Miranda Violations and Civil Liability
When an incriminating statement obtained during a custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda is used against a defendant in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the defendant’s constitutional Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is violated. Such a violation, even if not involving coercive interrogation techniques, may serve as a basis for a federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil suit for which the offending officer is responsible.
Plaintiff Terence Tekoh worked at a Los Angeles medical center, his job being to move patients between their hospital rooms and the MRI section. On one such occasion, he was accused by a female patient of having lifted her cover sheets and touching her vaginal area. Hospital staff reported the allegation to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. Deputy Carlos Vega responded to investigate. In contacting plaintiff, Deputy Vega asked if there was somewhere private that they could talk. It was suggested that they use the MRI “reading room;” a small, windowless, and soundproof room used by doctors to read MRIs. They were later joined by Deputy Vega’s supervisor, Sgt. Strangeland. What happened in that room before Sgt. Strangelove’s arrival became the point of contention. Per Deputy Vega, plaintiff immediately admitted that he had “made a mistake.” Asked to write on paper what had occurred, plaintiff put in writing what he himself referred to as an “honest and regrettable apology,” admitting in a brief account to “spreading (the patient’s) vagina lip for a quick view.” Sgt. Strangeland arrived afterwards, somewhat corroborating Deputy Vega’s account when he later testified that by the time he got there, plaintiff’s “demeanor (appeared to be) ‘that of a man who was contrite, who truly . . . regretted what he had done.’” Plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed that he continually denied touching the patient, but wrote out his mini-confession only after having been threatened by Deputy Vega. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that Deputy Vega refused to allow a third person to accompany them into the MRI room, would not let him leave the room once they were in there, ignored his request for an attorney, falsely claimed that the assault had been captured on video, used racial slurs, and threatened him with deportation, all triggering flashbacks to his experiences with police brutality in Cameroon where he was from. According to plaintiff, Deputy Vega put a pen and paper in front of him, telling him to “write what the patient said [he] did.” When plaintiff hesitated, Deputy Vega put his hand on his gun and said he was not joking. According to plaintiff, Deputy Vega then dictated the contents of the written confession. Plaintiff testified that he was so scared that he was “ready to write whatever [Vega] wanted,” acquiescing to writing the statement as dictated to him. Both parties agreed, however, that plaintiff was never read his Miranda rights. Arrested and charged in state court with unlawful sexual penetration, per P.C. § 289(d), plaintiff’s confession was admitted into evidence at trial. With a mistrial being declared mid-trial (due to evidence being used that had not previously been disclosed to the defense; i.e., a Brady v. Maryland violation), defendant was retried, and acquitted. (It is unknown why. It’s tough to lose a trial with a full written confession. It can only be assumed that the jury disbelieved both the victim and Deputy Vega, while discounting the veracity of Tekoh’s alleged confession.) After his acquittal on the criminal charge, plaintiff filed this civil action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for allegedly violating his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The main issues at trial were (1) whether or not plaintiff’s constitutional rights had been violated by Deputy Vega’s failure to Mirandize him, and (2) whether to constitute a violation, the confession had to have been obtained by coercion, with a Miranda violation but being one factor to consider on this issue. The trial court judge granted a retrial after admittedly mis-instructing the jury in the first trial. In the second trial, the district court judge instructed the jury that in determining whether plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment rights had been violated, they were to consider the “objective totality of all the surrounding circumstances (in determining) (w)hether a confession (was) improperly coerced or compelled . . . .”, followed by a non-exclusive list of the circumstances that may be considered. The jury returned a verdict for the civil defendants (i.e., Deputy Vega and the County of Los Angeles.). Plaintiff appealed.