The automobile exception to the search warrant requirement: Warrantless searches of vehicles under the automobile exception require that there be probable cause to search those areas of the vehicle searched.   

Searches of Vehicles; The Automobile Exception; Probable Cause and the Scope of an Automobile Search  

The automobile exception to the search warrant requirement allows for a warrantless search of a vehicle anywhere in that vehicle for which there is probable cause to believe seizeable items are located.  

On April 1, 2021, detectives from the Stockton Police Department were surveilling a gang funeral expecting criminal street gang members connected to prior shootings to be in attendance. The detectives were in plain clothes and in unmarked police vehicles. One detective recognized a particular juvenile based on photographs he had seen and prior conversations he had had with other detectives after a recent shooting at the juvenile’s home. He was aware that the juvenile was on searchable probation with a firearm restriction. In his observations of this juvenile, the detective believed that he was carrying a firearm.   

This conclusion was based upon the detective’s observation of an unidentifiable object protruding from the juvenile’s right front waistband as the juvenile held onto that area as he walked. The juvenile also walked as if he was trying to prevent the object in his waistband from causing his pants to fall.   

Another detective on the surveillance team confirmed via radio broadcast that he was able to clearly see a black handgun in the juvenile’s waistband. This juvenile was further observed contacting another minor, later identified as the defendant, Hilario Leal, Jr., and a woman. The three of them walked over to Leal’s car.   

Although the juvenile walked toward the car’s closed trunk at one point, at no time was the trunk observed to be open. The juvenile then walked back to the gravesite as Leal and the woman drove away. It appeared that by the way the juvenile was holding his waistband that he was still carrying the firearm. Leal was soon observed driving back to the gravesite as the juvenile approached his car a second time.   

This time, the juvenile, still holding his waistband, walked toward the car’s trunk. Although the detective’s view “was kind of obstructed for 10 to 15 seconds,” the trunk was never actually observed to be opened. The juvenile then walked to the rear driver’s side door, still with his hand on his waistband. He opened the door and sat in the rear seat while “appearing stiff in the waistband area unlike a “normal person would sit down.”   

He was then observed bending at the waist and laying down on the seat. He then reached toward his waistband while turning toward the back side of the front seat, away from the detective, and moving his hand toward his chest. The juvenile then got out of the car, no longer appearing to be stiff.   

These observations, in conjunction with the fact that the juvenile was observed adjusting his pants and walking away from Leal’s car without holding his waistband, led the detective to believe that the juvenile had just placed the firearm underneath the front passenger seat in Leal’s car. The detective broadcast these observations over the radio.   

As Leal drove away from the area, the detective requested via his radio that officers follow Leal until an enforcement stop could be made by a marked patrol car. Leal was followed to a barbershop, where he went inside. A uniformed officer in a marked patrol car followed Leal to the barbershop and detained him when he came out.   

When told by the officer that he was going to search his car, Leal “became nervous,” and told the officer that he did not want his car searched. The officer proceeded to search his car anyway. However, no firearm was found under the driver’s seat or anywhere else in the passenger compartment.   

So, the officer extended his search to the vehicle’s trunk where he found a loaded Glock handgun. Leal was charged in state court with various gun-related offenses and his motion to suppress the firearm was denied. He pleaded no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Sentenced to one year in county jail, suspended, with a year of informal probation, Leal appealed.  

The Third District Court of Appeal reversed. The issue on appeal, not surprisingly, was the legality of the warrantless search of Leal’s car. The basic rules are well settled: The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The general rule is that warrantless searches are unreasonable.   

However, there are several well recognized exceptions. The exception advanced by the People in this case is commonly referred to as the “automobile exception.” “The automobile exception provides that ‘police who have probable cause to believe a lawfully stopped vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity or contraband may conduct a warrantless search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.’” (People v. McGee?(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 796, 801.)  

But this well-recognized exception does not necessarily allow for a search of the entire car. It depends upon the circumstances. “The scope of a warrantless search is ‘defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.’” (United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 789, 824.)  

