• Prolonged Traffic Stops
• Mission of a Traffic Stop
• Officers’ Safety During a Traffic Stop

It is not a Fourth Amendment violation to ask about a driver’s parole status during a traffic stop in that to so is a negligibly burdensome measure that is reasonably related to officer safety.  Conducting the mission of a traffic stop includes asking questions related to the officer’s safety, such as whether the person contacted is a convicted felon and whether he has any weapons with him.

In July, 2020, Officers Dorin Buchanan and Patrick Marshall observed defendant Victor Ramirez speeding in a residential neighborhood, failing to stop at a stop sign, and not using his turn signal upon making a turn.  The officers recognized defendant as a gang member even before stopping him. Due to the observed traffic infractions, the officers made a traffic stop.  Officer Buchanan approached defendant and immediately initiated the verbal contact with: “What’s up my man? You on probation or parole?” Defendant responded that he was on parole.  When asked, “For what?”, defendant told the officer that it was, “For a firearm.”  Officer Buchanan followed up with a few more questions such as when it was he had last checked in with his parole officer, where he lived, whose car he was driving, and what he was doing in the area.

During this exchange, Officer Buchanan could see that defendant had several gang-related tattoos. Based on the tattoos, Officer Buchanan knew that defendant was in an area claimed by rival gang members. Officer Buchanan later testified that it would be “uncommon” for a rival gang?member to be in the area “without a firearm.”  Intending to conduct a parole search, Officer Buchanan instructed defendant to turn off the car.  He then asked whether he had a driver’s license while telling him not to attempt to reach for it.  Defendant told the officer that he did in fact have a license, although he didn’t have it with him at the time.

Being cautious, Officer Buchanan told defendant to put his right hand on the back of his head and unbuckle his safety belt with his left hand. Officer Buchanan asked defendant if he had a gun (referred to as a “strap”). Defendant admitted that he did, and that it was in the glove compartment.  Upon removing defendant from his car, a loaded 9mm semiautomatic pistol was recovered from the glove compartment.  Upon confirming via the police computer system in the patrol car that defendant was in fact on parole, he was arrested.  Indicted by a federal grand jury for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm), defendant’s motion to suppress the gun was denied by the trial court.  Defendant therefore pled guilty and was sentenced to 63 months (five years, three months) in prison.  He subsequently appealed. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed (remanding the case solely for the purpose of correcting some errors in the written judgment). 

On appeal, defendant conceded that the traffic stop was lawful.  His argument, however, was that because Officer Buchanan initiated the traffic stop with questions related to his parole status and other related issues instead of immediately attending to the purpose of the stop (i.e., to write him a citation), the stop was “unlawfully prolonged,” and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Indeed, it is a rule that upon initiating a traffic stop, officers are required to attend to what has become known as the “mission of the stop.”  To do anything else beyond the mission of the traffic stop is, as a general rule, an unlawful prolonging of the stop and a violation of the Fourth Amendment. “(A) traffic stop ‘exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.’” (Rodriquez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 350, 354.) However, the Supreme Court has also recognized that “[t]raffic stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers.” As such, “an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely.”  (Rodriguez v. United States, supra, at 356.)  For this reason, it has been held that in addition to the writing a ticket, officers may also lawfully check the driver’s license, determine whether there are any outstanding warrants, inspect the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance, and (as is relevant in this case) “attend to related safety concerns.” Those safety concerns include conducting a criminal history check to determine whether the driver is a felon and asking about the presence of any weapons in the car.  In assessing potential risks involved?in a traffic stop, it is useful for a police officer to know if the person is on parole because even though not all parolees are violent, a parolee has at the very least committed a crime serious enough to have merited prison time.

Given the potential danger to an officer in contacting a convicted felon, the Fourth Amendment allows the officer to ask the driver if he is a felon in that such a question is considered to be a “negligibly burdensome measure.” (Two inquiries were mentioned here that are beyond the mission of a traffic stop, and thus an illegal prolonging of the stop: (1) Doing an “ex-felon registration check” [a computer check to ensure that a felon is properly registered under state law], and (2) demanding identification from a passenger. Per the Court, neither is necessary to “advance officer safety.”)  Another action an officer may take to insure his or her safety is order the driver of a vehicle (and/or passenger) to exit the vehicle during a traffic stop, in that doing so may make it easier for the officer watch and keep control of the suspect.  (Pennsylvania v. Mimms 1977) 434 U.S. 106, 110. See also People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 670.) In this case, Officer Buchanon merely asked defendant if he was on parole (and thus a felon).  After defendant admitted to being on parole, the officer asked about the presence of any weapons. Both inquiries, being directly related to the officers’ safety, were lawful and thus did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop.  As such, defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.  The trial court therefore correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.  

The Court doesn’t specifically say it, but what it hints at very strongly is the fact that once defendant admitted to being a parolee, the Officer Buchannan thereafter had the right to extend the mission of the traffic stop long enough to conduct a warrantless parole search.  Upon determining that there was a gun in the car—an item that as a parolee he was forbidden to possess—the officers had the legal right to arrest him, making any further delays in the traffic stop a moot issue. So defendant’s goose was cooked, so to speak, as soon as the gun was found and it was confirmed via the police radio that he was indeed a convicted felon. Absent these (or similar officer-safety) circumstances, law enforcement officers making traffic stops need to know that they must move forward with completing the mission of the traffic stop, as described above, without wandering off onto side issues that have nothing to do with the reasons for the stop and which prolong the detention.  To do so constitutes an “unlawfully prolonged detention,” and will result in any criminal evidence later discovered being suppressed.