the Court had to wrestle with whether “the routine booking question exception to Miranda still appl(ies) when the questions posed—here, (defendant’s) date of birth and current age—fall squarely within Muniz’s core definition of ‘booking questions’ but, on the facts of the specific case, are nevertheless ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’”  Noting that there is a difference of opinion (i.e., a “split of authority”) between the California Supreme Court (see People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523.) and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal (see United States v. Henley (9th Cir. 1993) 984 F.2nd 1040.), the Court sided with the former.  Elizalde involved prison officials asking in-coming gangster inmates for their gang affiliation for purposes of determining where to house them, hoping to avoid gang-related issues within the prison.  The gangster’s response was often relevant and incriminating in his later prosecution in any gang case.  Gang affiliation is not one of the the seven categories of “basic identifying biographical data” as set forth in Muniz, and is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating answer.  For this reason, a gangster’s response to a gang affiliation question was held in Elizalde to constitute an exception to the “booking questions” exception as described in Muniz, and (absent a preceding Miranda admonishment and waiver) inadmissible in evidence.  The Court in Elizalde, however, went on to hold that any of the seven Muniz-established categories do in fact fall within booking questions exception, making a defendant’s responses to such questions admissible in evidence against him despite the lack of a Miranda admonishment and waiver.  The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Henley expressed a different point of view, holding that any and all questions asked during the booking process—even if those questions seek one or more of the seven categories of “basic identifying biographical data” enumerated in Muniz—are subject to exclusion under Miranda in any circumstance where “a police officer has reason to know that [the] suspect’s answer may incriminate him.” The Court here (in In re J.W.) decided to follow Elizalde for three reasons.  First, California Supreme Court cases take precedence over Ninth Circuit cases when being reviewed by lower California courts.  (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2nd 450, 455–456.)  Secondly, the Court agreed with Elizalde‘s implicit conclusion that its approach is more consistent with the holding in the Muniz decision itself.  And lastly, but perhaps most importantly, the Court found Elizalde to be more consistent with the rationale underlying Miranda; i.e., “creating prophylactic protections safeguarding a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination from the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of (a) custodial interrogation.” Under this rationale, for instance, “the Supreme Court has declined to apply Miranda in situations that ‘do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda’ because ‘the coercive atmosphere’ of (a) custodial interrogation ‘is lacking.’” (Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 296.)  Also, Miranda has been found to be inapplicable “in situations in which competing concerns ‘outweigh the need for’ Miranda's ‘prophylactic rule’ and the time consuming ‘on-the-scene balancing process’ it entails.”  (New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, 657–658.)   The responses to such booking questions as occurred here are only likely to be usable later in evidence in unusual circumstances; i.e., more “likely to be . . .  insignificant in the scheme of things.” Such booking questions also are not administered under circumstances where there exist “inherently compelling pressures” that might “compel (a suspect) to speak” when he or she might not otherwise have done so.  On the other side of the coin, it is critical for law enforcement to know who it is admitting into custody in that statutes require law enforcement to treat juveniles different than adults.  This responsibility is, of course, hindered when an arrestee’s age cannot be determined.  The bottom line to all this is that the Court here found the Muniz-established “booking questions” exception to the rule of Miranda to apply whenever a juvenile, during booking, is asked for his age and birthdate despite the fact that his answers may at some point be relevant to a prosecution on the pending charges.  For these reasons, the Court held that the Juvenile Court magistrate did not err in admitting the officer’s testimony regarding defendant’s answers to the booking questions about his age and date of birth.  With this evidence as part of the record, there was sufficient evidence to support the Juvenile Court’s adjudication.

Arguably, this same theory applies to adult cases as well, despite the fact that the important governmental interest of being able to determine that the person in custody is a minor does not exist.  So until we get a case that says otherwise, I think we have to assume (at least in state court) that a suspect’s responses to booking questions that fall into any of the seven Muniz-established categories (i.e., “name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age”) come within booking questions exception and are therefore admissible in a later criminal case, even if directly relevant to an element of the charged offense.  And then hopefully, the United States Supreme Court will someday tell us whether California (People v. Elizalde) or the Ninth Circuit (United States v. Henley, and other cases cited in the opinion) are correct.  Given the Ninth Circuit’s dismal track record of appeals heard by the United States Supreme Court, I like our chances.