Probable cause exists “where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” (Ornelas v. United States?(1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696.)  

Leal argued that under the unique circumstances of this case, while there may have been probable cause to believe that there was a gun hidden under the back side of the front seat, the same cannot be said for the trunk. The court agreed.  

In reviewing the cases where the automobile exception applied, the court found warrantless searches of trunks and other enclosed compartments in a vehicle were justified in three categories of circumstances:  

(1) Officers have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime will be found specifically in the trunk or other enclosed compartment;  

(2) A search of the passenger compartment reveals contraband or other evidence generating further probable cause to search the trunk or other enclosed compartment;  

(3) probable cause exists as to the entire car (i.e., that the contraband or?evidence of a crime will be found somewhere in the car).  

The search of the trunk here does not fit within any of these categories. Specifically, the court held that “when an officer has probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime will be found specifically in the passenger compartment of a vehicle (as compared to having probable cause to believe it will be found somewhere in the vehicle), and no other subsequent discovery or information provides further probable cause to believe the evidence will be found in the trunk, an officer’s search of the trunk exceeds the permissible scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception.” 

The officer in this case was acting upon information relayed to him from the detective. That information included the detective’s observations of a person (referred to above as “the juvenile”) carrying around what appeared to be a firearm. The juvenile was observed (as described in detail above) entering the back seat area of defendant’s vehicle and bending down as if placing the firearm under the rear portion of the front seat.  

Subsequent observations of the juvenile supported this conclusion when it reasonably appeared that the juvenile no longer had possession of the firearm after exiting defendant’s car. At no time did it ever appear that the juvenile had access to the trunk of that car.  

So, while probable cause clearly existed to support the officers’ suspicions that the juvenile had hidden a firearm in the passenger area of Leal’s car, extending the search to the vehicle’s trunk exceeded the scope of the search as allowed by the automobile exception.  

While there was probable cause to believe the juvenile had stashed a firearm in the area behind the driver’s seat, there was no probable cause to believe that he could have put it in the trunk instead. As such, searching the trunk violated the Fourth Amendment.  

In so ruling, the court rejected the People’s argument that because the detective’s view of the trunk had been obscured for some 10 to 15 seconds while the juvenile and several other of his companions stood nearby, that it was reasonable to assume that the gun may have been placed in there during that time.  

This argument ignores the simple fact that there was no evidence to support the argument that this was in fact what happened. What “may” have happened, with no evidence to support that conclusion, does not establish probable cause.  

The court further rejected the People’s argument that because it is possible to gain access to the trunk of this model of automobile by unlocking and lowering the back of the back seat, the officers should have been able to search the trunk as well. As pointed out by the court, there was again no evidence to support the argument that the back seat was lowered or even unlocked.  

The People further argued that defendant’s nervousness and objection to having his car searched accounted for something. The court rejected this argument out of hand, noting that nervousness about the search certainly did not, in and of itself, establish probable cause to search the trunk. (People v. Moore?(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 291, 302.) It also goes without saying that a citizen has a right to object to officers conducting a warrantless search of his vehicle.  

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the court rejected the People’s argument that because there was probable cause to believe a firearm would be found somewhere in the car, the whole car, including its trunk, was subject to a warrantless search. To the contrary, “the United States Supreme Court ‘made a distinction between probable cause to believe that [contraband is] in a particular section of the car, and probable cause to believe that [contraband is] generally within the car.’” (United States v. Seals?(5th Cir. 1993) 987 F.2nd 1102, 1107, fn. 8; citing and discussing (United States v. Ross, supra; and California v. Acevedo (1991) 500 U.S. 565.)  

Ross and Acevedo tell us that when the existing probable cause is limited to a specific area of the car, only that area may be searched under the automobile exception. It does not extend to the entire vehicle.  

Under the facts of this case, the officers’ probable cause was limited to a specific area within the passenger seating compartment. There was no probable cause supporting the argument that that area should be extended to the trunk.